

VISISTADVAITIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND DOCTRINE OF MATTER

Dr. N.S. Anantha Rangacharya



VISISTADVAITIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND DOCTRINE OF MATTER

Dr. N.S. Anantha Rangacharya

VISISTADVAITIC EPISTEMOLOGY

AND

DOCTRINE OF MATTER



Vedanta Vidwan, Desika Darsana Choodamani
Satsampradaya Bhushanam, Vedanta Vidya Vageesha
Vedanta Bhushana

Dr. N.S. Anantha Rangacharya

BANGALORE

"Visi¹Advaitic Epistemology and Doctrine of Matter" -
by Vedanta Vidwan Dr. N.S. Anantha Rangachar, # 780,
V Main Road, Vijayanagar, Bangalore - 560 040
Phone : 23383755

© author

First Edition : 2006

Price : Rs. 100/-

Printed by
Sri Rama Printers
25, 15th Cross
5th Main, Srinidhi Layout
Bangalore - 560 062

DEDICATION

This monograph is dedicated with all humility
and profound respect at the holy feet of
His Holiness Srimath Paramahansa
Parivrajakacharya
Sri Sri Gopala Desika Maha Desikar
of Sri Poundarikapuram Andavan Ashramam
Srirangam

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication	iii
Table of Contents	v
Abbreviations	vii
Author's Submission	ix
1. Theory of Knowledge	1
2. Perception	27
3. Inference	44
4. Sabda Pramana	62
5. Verbal Knowledge	66
5. Doctrine of Matter	85
6. Kaala (Time)	132

Abbreviations

ॠ. व.	Rigveda Samhita
य.आ.	Yajur Aranyaka
ईशा.	Isavasyopanishad
कठ.उ.	Kathopanishad
तै.उ.	Taittiriya Upanishad
मुं.उ.	Mundakopanishad
प्र.उ.	Prasnopanishad
छां.उ.	Chandogya Upanishad
बृ.उ.	Brihadaranyakopanishad
म.ना.उ.	Mahanarayana Upanishad
श्वे.उ.	Svetasvatropanishad
रा.	Valmiki Ramayana
भाग.	Bhagavatam
भ.गी. - B.G.	Bhagavadgita
वि.पु.	Vishnupurana
अ.सं.	Ahimbudhny Samhita
सि.त्र. S.T.	Siddhitrayam
गी.सं.	Gitartha Samgraham
स्तो.	Stotraratnam
श्री.भा. - S.B.	Sribhashyam
वे.दी.	Vedanta Deepa
वे.सा.	Vedanta Sara
गी.भा. - G.B.	Ramanuja Gira Bhashyam
वे.सं	Vedartha Samgraha
श.ग.	Sharanagati Gadyam
वै.ग.	Vaikunta Gadyam

न्या.सि. - N.S.	Nyayasiddhanjanam
न्या.परि. - N.P.	Nyayaparishuddhi
त.मु.क. - T.M.K.	Tattva Mukta Kalapa
त.टी.	Tattva Teeka
ता.चं	Tatparya Chandrika
अ.सा. - A.S.	Adhikarana Saravali
ग.भा.	Gadya Bhashyam - Desika
दया.	Daya Shatakam
अ.श.	Achyuta Shatakam
व.पं.	Varadaraja Panchasat
स.सि.- S.S.	Sarvartha Siddhi
गी.सं.र.	Gitartha Samgraha Raksha
श्रु.प्र.	Sruta Prakasika
य.म.दी. - Y.M.D.	Yatindramata Deepika
दर्श	Darsanodaya
गौ.न्या.सू.	Gautama Nyayasutra
सां.का.	Samkhya Karika
र.त्र.सा. - R.T.S.	Rahasya Traya Sara
L.T.	Lakshmi Tantra
न्या.ति.	Nyasa Tilaka
शां.सू.	Shandilya Sutra
ना.सू.	Narada Sutra
मो.ध.	Moksha Dharma
पू.मी.सू.	Purva Mimamsa Sutram
न्या.वि.	Nyasa Vimsati
या.स्मृ.	Yajnyavalkya Smrithi
न्या.वि.व्या.	Nyasa Vimsathi Vyakhyana

Author's Submission

I am glad to present his monograph on Visistadvaitic epistemology and the doctrine of matter according to Visistadvaita. This is a companion volume to the work on "The Philosophy of Sadhana in Visistadvaita", released earlier. It is hoped that one can get a complete picture of the pramana and prameya of this school as expounded by the celebrated masters.

This study is based on the eminent works "Nyayasiddhanjana", "Nyaya parisuddhi" and "Tattvamukta Kalapa" of Sri Vedanta Desika. The most significant features of Pramana and Prameya are pointed out here. The publication of this volume was made possible on account of the financial support given by my son Chi. Raghu. I am assisted in the proof correction by Chi. A. Narasimhan and Sri Rama Prasad. Sri Rama Printers have executed the work of printing nicely. May the all merciful Acharyas bless all of them with all good.

I hope that this monograph will be warmly received by all Sahridayas.

This book is dedicated with all humility to His Holiness Paravakkottai Andavan, Sri Sri Gopala desika Mahadesikan of the Poundarikapuram Andavan Ashraman, Srirangam.

Bangalore
1-8-2006

इति सज्जनविधेयः
N. S. Anantharangacharya

VISIṢṬĀDVAITIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Every sentient being forms certain assumptions right or wrong and this process of forming assumptions will be checked whenever there are certain obstructions: Non-rational beings have no power of discrimination and so cannot discriminate between the means, instruments, results, sources, validity or invalidity of their assumptions. But man is a rational being and he needs all these. Whenever he goes wrong he tries to rationalize his assumptions to avoid all kinds of misconceptions and misinterpretations. When he realizes that he has gone wrong he doubts about the means, sources, instruments, the application of procedure, the inter-relationship and the whole machinery and tries to locate the defect so that he may arrive at the correct position.

To achieve this accuracy he has theoretically postulated four actualities namely: *pramā*, *pramithi*, *pramēya* and *pramāna*.¹ This has been followed by all savants of the past. The root माङ् माने meaning correct measurement has yielded these four words in combination with the preposition “*pra*”.

These are standards of measurements by means of which we can test the validity of our knowledge. The means of valid knowledge are *pramāṇas* and *pramithi* is acquired valid knowledge. *Prameya* is the object of knowledge and *pramā* is right apprehension. Valid knowledge is possible only when the whole machinery is valid and it depends upon three constituents, namely, the sense organs, the *samskaras* and the objects to be known.

The knowledge that we get through the external instruments such as the five sense organs is objective

knowledge whereas desires, imaginations, fancies, fantasies, etc., formed by the mind, which are subjective, also belong to the attributive consciousness of the self. Pure subjective knowledge is self-existent. This is otherwise known as 'Svarūpa jñānam or Dharmijñānam' which is the native state of the spiritual entity. The Nyāya school postulates that this subjective or substantive knowledge is conceived by the mind 'आत्मा मनोमात्रैकगोचरः'. Absolute monism affirms that the subjective entity is unknowable. The Sāṅkhyas opine that the self-luminous subjective entity can be known through the Antahkaraṇa. But Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology says that the subjective entity is self-luminous and is felt through the attributive knowledge or Dharmabhūtajñānam.

Even regarding objective knowledge there is controversy and different schools of thought posit different theories apparently opposed to one another.²

There is thus wide difference of opinion between one school and another regarding the theories of knowledge and error. It is therefore necessary to go into the doctrine of pramāṇas, as propounded by this school, to know the line of thought, on which the truths of this school are established.

Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology is based on its ontology. Brahman is the only ultimate Reality according to this school. Both the material and the spiritual are attributes of the one and the only Transcendental Being. But, the concept of Brahman, according to this school of thought, is not an undifferentiated impersonal absoluteness of consciousness. On the other hand, it is an all-conscious being characterized by innumerable auspicious qualities. Brahman is 'Satya' or

the real, which transcends both physical nature and finite selves. It is absolute consciousness and absolute Ānanda. It is infinite. It is the one substance par-excellent which has everything else as its Mode. The world of Nature and the world of selves cannot exist independently of Brahman. According to this school, the ultimate reality which is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent reveals itself in its attributes: the chit and the achit, and knowledge is ultimately knowledge of Reality. The subject object relationship is a fact of reality, where both of them meet together. The ultimate knowledge that is obtained in the ultimate analysis is of the real, as stated in the Gīta ‘अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम्’ । (भ.गी. 18-20)

Knowledge:

All Indian systems of thought admit that knowledge is got by the subject-object relationship, as in ‘I know this’

‘अस्ति तावत् सर्वसिद्धान्तिनां इदमहं वेदमीति
कर्मकर्तृघटितक्रियाविशेषावभासः’ । (स.सि. p-174)

Knowledge is possible only when there is a subject and an object. Knowledge is always about an object: There can be no knowledge, if there is no subject. Knowledge thus relates to the knower and the known. It is viṣayāvabhāsa or illumination of an object to the subject. As Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that all objects are only revelations of Brahman, in the ultimate analysis, knowledge is not merely the illumination of some object, but the illumination of Brahman itself.

The Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Ārṇata schools maintain that the Antahkaraṇa itself is the subject or Jñāta, whereas the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold that the Ātman or the

self directly perceives, directly conceives, feels, understands and happens to be the propelling force. The Sāṅkhyas and their allies say that the Ātman or Chetana has no direct contact, and they attribute the fact of knowledge to the sensitive mind. The mental faculties by virtue of their emergence from the same substance, namely the primordial matter, are said to be capable of the process of knowing them, whereas the spiritual substance, being entirely different from the evolutes of matter, cannot work in consonance with it. But, in Viśiṣṭādvaita the Jīva or the self is the subject of knowledge. The Jīva, though atomic in nature, is verily capable of knowing anything through his Dharmabhūtajñānam or attributive consciousness. This attributive consciousness is capable of a double function, as it illumines itself, as well as other objects of knowledge.

The process of knowing commences with the sensations and finalises with the self. Objects are perceived and conceived and synthesized by the mind, with the unity of self-consciousness. The objects are relatively external to the self, and it knows the objects through its knowledge aided by the channels of the senses. The world of physical objects exists independent of consciousness, and the subject, or the self-conscious Ātman is different from the object. The real subject of every judgment is the supreme being who is the indweller and inner self of all things. He is the ultimate knower. Brahman is the knower in us as our inner self, and is the ground of all knowables in the ultimate analysis.

The attributive consciousness or Dharmabhūtajñānam reveals all objects of nature. Though this is different from the self and can be distinguished thus, it is inseparable from the self. The relationship between knowledge and the self

is one of 'aprithaksiddhi' (non-separable relation), and not one of Samavāya as in the Nyāya system. Ātman is substantive consciousness and has attributive consciousness as well. This attributive consciousness is Svayamprakāśa (self-luminous) and has also Arthaprakāśakatva, or the characteristic of illumining objects. It reveals itself and also other objects. It is not self realized like the Ātman.³ It is like physical light which can only 'show but cannot know'. This attributive consciousness is eternally all pervasive to the Nityas and Muktas as well as the supreme Being. But for others, during the phenomenal state of saṁsāra, it is subject to contractions due to Karma. In the state of Mukti or liberation it attains its original state of infiniteness and all-pervasiveness. This attributive consciousness persists even in dreamless sleep and in swoon, though not experienced then.⁴ The experience "सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्" (I slept well) bears evidence to this. This consciousness is a spiritual quality of the Ātman. It is eternal but contracts and expands like a substance due to Karma, so is a substance also. It is both a Dravya and a Guṇa.⁵ This is similar to prabhā or luminosity which is verily the quality of a substance, prabhāvat.

Thus knowledge is the illumination of an object for the sake of the Ātman. The self or the Ātman is the subject. Each self is both subject and object. It is the subject when it illuminates but is an object when it is illuminated in turn by the attributive consciousness.⁶ Jñāna is not inert or jaḍa but self luminous or Svayamprakāśa. It is Svaparanirvāhaka in its function of illuminating, and is realized as such. self-luminosity of consciousness lies in the fact that it illuminates an object to a subject at a particular time. It

follows from this that it need not be self luminous to all at all times.

‘यत्त्वनुभूतेः स्वयंप्रकाशकत्वमुक्तं तद्विषयप्रकाशनवेलायां

ज्ञातुरात्मनस्तथैव, न तु सर्वेषां सर्वदा तथैवेति नियमोऽस्ति।

(श्री.भा.1-1-1)

Naiyāyikas do not recognize the fact of ‘Svayamprakāśatva’ of knowledge. They argue that knowledge is cognized by ‘mānasa pratyakṣa’ or mental perception. They posit a second unit of knowledge for the revelation of the first unit, as knowledge by itself is not capable of revealing objects of experience. This is called Anuvyavasāya.

This theory of Anuvyavasāya is not admitted by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita. If the second unit of knowledge called Anuvyavasāya is assumed for the revelation of the first unit, it must be pointed out that this second unit, being itself unrevealed, cannot reveal the first unit. It requires another anuvyavasāya and that again another and so on leading to infinite regress or ‘anavasthā’. If it is argued that this second unit of knowledge called ‘anuvyavasāya’ is self revealed, we point out that it is better to regard the first unit itself as ‘self-revealed’.

Anuvyavasāya is therefore not necessary for knowledge to reveal the objects of experience. Knowledge itself is self-revealed. We know that we know a thing at the same time.⁷ If this is not admitted, omniscience cannot be attributed to God. It cannot be argued that Omniscience is only self-experienced and not self-revealed. Further, the common experience of Dhārāvāhika vijñāna cannot be

explained, if the characteristic of self-revelation is not admitted of knowledge. So it must be admitted that knowledge is self revealed.

The Kaumārila argue that knowledge is to be inferred on account of object revelation. This view is criticized by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita as unscientific.⁹ It is said in the above school that prākāṣya or Jñātata or Prakaṣatā is a product of the cognition of an object, and that this prakatya leads to the inference of the cause, namely cognition. It is natural that prakaṣatā should lead to the causal collocation and not to cognition. To argue that cognition which was unrevealed is inferred from cognizedness would take us nowhere as it serves no practical purpose. On the other hand, it is not possible to apply this principle of Prākāṣyānumēya regarding objects of the past and the future. It must therefore be admitted that knowledge is essentially self-revealed and is not inferred from some other characteristic of cognizedness.

The special features of Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology can be summarized as follows:-

1. Reality is knowable in all its levels and aspects.
2. Knowledge presupposes a knower and an object of thought.
3. The Ātman is of the essential nature of consciousness, qualified by attributive consciousness
4. Substantive consciousness is self-realized, whereas the attributive consciousness reveals itself as well as other objects.
5. Substantive consciousness is a 'Self-aware' or 'pratyak' principle, whereas the attributive consciousness is not aware of itself being a 'parāk' principle.

6. The substantive consciousness is ever effulgent, and is unaffected by any transformation. But the attributive consciousness is subject to contraction during the state of Samsāra, owing to the impact of Karma.
7. The attributive consciousness regains its original state of purity and all-pervasive nature during the state of liberation.
8. The attributive consciousness or Dharmabhūta jñānam is both an attribute and a substance.
9. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are all different aspects of Dharmabhūtajñānam, and are implied in it.
10. Knowledge is 'Brahma Dṛiṣṭi', as Brahman is the ground of all knowledge, as well as the experiencer of all in the ultimate analysis.

Knowledge is self-valid:

Knowledge is 'Svataḥ pramāṇa' or self-valid in its essential nature. This self-validity is inherent in its very nature. ¹⁰

The Mukta or the liberated self apprehends all things of his own accord as ordained in the Vedas as “‘सर्वं ह पश्यःपश्यति’ etc. The validity of the knowledge there, cannot be due to any adjuncts or any external factors. It means the intuition of the soul is essentially self-revealing and self-valid, and self-validity is natural to knowledge. This applies to all knowledge in general. All knowledge grasps the corresponding objects and reveals them. This is its self-validity. ¹¹

Moreover Bhrānti or erroneous knowledge cannot be

a fact, as knowledge is not divided into illusion and non-illusion at all.¹² Then what are we to say about the shell-silver illusion and the yellow-conch illusion? Illusion is caused by two factors namely, the Vaiparētya of Svarūpa Nirūpakadharman or the Vaiparētya of the Nirūpita Svarūpaviśeṣana. The former is the example for the first, and the latter for the second. The shell-silver experience is an instance of Svarūpa Nirūpakadharma Vaiparētya. Here the Svarūpanirūpakadharma or the characteristics that determine the silver are grasped, instead of those of the shell. The 'Yellow-conch' cognition is of a different type. Here, the determining characteristics of the conch, or the 'conchness', is grasped whereas the Nirūpita-Svarūpaviśeṣadharma, or the defining details are not completely grasped. The yellow colour instead of the white is grasped there. This invalidity is caused by certain defects in vision, or other extraneous factors, and as such, the self validity of knowledge is not in any way hampered.

Difference between Pramā and Apramā:

As enunciated above, the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita admits that 'Jñānam' (knowledge) is self-valid and true. It also affirms that the real or the Sat alone is cognized and as such integrity of experience in all levels is accepted. The world of selves and matter is in Brahman-तस्मिन्सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् Brahman is Satyasya Satyam, as it is the indweller in the chit or the finite self, which-is the inner self of the Achit and so distinct from it. It is only through Brahman that both the Chit and the Achit get their value. This divine immanence in the object and the subject forms the background of all knowledge.

According to this Theory of Knowledge there cannot be any division of Pramā and Apramā, into two watertight compartments as all knowledge is, in the ultimate analysis, of the Real Object and a Fact of Life. The knowledge of the omniscient Divine is always Pramā. The Dharmijñānam of the Nityas and the Muktas is ever shining, and it is always self-luminous, being far from any kind of contraction at all, and so is Pramā. The Dharmabhuta jñānam or attributive consciousness of the bound self is subject to limitations and contractions, under the stress of Samsāra, and this attributive consciousness is conditioned by physical defects and takes the form of truth or falsehood according to the situation. So the division of Pramā or Apramā is applicable to the attributive consciousness of the Samsārīchetana or the bound-self only.

Some epistemologists of this school defined Pramā as 'Samyaganubhavaḥ' (or thorough apprehension of an object) as they wanted to exclude memory from right apprehension, though they admitted Anyathākhyāti. Those who accepted both, namely memory and Anyathākhyāti defined Pramā as Yathārtham Jñānam or the knowledge of an object as it is. Some others who rejected both the above defined Pramā or right apprehension as Anubhūti. All these definitions serve the purpose of distinguishing Smṛiti from Pramā.

Smṛiti or memory is not denied the characteristic of Pramā by Deśika. If memory has no characteristic of right knowledge, then recognition, based on this, will turn out to be Apramā. Memory functions in many fields of our life, and it is essential for unbroken meditation and selfless

devotion. Knowledge born of mere reminiscent impressions is memory, and though it is mediate and does not grasp an object, it is necessarily due to the former apprehension, and so it is not baseless. It corresponds to objective reality experienced before, and so gets itself included within the province of Pramā.¹³ That is why Pramā is defined as:

‘यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानं प्रमा’ । न्या.परि. - 92

The two words namely Yathāvasthita and Vyavahārānugūṇa are significant in this definition. Yathāvasthita is a term that signifies the realistic attitude of this school. The term means the existence of things as they are and so includes all aspects of knowledge both subjective and objective. The term Vyavahārānugūṇa emphasizes the purpose of knowledge. Knowledge must be able to fulfil the purposes of our life. It should be conducive to the progress of humanity both material and spiritual. It must satisfy the practical interests of our life. Vyavahāra here applies to hāna (rejection) and Upādāna (acceptance) of undesirables and desirables respectively. Knowledge must be able to fulfil the purpose of also śābdavyavahāra, as human experience is not solely limited to hana and upadana. Śābdavyavahāra is one of the essential features of human activities and is therefore part and parcel of Vyavahāra. Internal consistency is thus implied by these two terms. The soul, suffering under the stress and strain of Samsāra, has certain objects to attain, and true knowledge helps him to realize his aims. Thus right knowledge or Pramā has a definite purpose to serve.

This definition of Deśika is free from the defects of Viparyaya or wrong notion and Saṁśaya or doubt.¹⁴

Viparyaya or wrong notion is different from Pramā. Firstly, a wrong notion is to take one thing for another. Secondly, a notion of contradictory and untenable properties of a particular object, the essential attribute of which is cognized in general, is also an example of Viparyaya. This is of many types owing to the appearance of one or more of the opposite qualities. The 'Yellow-conch' experience is an example of the appearance (Sphuraṇa) of one opposite property. The theory of being one and different at the same time, as put by the Jinas, is an example of viparyaya of many opposite viśeṣas or qualities. The Theory of the Monists, that the world is neither real nor unreal, is another example of viparyaya of the same type as above. All these instances of wrong notion do not any how imply contradiction and are different from doubt.¹⁵

In all these instances there is a consciousness of the objects qualified by these qualities leading to a wrong identification. The experience of the 'Double Moon' and the 'Little Moon' is, again, a case of viparyaya, as the qualities of doubleness and littleness opposed to the oneness and bigness of the moon play prominent part and push them aside, though the moon is cognized with its essential attribute. This is an example of परस्परविरुद्धानेकविशेषस्फुरण the appearance of many particularities that are mutually contradictory. The cause of viparyaya is either wrong identification, as in the case of the rope snake, or superimposition as in the case of the Yellowconch. The Gīta explains that Rajas and Thamas are verily responsible for a wrong notion. To mistake dharma for Adharma and Adharma for Dharma, as well as Kārya for Akārya and vice-versa, is a case of viparyaya. Viparyaya is far from pramā or right apprehension and to exclude this from

pramā the term 'yathāvasthita' is used in the definition by Deśika.

The above definition excludes Samśaya also from Pramā. What is Samśaya or Doubt ?

‘सामान्यधर्मिस्फुरणे सति अप्रतिपन्नतद्विरोधप्रतिपन्नमिथो
विरोधानेकविशेषस्फुरणं संशयः’। न्या.परि. p - 92

Doubt is caused by the cognition of contradictory and incompatible qualities of two objects at one and the same locus. Here the Dharmi or object of cognition is experienced along with incompatible features. ‘Is it a post or a man’?, is an example of doubt. The ‘tallness’, common to the post and the man, is cognized and this gives rise to a cognition of contradictory features, and the mind fails to decide whether it is a post or a man, as it finds in that one object both the qualities of ‘posthood’ and ‘manhood’ which are contradictory and incompatible to one and the same locus. There will be cognitions of these incompatibles; alternatively and simultaneously as in the case of a swing that gains a forward and a backward move at the same time.¹⁶ Thus in doubt or Samśaya there is the cognition of contradictory alternatives and this leads to indecision. Though there is decisive contact or ‘Dhṛiḍasamyoga’ of the attributive consciousness with the object there is also an indecisive contact of the same Dharmabhūtajñam with the many incompatible features¹⁷. The loose sense object contact gives rise to the cognition of incompatible and contradictory qualities resulting in doubt. Such a kind of cognition cannot be Yathāvasthita and so is not right apprehension.

Anadhyavasāya is not Pramā:

Anadhyavasāya of the type of ‘What may be the name of that tree ?’, which has been distinguished by some logicians as different from doubt, is also included under Samsaya as alternatives are implied there also.¹⁸

Even conjecture or Ūha is -a kind of cognition which is not definite and so is not Pramā¹⁹. Here also there are two alternatives and the characteristics of one manifest suppressing the other, and so this also is a case of doubt alone. The definition of right apprehension or Pramā given by Deśika is synoptic, and this excludes from its sphere, wrong notion, doubt, Anadhyavasāya and conjecture by the term Yathāvasthita, and applies to practical life by the use of the word Vyavahārāhuguna. Thus Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology is not severed from life, but, on the other hand, is related to it wholly.

Apramā or erroneous cognition or Bhrama:

Strictly speaking there cannot be any distinction between Pramā and Bhrama in this school, in the ultimate analysis, as every cognition is of the real. The attributive consciousness of the finite self is subject to contractions on account of Karma as mentioned before, and as a consequence of this, it loses its purity and all-pervasive character, under the stress of Samsāra. In this stage error creeps in. Error is due only to Avidyā-Karma of the finite self and does never happen either to the Absolute or to the liberated or to the eternal.

This distinction between Pramā and Bhrama is also one of degree, and this disappears when the attributive

consciousness is freed from its contractions of Karma. We must examine empirical experience in this light and find out whether they are Pramā or Bhrama. That which has a practical utility, and that which leads to the furtherance of the ends of life happens to be Pramā, whereas that which is contrary to this is Bhrama.²⁰

If the cognition of an object as it is, is Pramā or right apprehension the cognition of an object otherwise is Bhrama. To cognize the shell as shell is Pramā, but to apprehend it as silver is Bhrama. How are we to explain this then ? According to the principle of quintuplication, a minute element of silver does exist even in the shell and this happens to be the cause of its cognition as silver. But that is not Pramā as that cognition of silver in the shell becomes bādhita on account of its infinitesimalness. So the criterion for the validity or invalidity of a cognition happens to be the fact of its being contradicted or not contradicted²¹

Yathārthakhyāthi Theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita :

The theory of error according to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita is described by Deśika as Akhyāthisamvalita yathārthakhyāthi.²² According to this theory all knowledge is Yathārtha or, knowledge of an object as it is. In the yellow-conch illusion the yellow colour of the eye is transmitted to the conch and that experience of the yellowness of the conch is real and is due to the real cause of the bile in the eye, and not due to self-deceptive Māyā. The finite self obscured by Avidyākarma is the seat of error. Error is therefor due to either real defects or Upādhis. Illusions of all types are erroneous perceptions but they are manifestations of consciousness that subsist and are

facts of experience. These are not non-existent. They are real effects of real causes. The illusion of the double moon or the yellow-conch or the fire-brand circle, are all due to either the defects of the eye or real Upādhis. If they are not (Vyavahārānugūṇa or) able to satisfy our practical needs of life they are false or Apramā.²³ Pramā or right apprehension is not only applicable to practical life but must also be Yathārtha.

Then how is an error caused? Whenever there is an apprehension of the essential characteristic of a thing, the thinghood of that thing is cognized and becomes Pramā. If the essential part of a thing is not observed or missed, error or Bhrama ensues.²⁴

Theory of Error:

The Theory of Error according to Rāmānuja is Yathārtha khyāthi. Errors can be grouped into certain types such as hallucinations, dreams and illusions.²⁵ All these are facts of experience and manifestations of knowledge. They are real effects of real causes. Hallucinations are due to real psychic disorders and the experience is real to the subject at that particular time. Dreams experienced also are real, being the result of the past Karma of the dreamer. The objects of the dream world are all creations of God suited to the specific merit or demerit of that particular soul. Though dreams are subjective they are actually experienced. Illusions may be broadly classified into two types viz., perceptual and non-perceptual. Instances of perceptual error such as the shell-silver illusion, yellow-conch illusion, red-crystal illusion, a mirage, a fire-brand wheel and others are all real effects of real causes. These are due to the defective sense material on account of which

the thinghood of that thing is misapprehended. When it is found out that the water element in the mirage or the silver element in the shell is of no practical value, the illusion vanishes. The doctrine of panchikarana or quintuplication affirms the fundamental unity of nature, and expounds that everything has an element of every other thing in itself. This happens to be the background of illusion. When the main part is revealed there is Pramā or true knowledge. But, when the thinghood of a thing, as well as its difference from others, is not grasped, illusion ensues. These are all, therefore examples of Yathārthakhyāthi alone. These did not become Pramā on account of their failure to promote the practical interests of life.

There are errors that relate to the moral and ethical conceptions also. Rajas and Tamas are described as causing non-apprehension and misapprehension. This kind of error is due to real defects of Samskāras of the finite self labouring under the impact of Karma. As Kanada has put it Avidyā is due to either Indriyadōṣas or Samskāradōṣas. Patanjali points out that Avidyā is to mistake the non-eternal for the eternal, the impure for the pure, sorrow for pleasure, and the non-self for the self.

‘अनित्यशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिः अविद्या’।

(P.Y.S. 2-5)

The province or error is thus very wide and includes within itself perceptual and non-perceptual error. All errors are real effects of real causes, and tests of pragmatic verification have got to be applied to correct those erroneous impressions. Error is real and relative and is due to extraneous factors and not due to Avidyā, the inexplicable principle of Monism. Rāmānuja comes to the

conclusion in his Śrī Bhashya, that all knowledges is real and of the real.

It is some times described by some scholars that Rāmānuja's Theory of Error is "Anyathākhyāthi" of a special kind different from that of the Naiyāyikas.²⁶ The basis for this conclusion is evidently a statement of Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya. viz. 'ख्यात्यन्तरवादिना सुदूरमपिगत्वा अन्यथावभासोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः' (S.B. 1-1-1). This statement occurs there to reduce all theories of error other than his, to Anyathākhyāthi, which of course gets refuted further giving room to his own Theory of Yathārtha khyāthi. The celebrated commentator of Rāmānuja, Sri Sudarsana Suri sheds much light on this conclusion.²⁷ But the opinion of the above scholars favouring "Anyathākhyāthi" is not altogether unfounded. From a careful study of Sarvārtha Siddhi of Deśika under stanzas No. 9, 10 and 11 of the Buddhisara, we learn that even among the followers of Rāmānuja there were two schools of thought from very early times, holding two different views of Anyātha khyāthi and yathārtha khyāthi. Deśika's conclusion is of course in favour of the latter only.²⁸

When we examine the theory of Error carefully we realize that the principle of Yathārtha khyāthi underlies allothers, as all projections and presentations are only modal manifestations of the "One Absolute", the "Sat". Just as the theory of Aparyavasāna vritti explains that all words connote the Supreme in the ultimate analysis, the theory of error 'Yathārtha khyāthi' explains all instances of error, in the final analysis, as real experiences due to real causes.

To sum up

1. Error relates only to the attributive consciousness or Dharmabhūtajñam of the embodied self.
2. This is due to the non-apprehension. of the determinate characteristics of an object and of its difference from others.
3. Error is part of Reality both as an act of thought and as the object cognised by that act.
4. Error is a real experience due to a real cause.
5. Error is due to extraneous factors like defective sense organs or defective Samskāras.
6. Error can be finally corrected by means of Pragmatic verification.

Theories of other Schools examined:

The Anirvachanīya khyāthi of the Advaitins says that all things apprehended here as shell-silver or any other thing are not real, but only distortions of the Reality. The Reality which is undifferentiated universal consciousness is unknowable. All these presentations are therefore mere products of Avidyā. In the shell-silver illusion neither the shell nor the silver is real. The silver in the shell is neither existent nor non-existent. So it is indefinable and is the result of the indefinable nescience or Avidyā. This view point of Anirvachanīyakhyāthi is totally discarded by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita as unreasonable and untenable. For, existence or Sattva and non-existence or Asattva cannot reside in the same thing at the same place and time. If something exists like Brahman it cannot be non-existent. If a thing does not exist as the hare's horns it cannot exist at all. These two are incompatibles and cannot exist in one and the same thing at the same time and place. So then,

anirvachanīyata is not a fact of apprehension at all. Defining the indefinable is again a self contradiction.²⁹ It is further argued that the presentation of silver said to be indefinable, is not a product of Avidyā. It is not an illusory manifestation against the background of Brahman as maintained by monistic epistemologists. Silver as such is not totally discarded as illusion. The experience namely 'this is silver' is contradicted and there is only bādha and the presentation of silver in the shell in this instance amounts to only Anyathā Khyāthi and not Anirvachanīya Khyāthi.³⁰

The futility of Anirvachanīya khyāthi is established by Rāmānuja in his Śrī Bhāṣya. Seven kinds of incompatibilities namely (1) आश्रयानुपपत्तिः (2) तिरोधानानुपपत्तिः (3) स्वरूपानुपपत्तिः (4) अनिर्वचनीयानुपपत्तिः (5) प्रमाणानुपपत्तिः (6) निर्वर्तकानुपपत्तिः, (7) निवृत्यनुपपत्तिः are charged against the Theory of Avidyā. These charges are further elaborated by Deśika in his Śatadūṣini.

The epistemologists of Monistic thought posit a substratum for Avidyā just to avoid Nihilism and their concept of Avidyā is proved to be unreasonable and untenable. When this itself is untenable what to say of the Niradhiṣṭāna Bhrama, or baseless illusion of the Buddhists. The Ātma khyāthi of the Buddhist idealist is also said to be self-contradictory. These Vijñānavadins say that only forms of consciousness caused by super-imposition are experienced and Vijñānas are said to be of two kinds namely Ālaya Vijñāna and Pravritti Vijñāna. Viśiṣṭādvaita refutes this Theory as opposed to all human experience.

Our daily experience reveals to us many objects other than the mind and there cannot be any identity between the Grāhya and Grāhaka.³¹ How can cognition arise without a corresponding object? Moreover the four causes of cognition namely Adhipathi, Sahakāri, Ālambana and Samānatantra cannot be set aside. As such, various objects are responsible for varied cognitions. The Buddhist nihilist posits the theory of Asatkhyāthi. This theory of error negates not only external objects but also the Vijñānas of the Yogāchāra school. Reality according to the Sūnyavādin is Sūnya. The object of cognition is Asat and as such both Pramā and Apramā are Asat.

This theory is strongly refuted by Vedantic schools. Viśiṣṭādvaita has repudiated this theory of error with all its strength. The states of existence or non-existence apply only to things that really exist and so the theory of nothingness establishes, on the other hand, only the reality of things. Error cannot occur without having a locus or substratum. An object is experienced always with spatial and temporal relationship as 'this pot is here'. If 'there' is real, then an Ādhara becomes existent, and the theory of nihilism is smashed to pieces. If spatial relationship as 'there' is denied, there is no possibility of an error at all. As such the theory of Nihilism positing Asat khyāthi is also unfounded.

To sum up - knowledge is an illumination of an object to the knowing self³². The self is self-luminous and is of the nature of substantive consciousness, Jñānaswarūpa. The universal self as well as the finite selves are thus self-shining consciousness. They have also consciousness as their attribute. Thus Jñānam is of two types namely Dharmi

jñānam and Dharmabhūtajñānam. Dharmi jñānam is only self revealing, whereas Dharmabhūtajñānam reveals itself as well as others. It is Swaparanirvāhaka. Knowledge is self-valid and self revealed. The attributive consciousness is subject to contractions during the state of samsāra due to Karma, and it attains its original state in Mukti. All kinds of feelings like pleasure, pain, desire, anger and others are all various effects of the attributive consciousness. The unseen sin or merit is again the will of the Divine to reward or punish, and these are the results of the attributive consciousness of the Divine.

The Dharmabhūtajñāna has different states of both right knowledge and wrong knowledge in the state of Samsāra, but in the state of liberation it is perfect, all pervasive and ever shining.

The utility of knowledge in the furtherance of our moral, ethical and spiritual purposes is thus properly emphasized in the synoptic definition of Jñāna as adopted by this school.

Pramāṇas and Their Number:

Significance of Pramāṇas: The analysis of the Pramāṇas in any school relates to the prameya of that particular school. An exposition of the Pramāṇas based on right authorities is also essential for the sound standing (for all time to come) of the philosophical structure of that school. The means of right knowledge must also necessarily be valid as the knowledge it is going to establish.³³ The statement 'I speak the Truth' must also be true, in the same way, as the statement it is going to make. Thus, Pramāṇa establishes itself as well as other objects.³⁴ Pramāṇas are in

a way standards for examination, verification, modification and confirmation of our knowledge.

A mention of Pramāṇas is made in the Thaithiriya Āraṇyaka where four terms namely Smṛiti, Prathyakṣa, Aithihya and Anumānam are stated.³⁵ The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika logic deals with Pramāṇas in a significant manner. The medieval logicians treated this doctrine in such a way that it could be applied to the religious systems of all schools and on account of this pure treatment this came to be termed as 'The science of right knowledge';

Viśiṣṭādvaita logicians have in their own way reconstructed the Nyāya logic according to their philosophy. Śri Vedānta Deśika has made a glorious contribution towards this cause by writing an important work namely Nyāyapariśuddhi. The very title of this work suggests that this is a purification or re-orientation of the system propounded by the great Gōtama. The great Gōtama or Akṣapāda, the author of the Nyāya sūtras is renowned as a great thinker of authority and the foremost of sages, which implies in his Āptatamatva.

Though Gōtama, the originator of the Nyāya system, is not counted as a Thāmasa or as a deceiver, yet his exposition cannot be totally acceptable to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita as his Thesis is opposed in many respects to the teaching of Vedānta, and also as he is exposed by the author of the Vedānta Sūtras.³⁶ Therefore his school like Vaiśeṣika or the Sāṃkhya is not a proper authority for spiritual perfection.

‘काणादमाक्षपादं च कापिलं तन्त्रमेव च ।

तन्त्राण्येतानि सर्वाणि न तन्त्राण्यात्मनिर्णये ॥' न्या.परि. p-86

The Brahma sūtras make a categorical rejection of all such views as are opposed to the scriptures.³⁷ The great Rāmānuja comments in this context as follows;

‘एतेन वेदापरिगृहीतसांख्यपक्षक्षपणेन परिशिष्टाश्च
वेदापरिगृहीताः कणभक्षाक्षपादक्षपणकभिक्षुपक्षाः क्षपिताः
वेदितव्याः ।’ श्री.भा.2-1-13

Vedānta Deśika, known for his Samanvaya. dṛiṣṭi, has made an attempt to syncretise the Nyāya system into Vedānta wherever possible, but has summarily rejected such of the views of Gōtama which are irreconcilable with the ontological position of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The guiding principle for acceptance or otherwise of the theories of other schools is stated by himself as follows;

‘यद्वा नातिबहिष्कारः नातीव च परिग्रहः ।
सांख्यादिवदिहापि स्यात् समाधिस्तौषतण्डुलः ॥
उपजीव्यबहुत्वेन विद्यास्थाननिवेशनम् ।
विरुद्धांशैकविषया सूत्रादिषु बहिष्क्रिया ॥’ न्या.परि. p-86

Only such of the things that are diametrically opposed to the standpoint of the holy texts and the sūtras are rejected, whereas those that are not objectionable to the system are adopted.

Vedānta Deśika has analysed the Nyāya system with reference to the position of Viśiṣṭādvaita, and has, so to say, reconstructed Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic with reference to the Nyāya system. We will now briefly go into the essentials of Viśiṣṭādvaita logic.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic accepts three means of right knowledge namely pratyakṣa or perception, Anumānam or inference and Śabda or verbal testimony. We may study the special characteristics of these means of right knowledge as admitted by Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians.

The importance of Pramāṇa śāstra has been significantly expressed by Deśika as follows;

‘प्रमाणमेवास्य शास्त्रस्य प्राधान्यतो विषयः’ । न्या.परि -p- 90

Pramāṇas are three fold- ‘प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दभेदात्’ । This three fold division is acceptable to Manu also.

‘प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् ।

त्रयं सुविदिनं कार्यं धर्मसिद्धिमभीप्सता ॥’

Sri Vishnuchitta states in his prameya samgraha:

‘प्रमाणसंख्याविवादेपीत्यत्र त्रिप्रमाणत्वं भाष्योक्तम् इति’

न्या.परि p- 94

Though Smṛiti is established as a valid means of right knowledge, yet it is included in pratyakṣa, and so does not form a different Pramāṇa.

Tatvaratnakara of Parasarabhatta states:

‘प्रत्यक्षादिमूलानां स्मृतीनां स्वस्वमूलेऽन्तर्भावविवक्षया प्रमाणत्रित्वाविरोधः ।’

न्या.परि. p- 94

The Taittiriya aranyaka names four Pramāṇas namely Smṛiti, Pratyakṣam, Aithiham, Anumānam and it is implied here that Pratyakṣa is not inclusive of remembrance or Smṛiti and so there is no change in the number of Pramāṇas.³⁸

According to the above the number of Pramāṇas in Viśiṣṭādvaita logic is only three, and could be reconciled thus by continuing Smṛiti as a Pramāṇa though included in perception. The statement of Prajñāparitrāṇa namely, .

‘तत्रेन्द्रियार्थसम्बन्धो लिङ्गशब्दग्रहौ तथा ।

संस्कारोन्मेष इत्येते संविदां जन्महेतवः ॥’ न्या.परि. p- 95

enumerates the four fold means of knowledge as (1) sense-object contact, (2) Lingagrahana or grasp of pervasion; (3) verbal testimony and (4) Samskaronmēṣa. This fourfold nature of acquisition of knowledge does not admit Smṛiti as a right means of knowledge. The same author further states that there are five means of right knowledge according to Jaimini and Vyasa:

‘स्वयंसिद्धिस्तथा दिव्यं प्रत्यक्षमनुमागमः ।

पञ्च सन्ति प्रमाणानि जैमिनिव्यासयोर्हृदि ॥’ न्या.परि. p - 95

The Thesis of the author of Prajñāparitrāṇa is not irreconcilable, as in the ultimate analysis the number of Pramāṇas comes only to three. In the above quoted passage the two viz., Swayamsiddhi and Divyam are counted as different Pramāṇas to make up the number of five, along with perception, inference and scripture. But these two namely Swayamsiddhi & Divyam get themselves included under perception alone as Viśiṣṭādvaita explains ‘divyam’ as that kind of pratyakṣa which is acquired by the grace of the Lord.

‘भगवत्प्रसादलव्योगिप्रत्यक्षं दिव्यम्’ ।

न्या.परि. p - 95

From the above analysis it becomes clear that though some of the celebrated logicians of this school counted four

or five means of right knowledge, when closely examined, they get themselves included under only three Pramāṇas namely pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda.

II. PERCEPTION

Definition and significance of perception:

Pratyakṣa or perception is very significant as all our experiences begin with this. We perceive the external objects through the senses and know about them. What all we perceive is real according to this school. Perception reveals a part of Reality as only certain aspects of reality are perceptible. Many aspects of reality are not cognizable through the functions of the sense organs and that is why other Pramāṇas, like inference and Śabda, are admitted as valid means of right knowledge. Of the three Pramāṇas, perception however is the first means, and this stops somewhere giving place to other Pramāṇas.

Vedānta Deśika discusses the definitions of pratyakṣa, as given by some of his predecessors, and after analysing them gives his own definition in his 'Nyāyapariśuddhi'.

1. Sri Viṣṇuchitta defined Pratyakṣa in his prameya samgraha as follows:

‘साक्षादनुभवः प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्त्वं जातिः इत्यादि’ ।

न्या.परि p - 95

2. Sri Parāśara Bhatta defined perception in his Tatvaratnakāra in the following words:-

‘अपरोक्षप्रमाध्यक्षमापरोक्ष्यं च संविदः ।

व्यवहारार्थसम्बन्धिज्ञानजत्वविवर्जनम् ॥’

3. Sri Varada Viṣṇu Miśra defined the same in his Mānayaṭhiathāmyanirnaya as follows:

अपरोक्षप्रमा प्रत्यक्षम् । प्रमाया अपरोक्ष्यं नाम
विशदावभासत्वमिति ब्रूमः । किमिदं वैशद्यं नाम ?
असधारणाकारेण वस्त्ववभासकत्वम् ।' या.परि - 95

The first definition states that Prathyakṣa is an Anubhava or apprehension. This is said to be Sākṣāth or direct. This Sākṣātva is Jāthi or the characteristic feature (or directness) of this apprehension.

The second definition points out that perception is direct knowledge based on the sense-object contact. This is not indirect as in the case of inference or verbal testimony that depend upon Vyāp̥thi and Śabda respectively.

The third definition declares that perception grasps the objects of sensation clearly, and results in a direct experience of the objects. The subject or the self-luminous self gets a direct and intuitive experience of the objects when its dharmabhūtajñāna reaches them through the sense channels. This would be a very vivid illumination of the external objects to the knowing subject.

All these three definitions affirm that perception is an immediate experience of the objects. Immediacy or Sākṣātva is said to be the differentia of perception. But even in inference and Śabda, there ensue in the long run, an illumination of the object and a direct intuitive experience. Sākṣātva is the general characteristic of all kinds of knowledge as every type of knowledge naturally implies Viśadāvabhāsatva or vivid manifestation. So then, to differentiate perception from the other two means of valid

knowledge, Deśika has posited his own definition of Pratyakṣa as mentioned hereunder:-

‘साक्षात्कारिप्रमा प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्त्वं च जातिरूप उपाधिरूपोवा
कश्चित् ज्ञानस्वभावविशेषः स्वात्मसाक्षिकः ।’ न्या.परि p. 95

The above definition of Deśika is all-comprehensive and marks clearly the boundaries of perception. It also signifies the differentia of perception from other means of knowledge. Pratyakṣam is defined as Sākṣātkāripramā or knowledge that is immediate. It means that this does not need any other type of knowledge. This characteristic feature of not depending upon any other knowledge is the differentia of perception from other Pramāṇas, as they require Vyāpti jñānam or Śabda jñānam as the case may be. Further, this Sākṣātvam is defined as an Upādhirūpā or a specially conditioned one. These peculiar conditions of perception are (1) the sense-object contact and (2) the absence of the dependence upon any other type of knowledge.


Perception has, thus, the nature of immediacy of awareness, in the sense that it depends upon itself and not on any other knowledge.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the mind is necessary for the fact of knowledge. According to them, the soul is a substance which has the quality of consciousness. Knowledge is possible through perception only when there is sense-object contact causing the perspective aspect of consciousness. According to them, the mind reflects the objective impressions to the self. But this is not agreeable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. For him, the soul is jñāna-svarūpa and jñāna-guṇaka, and he acquires knowledge only on account

of his being a self-conscious being. Here the subject-object relationship is emphasized instead of the sense-object contact. The Indriyas are born of Ahamkara, and they have only the capacity of flashing or dyōthana,

Similarly, the treatment of perception by the Advaitin is also not acceptable to this school. According to them, all these experiences are illusions, whereas the non-second Brahman is unknowable. According to this school, the subject is real, the object is real, the approach is real and knowledge is also real.

Vedānta Deśika has classified perception as mentioned hereunder;-



First of all perception is of two types namely eternal and non-eternal. The jñānam of the Supreme, as well as that of the eternally free, is always eternal. Nityasākṣatkara is their characteristic feature. Anitya Sākṣātkāra refers to us, and this again is twofold, namely the perception of yogins and that of non-yogins.

Yogic Perception :

Yōgic perception is described by Vedānta Deśika as follows:

‘योगिप्रत्यक्षम् प्रकृष्टादृष्टविशेषजम् । तत् युक्तावस्थायां
मनोमात्रजन्यम् । वियुक्तावस्थायां तु बाह्येन्द्रियजन्यमपि ।

न्या.परि. - 95

Yōgic perception is that which arises out of the operation of the mind only when they are absorbed in meditation. This is due to their extraordinary yogic powers. When they are out of absorption, the yogins can perceive things by contacting the objects with their external sense organs. This kind of yogic perception that is possible even without the sense organ is called ‘Indriyānapekṣam pratyakṣam’. Yogic perception is authentic. Yogins will be blessed with a Divine insight on account of their realization of abnormal yogic powers, or Divine inspiration. Bhagavan Rāmānuja does not deny this Divine insight of Yogins. But he does not admit the possibility of the Sākṣātkāra of the Divine through mere imagination or reflection.

‘भावनाबलजमात्रं जगत्कर्तरि प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिक्षिप्तं
शास्त्रयोन्यधिकरणे, अन्यत्र भाष्यकारैरेव साक्षाद्योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य
कण्ठोक्तेः । तस्य सम्भवतोऽपि आगमिकेश्वरज्ञानमूलस्या
गमानुवादत्वापादनशक्त्या तत्रौदासीन्यात् ।’ न्या.परि. p-95

Yogic perception of this type will be on account of an Adṛṣṭaviseṣa which will be produced by Yogābhyāsa, penance and the like.³⁹ Ārṣa-jñāna is also produced likewise by Prakṛistādṛṣṭa and so comes under ‘Yogic perception’. Deśika quotes the authority of Prajnāparithrāna for this.⁴⁰ Having thus established the possibility and validity of yogic perception Deśika explains what is meant by the statement Indriyānapekṣam. In the opinion of Vedānta Deśika what is discarded here is only ordinary sense organs and not the

total absence of all sense organs. The sense organs that are implied here are those that are not Divine. So then, the need for Divine sense organs is emphasised.⁴¹ The term 'Indriyānapeksam' can be explained in two ways. Either it may be the non-requirement of non-divine sense organs or it may be the total absence of all sense organs just as in the perception of the Supreme the Nityas and the Muktas. The attributive-consciousness of the liberated self attains its original state of illuminating everything and then all things are perceived even without the aid of sense organs. Likewise, the consciousness of the sages may be capable of cognising all on account of Bhagavatprasāda and this may be also 'Indriyānapeksa'. Thus the twofold significance of the term Indriyānapeksa is explained by Deśika. This Yogic perception itself is verily the mental perception of this school.

Denial of Mental Perception:

But for non-yogins or ordinary people mental perception is not possible.⁴² Mental perception is not necessary in this school for knowing the self, as in the Nyāya school for the following reasons:⁴³

1. The substantive-consciousness is itself self-luminous.
2. The attributive-consciousness too is self-luminous.
3. The experiences of pleasure pain, desire, hatred and others are only manifestations of consciousness due to different causes.⁴⁴
4. The essential nature of the soul such as Nityatva and others are known from the Śāstras.
5. The past experiences of ours are known through recollection.

Mental perception or Mānasapratyakṣa is, therefore, not included in ordinary perceptions. Rāmānuja deals with this question in his Śrī Bhāṣya while commenting on the Third Sūtra 'Śāstra Yonirvāt'. While describing the argument of the Mīmāṃsakas, against the objection that Brahman is capable of being made out by other means of proof and hence that Brahman is not Śāstraika samadhigamya, Rāmānuja argues that Brahman can not be proved by both the kinds of perception namely, that born of the senses, and that born of Yoga. Further, sense perception is subdivided into two types namely 'Bāhyasambhavam' and 'Āntharasambhavam'. After refuting that Bāhyasambhava pratyakṣam is not capable of proving Brahman, Rāmānuja says:

‘नाप्यान्तरम् । आन्तरसुखदुःखादिव्यतिरिक्तबहिर्विषयेषु तस्य बाह्येन्द्रियानपेक्षप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः ।’ श्री.भा. 1-1-3

Here the celebrated commentator Sri Sūdasana Bhatta comments as follows:

‘मनश्च तद्विषयबोधजनकमित्यर्थः । आन्तरसुखदुःखादीत्यत्रान्तर शब्दः आत्मतद्धर्मपरः । तद्ग्राहित्वादेव हि मनसोऽप्यान्तरत्वम् ।’ शु.प्र. 1-1-3

The above illustration may create a doubt that Rāmānuja accepted the distinction between mental and non-mental perception. But, if the context is carefully followed, Rāmānuja is only referring to the view point of the Nyāya school here as remarked by Vedānta Deśika in his Nyāya Parisuddhi.⁴⁵ Thus, the view of mental and non-mental perception is not admissible in this school of philosophy.

The perception of non-yogins is that which is born of non-divine external sense organs-"Adivyabāhyendriya prasūtam." This sense perception is fivefold corresponding to the five senses namely the eye, the tongue, the nose, the skin and the ear.

Determinate and Indeterminate Perception:

Perception is further subdivided into two broad categories namely Savikalpaka pratyakṣa and Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Determinate or Savikalpaka perception consists of the recognition of certain relationships and so is defined as:

‘सप्रत्यवमर्शं प्रत्यक्षं सविकल्पकम्’ । न्या.परि. p- 96

This is Indriya janya or born of sense-object contact and is also assisted by the retrospection of the object. This is rightly defined as knowledge born of the sense-object contact and assisted by the Samskāras.⁴⁶ There is Anuvritti or cognition of the relationship of a number of things in determinate perception. In the perception ‘Iyam Gauh’ or ‘This is a cow’, the object before us is related to the idea of a ‘cow’ known by us before. The relationship between the object before us and its name is remembered here. Thus there is sense-object contact followed by a recollection of its relation with the object known before. The former mental impressions that remain, help the senses to grasp the objects in all their details. Thus, the objects experienced in Savikalpaka pratyakṣa are distinguished from others as their essential characteristics will be distinctly noticed. The name of the object, its important features, its configuration, its qualities and functions will all be noticed. The object, its qualities and their relationship will all be thus conspicuous in Savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Indeterminate or Nirvikalpakapratyakṣam does not signify the cognition of an undifferentiated and unqualified object. On the other hand, it is the cognition of an object unaccompanied with former mental impressions. Even in this kind of perception, the object is qualified by certain attributes such as configuration etc., but devoid of retrospection as it happens to be the first object of that kind cognized. There is no pratyavamarśa here as in Savikalpaka pratyakṣam.⁴⁷

The Nayyāyika takes Nirvikalpaka perception to signify a perception of an object devoid of attributes, relations, jāti and others, and gives the perception of an infant for this as an illustration. This view is not tenable according to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Vedānta Deśika argues that even the perception of an infant or a dumb person cannot be devoid of all attributes. Cognition of an object devoid of all characteristics is impossible and opposed to all human experience.

‘अविशिष्टवस्तुग्राहिणो ज्ञानस्यानुपलम्भात् अनुपपत्तेश्च ।
बालमूकतिर्यगादिविज्ञानमपि हि संज्ञादिविकल्परहितमपि
विशिष्टविषयमेव अन्यथा तेषां हेयोपादेयविभाग
पूर्वकप्रवृत्तिविशेषानुपपत्तेः ।’
न्या.परि. p - 96

The essential characteristics of the object are grasped in all kinds of perceptions either determinate or indeterminate. In determinate perception, the attributes are cognized as related to the object known before, followed with retrospection. But in indeterminate perception this kind of Anuvritti only is absent. But the grasp of the object qualified by certain attributes does exist. If this is denied, then the perception cannot lead us to any purposeful activity, and so does not become

Vyavahārānugūṇa. Rāmānuja expounds the difference between Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as follows:

‘सविकल्पकं जात्याद्यनेकपदार्थविशिष्टविषयत्वादेव
सविशेषविषयम् । निर्विकल्पकमपि सविशेषविषयमेव ।
सविकल्पके स्वस्मिन्ननुभूतपदार्थविशिष्टप्रतिसन्धानहेतुत्वात् ।
निर्विकल्पकं नाम केनचिद्विशेषणवियुक्तस्य ग्रहणम् । न
सर्वविशेषरहितस्य । तथाभूतस्य कदाचिदपि ग्रहणा
दर्शनादनुपपत्तेश्च । ... अतो निर्विकल्पकमेकजातीयब्रह्मेषु
प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणम् । द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणम् सविकल्पक
मित्युच्यते ॥’

श्री.भा. 1-1-1

The above exposition makes clear the view point of Viśiṣṭādvaita and sets at naught the Nirvikalpaka conceptions of the Nayyāyikas and the Advaitins at the same stroke. Indeterminate perception of the kind proposed by the Nyāya school is untrue to all experience. Likewise the theory of the Advaitins that Sanmātram is the object of perception is also unsound.⁴⁸

The gist of all this discussion is summed up by Deśika and the definition of Nirvikalpaka is given as follows:

‘तस्मात् संस्कारशून्येन्द्रियजनितमतिः निर्विकल्पेतिवाच्या ।’

त.मु.क. 4-32

The process of perception is described by Srinivasa in his Yatindramata dipika.

‘आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण । इन्द्रियमर्थेनेति
इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यप्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् ।’

Y. M. D.

The sense organs come into contact with the several

objects and when the mind is in union with the senses and when the knowing self is joined with the mind, perception is possible to the knowing self. The sense organs by themselves cannot create cognition. They are merely illuminators (Prakāśakāḥ). It is the self which is the knower through the mind-sense-object contact. If the mind is not in union with the senses, perception is not possible, and that is the reason why we do not perceive certain objects which are even before our very eyes. The mind, so, must have contact with the senses on the one hand, and the self on the other. The sense-relation of perception is Samyōga or one of conjunction, and not Samavāya as in the school of Nyāya.

This sense-object contact is, in all cases of ordinary perception, of two types: (1) one of conjunction or samyoga and (2) another of complex conjunction or Samyuktāśrayana.

Whenever an object is perceived the sense-object contact is one of conjunction. Whenever the attributes of the objects are perceived along with the object the sense-object contact is one of complex conjunctions.

द्रव्यगतरूपादिग्रहणे समवायानङ्गीकारात् संयुक्ताश्रयणसम्बन्धः'

Y. M. D.

When the visual sense comes into contact with any object, it comes into contact not only with that object, but also with its attributes, namely, the colour, configuration and others. This is through the relation of Āśrayana and this relation is called Samyuktāśrayana. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians do not admit the six fold sense-object contact of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas.

Tatvaratnākara declares this as follows:

‘अत्र वृद्धा विदामासुः संयोगः सन्निकर्षणम् ।

संयुक्ताश्रयणं चेति यथासम्भवमूह्यताम् ॥ = न्या.परि. p - 96

And again perception is twofold namely Arvāchēnam and Anarvāchēnam or recent and ancient. The Anarvāchēnam or ancient perception is capable of perceiving all things at the same time. Deśika defines this as:

‘युगपदशेषविषयसाक्षात्कारक्षमं अनर्वाचीनम्’ । न्या.परि. p - 97

and this happens only to the Yogins, the released and the Supreme Being⁵⁰.

Perception includes in itself recollection or Smṛti, Recognition or Pratyabhijñā, Non-existence or Abhāva, Conjecture or Ūha, Doubt or Saṁśaya and Special mental powers or Prathibhāh. These are not therefore different pramāṇas. Recollection has perception alone for its origin and so is not a different pramāṇa though it is Vyavahārānugūṇa or workable in practical life. The residual mental impressions are responsible for recollection and previous experience is the cause of such impressions⁵¹. So recollection gets included in perception itself. Recollection is caused by Sādṛśya (similarity), Adṛṣṭa (effect of previous karma), Chinta (deep thought) and Sāhacharya (concomittance). When an object resembles another we are reminded of the other due to similarity. Due to the effect of our previous karma, we may remember spontaneously a prior experience. When there is conscious meditation we may recollect the auspicious figure of the Lord enshrined in any holy temple. If we are used to see two friends

invariably together, the sight of one kindles the recollection of another. It is clear from the above analysis that recollection is based on previous perceptual experience. But it, is not necessary that we should recollect all things we have experienced before for many of our Samskāras or residual impressions get obscured due to various reasons such as lapse of time, disease, etc.

‘क्वचित्कालदैर्घ्यात् व्याध्यादिना वा संस्कारप्रमोषात्
स्मृत्यभावः।’ Y. M. D. p -13

In recognition, the prior experience of our object is affirmed, by the present experience of the same object. This is perceptual experience as it is born of sense-object contact. Recognition is of the form of ‘This is that Devadatta’ and this is rightly included in perception according to Viśiṣṭādvaita logic⁵².

The system of Viśiṣṭādvaita considers Abhāva also as another form of existence and so the knowledge of non-existence is perceptual.

अभावस्त्वस्मन्मते भावान्तरात्मा । स चाक्षादिभिः यथा
सिद्ध्यति। न्या.परि. p-176

Advaitins and Bhattas accept Abhāva as a pramāṇa where as the Naiyāyikas consider it as a distinct category, though they do not admit it as a pramāṇa. Ūha or conjecture as well as Saṁśaya or doubt, arises out of perception, and so should be included in perception itself. Likewise, the special mental powers of great men are also included in pratyakṣa.

‘पुण्यपुरुषनिष्ठा प्रतिभापि प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्गता’। Y. M. D. p -14

It is the understanding of the Vedantins that all perceptual cognition has what is real for its object. The primary as well as the secondary texts affirm that the same indweller and controller is cognised in all cognition. The Sadvidyā has a bearing upon this theory.⁵³

That cosmic principle, the "Sat", thought of becoming many and created the elements. That primordial being got the tripartite combination of the elements and entered those elements, as the indweller of the Jīva and articulated names and forms. Thus all this is ensouled by the Supreme soul. And all kinds of elements are existing in all things on account of the fact of quintuplication. The Viṣṇu Purāṇa also speaks of evolution in the same terms. The Sūtrakāra also refers to the combination of these three elements, in the Sūtras⁵⁴. The existence of all elements in all things does not, anyhow lead to any confusion at all as the preponderant element shapes the thinghood of every object. One element becomes the Āśraya, and the others the Āśritas. This concept of dependency implies variation in preponderance.

Cases of error in perception are due to existing ocular defects, and when one is free from those defects there will be no illusion for one. ⁵⁵ In this school of thought all cognitions are real. The cognition of a dream is also real, as the scripture states that the supreme creates chariots etc., that remain for a certain time to be experienced by particular souls, according to their spiritual merit or demerit. The cognition of the yellow conch is real, due to the real cause of the effect of the bile in the eye. The cognition of the crystal as red, when placed near a Japākusuma, is also real⁵⁶.

The cognition of water in mirage is true. The cognition of one direction being mistaken for another is also true as one direction exists in another;

When the fire brand is swung round, that object comes in conjunction with all points of the circle, and the cognition of the fiery wheel is also real.

The cognition of one's own face in the mirrors is also true, as the visual rays moving towards the mirror are reversed by the mirror, and these cognize the person's own face after cognizing the mirror. This process is very rapid and so the interval between the perception of the mirror and the reflections is not apprehended. Even the apprehension of the double moon is real, as it is due to a real cause. Due to the pressure of the finger on the eye the visual rays are actually divided and, so the cognition of a double moon ensues, on account of the existence of two independent apparatus.

Thus all types of perceptions are real and have for their objects only those that are affected with difference.

Perception is not born out of a verbal statement:

The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita does not admit the possibility of perception born out of a verbal statement, as posited by the school of Śaṅkara. Knowledge has no doubt the element of perception as well as the element of scripture, but one should not be confused with the other. The causal collocation capable of producing knowledge indirectly cannot change its nature. If one kind of material is capable of producing different kinds of effects, then the incompatibility of all kinds of effects being produced by only one kind of causal collocation ensues. Then, the principle that the effect should be of the same kind as the

cause also becomes endangered, for one type of causal collocation cannot produce all kinds of effects. Scripture is capable of producing indirect knowledge only, and so cannot at any time produce direct awareness, through the sense-object contact.

‘नहि परोक्षस्वभावजननतया सिद्धसामग्री विशेषाभावे क्वचित् स्वभावमतिपतेत् । न चैकजातीयसामग्रीतः प्रसूतं कार्यं विचित्रं स्यात् । एकस्यैव सामग्र्या सर्वजातीयोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् एकस्य कार्यस्य विरुद्धजातियोग प्रसङ्गाच्च’ । न्या.परि. p- 97

In the statement ‘Thou art the tenth’, only ‘Thou’ is a perceptual cognition, and that ‘I am the Tenth’ is not born solely of the sense organs. This is a cognition generated from only the sentence uttered by the person.

‘दशमस्त्वमसि इत्यादिदृष्टान्तेऽपि त्वमर्थमात्रं प्रत्यक्षम् । दशमोऽहमिति प्रत्ययो हि नेन्द्रियस्वातन्त्र्येणोदेति किन्तु पुरुषवचनानुरोधेन ।’ न्या.परि. p- 97

If it is maintained that this cognition is also perception, though caused by a statement, then by the same logic the statement ‘Thou art meritorious’ also must be treated as perception which results in athiprasanga, as Dharma is not admitted to be the object of perception. In that case, there will be nothing in this world which is imperceptible, and there would be no meaning in classifying and differentiating the different means of knowledge at all.

‘एवं धर्मवान् त्वमसि इति कार्तान्तिकोपदेशादौ तादृशोऽहमस्मीति बोधे धर्मादेरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गः । ततश्च अप्रत्यक्षमिति जगति किञ्चिन्नस्यात् ।’ न्या.परि. p- 97

Though scripture is admitted to establish Brahman,

verbal cognition as such, does not result in an immediate awareness of Brahman, which, of course, has got to be achieved by means of spiritual discipline. The realization of the Supreme can be brought out not by the texts as such, but only through the Divine Will to save the soul that loves immensely the Divine.

It is, therefore, the conclusion of this school that a verbal statement is not capable of generating Aparokṣa jñānam.

Now, we may sum up, as follows, the essential features of perception according to this school:

1. Perception is Sākṣātkāri Pramā or immediate experience of the objects. It does not depend upon any other kind of knowledge, but is born on the other hand, solely due to sense-object contact. Perception is possible to all selves and the lord.
2. The perception of the supreme Being, as well as that of the Eternal and Liberated souls, is eternal where as the perception of others is non-eternal.
3. Yogic perception is the only kind of mental perception in this school.
4. Indeterminate perception implies cognition of an object necessarily qualified by certain ATTRIBUTES. The perception of the first object of the kind is indeterminate, whereas successive perceptions are determinate, being followed by retrospection.
5. All cases of perception are real. Perceptual error arises due to the fact of non apprehension of the essential features of an object as well as its difference from others.

6. As all aspects of reality cannot be known by perception there is need for inference and scripture.

III. INFERENCE COGNITION

Inference is a distinct means of knowledge:

There are different means of gaining knowledge and we have examined the very first means of our approach to the objects of the external world viz., perception, in the previous section. Perception must necessarily stop somewhere, for its scope is limited to the sense-object contact only. Even after the cessation of the sense-object contact, we arrive at knowledge by means of Anusandhāna or the process of mental assimilation. Likewise, verbal testimony or speech also is, by itself, capable of conveying sense, and so happens to be a distinct means of valid knowledge. Thus, these three namely perception, inference and speech, have different characteristics of their own, though they are alike in their function of illuminating an object to a subject.

The distinctive characteristics of inference are as follows:-

- i) Inference is capable of apprehending an object out of sight as it can function even after the cessation of the sense-object contact.
- ii) It requires the Anusandhāna or the mental process of correlation between the pervader and the pervaded as perceived before.
- iii) Though the residual mental impressions are involved in inference, it is distinct from mental perception. The sub-conscious impressions are in the back-ground in perception, whereas in inference, they feature

prominently in the comprehension of the concomittance between the general and the particular.

- iv) Inference is distinct from memory. Memory brings to our mind only those things that are previously experienced, whereas inference illumines things never before experienced. This fact of Adhikaviṣayatva differentiates inference from memory.
- v) Inference is different from verbal knowledge for this has quite different factors operating in the generation of knowledge.
- vi) Inference is based on perception, and yet it is distinct and different from perception and scripture.⁵⁷

Definition and character of inference:

Inference is defined by Vedānta Deśika as :

‘व्याप्यस्य व्याप्यत्वानुसन्धानात् व्यापकविशेषप्रतीतिरनुमानम्’ ।

न्या.परि. p-98

Inferential cognition is the valid knowledge of the particular pervader or ‘Vyāpaka’ obtained from the observation of the pervadedness of the pervaded or Vyāpya. Here are three terms namely ‘Vyāpya’, ‘Vyāpaka’ and ‘Anusandhāna’. The Vyāpya or the pervaded is as a rule not more extensive than the Vyāpaka or pervader in respect of space and time. We come to know from our daily experience that certain objects exist together in respect of space and time. Some objects exist in a wider range than others whereas some exist in a smaller range. Some sets of objects have an equal range of existence, and to include them also as pervaded, the definition of Vyāpya is given by this school as ‘Anadhika dēśa kāla niyatam.’ The Vyāpya,

therefore, does not cover a greater range than the Vyāpaka. This means that the Vyāpya might be smaller in range or might equally coexist spatially or temporally with the Vyāpaka. The Vyāpaka or pervader is defined as 'Anyūnadēśakālavṛtti' or that which is not less extensive than the Vyāpya in respect of time and space. According to this the pervader has to cover a greater range than the pervaded, or atleast an equal range as that of the Vyāpya⁵⁸.

We observe different objects existing together spatially and temporally and arrive at the principle of invariable concomittance, and later apply this law of invariable concomittance in particular cases, and this is known as Anusandhāna.

This application of the law that is previously deduced is the essential part of inference. The Vyāpyatva or pervadedness of the pervaded or vyāpya is analysed in each case and fresh objects are found out by means of past experiences. So Anusandhāna is very important as the nature of the Vyāpya is clearly shown by this. To give an illustration we may consider the relationship between fire and smoke. Fire is a particular pervader and smoke is invariably pervaded by fire. Wherever there is smoke there is fire, but smoke is not invariably existent wherever there is fire. In this instance we find that smoke is not more extensive than fire whereas fire is not less extensive than smoke. The knowledge of this particular pervader namely fire is cognised through inference.

For valid inference, it is very essential that we should grasp the unconditional correlation between the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka. All objects of our experience are not Vyāpya, and therefore, one has to deduce the law of

association, by means of actual observation and accurate analysis. Logicians cannot, however, ignore the upādhis or counter - laws defying the concomitance of objects. So we have to find out carefully these upādhis or counter-laws in every case of Vyāpya and Vyāpaka. What is an upādhi then? It is defined as ⁵⁹ .

‘साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यसमव्याप्तः साधनधर्मव्यतिरिक्तः
धर्मः उपाधिः’ । न्या.परि. p-100

A characteristic which is not extensively applicable to the sādhana or Vyāpya, but which applies extensively to the sādhya or Vyāpaka, being in itself different from- the sādhana or Vyāpya is an upādhi. In the proposition ‘The mountain is fiery because it has smoke, the contact with wet fuel is found invariably in every place where there is smoke, but not in every place where there is fire. So this contact with wet fuel is less extensive than fire, but co-extensive with smoke. The presence of an upādhi doesnot allow unconditional correlation between the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka and consequently vitiates the inference⁶⁰. This upādhi is of two types namely definite and doubtful. The following is an example for an upādhi of a definite type:

‘विप्रतिपन्ना सेवा दुःखहेतुः राजसेवावत् इत्यनुमाने पापारब्धत्वम्
ईश्वरसेवायां नास्तीति शास्त्रतो निश्चितत्वात् व्याप्तत्वाच्च
निश्चितोपाधिः । न्या.परि. p-100

“Service is the cause of unhappiness just like the service of a king”. In the above instance our invariable association does not subsist between the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka viz., service and unhappiness, as it is ascertained by the scriptures that unhappiness does not exist in the

service of God. In the service of God there is no pāpārabdhatva or result of previous demerit. This characteristic of pāpārabdhatva is extensively applicable to the Vyāpaka namely causing unhappiness but is not extensively applicable to the Vyāpya or service. So there is no correlation between the sādhyā and the sādhana, namely service and unhappiness. This upādhi is definite, as it is so ascertained by the Śāstras.

Upādhi is also of a doubtful nature as in the following example:

‘विप्रतिपन्नो जीवः एतच्छरीरावसाने मुक्तिमान् निष्पन्न
समाधित्वात् शुकादिवदित्यत्र कर्मात्यन्तपरिक्षयः उपाधिः । सच
निष्पन्नसमाधौ विप्रतिपन्ने जीवे अस्तिवा नास्ति वा इति
सन्दिग्धत्वात् शङ्कितोपाधिः ।

न्या.परि. p-100

“This self attains liberation at the end of this body as it has achieved samādhi just like suka”. In this inference the upādhi happens to be the total destruction of previous karma. As it is doubtful whether the self in question has any residual karma or not, the sādhyā and the sādhana cannot be unconditionally correlated. Though yōgins free themselves from the bondage of both accumulated and the future karmas they cannot get themselves rid of the prārabdha karma, without actually exhausting it by experience. It may be that they take many births to exhaust it completely. So there can be no correlation between Niṣpannasamādhitva and Liberation. The total absence of any karma is the upādhi here, and as the existence or otherwise of this characteristic cannot be definitely known, this is designated as Śankithōpādhi.

The upādhi or the counter-law takes many forms and one has to observe carefully each case of correlation of the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka. This upādhi has to be avoided by means of Tarka.⁶¹

So, it becomes established that Anusandhāna of the pervadedness of the pervader means the process of mentally analysing the unconditional correlation between the Vyāpya or the reason and the Vyāpaka or the point to be proved⁶².

Essential features of inference according to Viśiṣṭādvaita :

Though inferential cognition is accepted as a means of valid knowledge by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, it differs from the other schools in its details and has some special features of its own. These are:

1. Observation of a number of instances for grasping pervasion.
2. The refutation of Kevala Vyathirēki Anumāna.
3. The refutation of Parārthānumāna.
4. No restriction regarding the usage of the component parts of the formal inference.
5. Inference includes Tarka also.

Let us now examine each of these in brief.

1. Vyāpti or the invariable association between two objects is ascertained by means of repeated observation⁶³. The view point of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāchārya as explained in Tatvaratnākara is that pervasion is perceived by observing even a single instance if it is determinative.⁶⁴

But Varāda Viṣṇu Miśra is of the opinion that pervasion can be grasped only by observing a number of instances⁶⁵. The relation of vyāpti cannot be known only by perceiving it once. A single experience, it is said, cannot establish this, for one experience cannot bring out an extraordinary perception involving the cognition of things that are even afar, as Samānya-lakṣana-pratyāsatti is not admissible here. So the relation of pervasion is to be understood, according to Deśika, who follows Varāda Viṣṇu Miśra, only by means of repeated observation. Sahachāradarśana, or observation of concomittance, is essential, be it found in one or a number of experiences. Experience is necessary for the cognition of vyāpti. As a universal pervasion cannot be established by a single instance, it is maintained, to be on the safer side, that Bhūyōdarśana, or repeated observation, is needed for the establishment of vyāpti. ⁶⁶

2. Inference is of two types according to this school namely Anvaya vyathirēki or affirmative-cum-negative and Kevalānvayin or bare co-affirmation⁶⁷. The anvayavyathirekin probans has both positive and negative concomittance. It has got its vipakṣa or counter-instance as well. In the example 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke' - the positive concomittance such as, 'whatever has smoke has fire just as the hearth' is as prominent as the negative concomittance, such as, 'whatever has no fire has no smoke like a lake.' This kind of reason is affirmative-cum-negative. Every act of inference has two aspects or limbs namely vyāpti and Pakṣadharmatā. Vyāpti or pervasion forms the subjective aspect whereas

Pakṣadharmatā or subject-characterisation has an objective aspect. These two elements are involved in every act of inference. These together have five conditions as follows:-

Vyāpti or pervasion has (1) Sapakṣa Satvam or presence in similar instances, (2) Vipakṣa vrittirahitatvam or absence in counter-instance. The Pakṣadharmatā aspect has the aspects of (3) Pakṣavyāpakatvam or presence in the subject; (4) Abādhita Viśayatvam or unstultified object. Both have incommon (5) Asatpratipakṣatvam or absence of opposite problems.

All these five phases are found in the Anvaya vyatirēkī inference.

पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात् ।

योयो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः ।

योऽग्निः स निर्धूमः यथा महाहृदः ।

The affirmative-cum-negative inference is that which has a counter instance as well and has all the five phases of vyāpti and Pakṣadharmatā, required for a perfect inference.

The kevalānvayi inference is pure positive reason and has no counter instance.

In the example, “Brahman is expressible by word, because it is a thing like a jar”,

‘ब्रह्म शब्दवाच्यं वस्तुत्वात् द्रव्यत्वाद्वा घटादिवत् ।

This reason of being verbally expressible is purely affirmative, and as there is not a vipakṣa, the negative reason is totally excluded. This is Kevalānvayi. It is defined as

‘तादृशमेव विपक्षरहितं केवलान्वयि’

न्या.परि. p -102

This kind of reason has only four of the five conditions as the fact of being absent in the counter instance is ruled out, due to the total absence of a counter instance itself. Even this Kevalānvayi reason, according to Deśika, is claimed to have all the five aspects of inferential cognition. The very fact of the Kevalānvayi reasons having no counter instance proves necessarily its Vipakṣa Vrittirahitatvam⁶⁸.

The Kevalānvayin cannot be deemed to be invalid, just because of the absence of the counter instance. The absence of a counter instance itself, once for all, rules out the possibility of the reason being present in the counter instance, and so goes to prove its validity itself. If it is contended that the Kevalānvayin cannot be admitted, as it would lead to unjustifiable conclusions such as-"fire is cold because it is an object just like a jar", it shall be answered that it is not so. In the given instance, the coldness of the fire is contradictory to all human experience, and so such an inference is smashed to pieces. But such Kevalānvayi inferences that are not contradicted by experience are perfectly valid.

The Kevalānvayi has certain definite advantages. Firstly, this kind of inference establishes the validity of the scriptures, and demolishes the counter attack of the Buddhists. Secondly, people of ordinary intelligence will not turn out disbelievers of the scriptures that declare the Absolute Brahman to be beyond speech and thought ⁶⁹. Thus the bare affirmative implies the contradiction of the opposite of the Sādhya, and in the long run, results in the establishment of the sādhyā itself.

Negation of Kēvala Vyathirēki Inference:

While there exists the bare affirmative reason, as well as the affirmative-cum-negative reason, there does not exist according to Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians, a bare negative reason. That is why the Kevalavyathirēki inference or the bare negative inference is rejected. The following are the reasons put forth for the rejection of the bare negative.

1. The bare negative has no factual foundation, as the very essential characteristic of 'Sapakṣa Satvam' is missing in it.
2. It is impossible to grasp in the Kēvalavyathirēki inference any invariable concomitance operating between the Sādhya and the Sādhana, just because the Sādhya happens to be the unknown as in the example.⁷⁰

‘अनुभूतिः अननुभाव्या अनुभूतित्वात् । यदनुभाव्यं न सा अनुभूतिः यथा घटः ।

‘Consciousness is uncognizable as it is consciousness. What is cognizable is not consciousness just like a pot’. When the very knowledge of the Sādhya is impossible, it is obvious that there cannot be any process of inference at all, which necessarily involves the knowledge of the Sādhya and the Sādhana.

‘केवलव्यतिरेकिणि साध्याप्रसिद्धेः तद्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः दुर्गहा’

न्या.पी. p- 105

3. Inference has got its own limitations according to this school, and cannot prove the existence of God and the individual self, and so it is restricted to only the sphere

of humanly sensible objects. So much so, Kēvalavyathirēkī inference is not needed for proving super-sensible objects, as posited by thinkers of other schools.

4. Kēvalavyathirēkī inference is not indispensable for accurately defining things, as argued by some schools. The Anvayavyathirēkī inference itself does this function of definitions very successfully. Even in Anvayavyathirēkī the affirmative concomitance itself is the most important, and the negative reason only goes to prove the former.

‘लक्षणस्य केवलव्यतिरेकित्वाभावात्’ । न्या.परि p- 150

The opinions of Varada Viṣṇu Misra and Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, appearing to be leaning towards the acceptance of the bare negative, when closely examined, appear to be the prima-facie view, being that of Akṣapada only. It is therefore the opinion of Deśika that the bare negative is completely inadmissible. Nyāyakuliśa of Atreya Rāmānuja also clearly states that this is not the view of the Siddhāntin⁷¹.

So, the syllogism of the type of Kēvalavyathirēkī is not acceptable to this school, as it is far from experience. It may be argued that the bare-affirmative reason is also subject to the same kind of defect, as seen in the following example.

‘घटः स्वप्रकाशः घटत्वात् । न यदेवं न तदेवं यथा घटः’ ।

This argument is incorrect. All types of examples of the bare-negative are fundamentally defective as pervasion is totally absent there. Vyathirēka vyāpti is

incomprehensible, as they are beyond human experience. But, an instance of bare-affirmative is not so. In this case, the most significant point is Anvaya Vyāpti and this can be surely grasped and so this bare-affirmative reason is quite valid⁷².

The argument that the bare negative is essential for accurately defining objects also falls flat as the bare-negative alone does not define a thing⁷³. The Tatvarathnākara affirms that the extraordinary features of an object have got to be noted to define them. and to distinguish them from like and unlike objects.

‘असाधारणधर्मोपस्थापनेन व्यवहारव्यवस्थापकमाप्तवाक्यादिक
मेवलक्षणम् ।’ न्या.परि p- 105

The bare-negative cannot stand to this test. Prameya is defined as Pramāviṣaya, and this does not happen in the case of the bare negative.

‘प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयमित्यादिषु च लक्षणतया संमतेषु
विपक्षशून्यत्वेन केवलव्यतिरेकित्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गः’। न्या.परि p- 105

The object of prama, then, must necessarily be an existent and never a bare-negative. The bare-negative is bound to be denied, even if Lakṣana is defined as comprising of both positive and negative (Anvayavyathirēkī Viśesa), as this positive-cum-negative pervasion is absent in that bare-negative. The denial of the bare-negative is bound to ensure, even if Lakṣana is defined as,

‘असाधारणो व्यापको धर्मो लक्षणम् ।’ न्या.परि p- 105

Lakṣanam has nothing like Kēvalavyathirēkī at any time. In the following example,

शरीरम् पार्थिवम् गन्धवत्त्वात् घटवत् ।

शरीरम् आप्यादिकं न भवति गन्धवत्त्वात् घटवत् ।

the special characteristic of 'Gandhavatva' establishes the fact of pāṛthivatva or otherwise of objects. This characteristic is invariably present in earth and invariably absent in any others. This, therefore, happens to be the distinguishing characteristic of the body⁷⁴. So, the bare-negative has nothing to do with the definition of things, and it cannot help us to grasp the defining characteristics of things, as held by the objector.

The refutation of Parārthānumāna:

Some logicians classify inference into two kinds namely Svārthānumana and Parārthānumana. This kind of classification is not agreeable to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, for all inferences are only Svārtha, as they are brought out by one's own SvārthAnumāna. A person might understand the generalization viz., 'Where there is smoke there is fire', after observing the concomittance of fire and smoke repeated invariably in various places. This is said to be inference for one's own self. After making out this generalization, he may use a five-membered syllogism to enable others to know the same inferential cognition. Then it is said to be inference for another.

This kind of division into Svārtha and Parārtha is wholly unreasonable, for self-comprehension of the invariable concomittance is the origin of all inferences.⁷⁵ All inferences promote one's own activity in life after enlightening one self about the invariable association of several objects. So inferences are all Svārtha alone.

Even when a syllogistic reasoning is presented to make

others know of this inferential cognition, it must be said, that the person infers for himself and he does not cognize only on the strength of the inferential statement. He becomes aware of the pervasion of things and this knowledge of invariable concomitance enables him to infer for himself after self experience. If inference is said to be for another or Parārtha only, on the basis of the use of words by another, then it will have to result in the acceptance of perceptual and verbal knowledge also as inference. So, inference for another is out of question. The essentiality of self experience is emphasised, and the syllogism used only reminds of the pervasion, on the basis of which one has to infer for oneself. A verbal statement reminding one of the pervasion cannot, therefore, be treated as inference for another⁷⁶.

When we examine these issues carefully, we can conclude that all inferences are only for oneself, but that the pramāṇas of inferential cognition are two fold namely (1) Those that are self experienced and (2) those that arise out of the words of others.

‘एतदुक्तं भवति - द्विविधानि प्रमाणानि स्वयमेव सिद्धानि,
परवाक्यपूर्वाणि चेति सामान्यत एव विभागः कार्यः इति’ ।

न्या.परि p- 107

The Component Parts of the Formal Syllogism:

The Nāyāyikas advocate that the formal inference should be composed of the five components namely, (1) the proposition (2) the reason (3) the example (4) the application and (5) the conclusion.

While the Nāyāyikas uphold this kind of a syllogism having all the five components, the Mīmāsakas are satisfied

with only three viz. Pratijñā, Hetu and Udāharaṇa. The Buddhists need only Udāharaṇa and Upanaya and the rest they consider as superfluous. Vedānta Deśika declares that there is no hard and fast rule regarding the usage of the component parts of the formal inference, if only vyāpti and Pakṣadharmatā are clearly conveyed. So, the component parts are not fixed, and they may be used as the situation demands, and in accordance with the mental attainments of the individuals for whom they are meant. Syllogisms of all types such as the five-membered ones, three-membered ones, those without any part (Avayava kalpanārahita) and those having only affirmative-concomittance (ekavyāptika) and others are abounding in the works of savants like Rāmānuja, Yāmuna and other great teachers. What is essential here is that the aspect of pervasion is to be clearly conveyed, and this could be done according to the capacities of the persons for whom it is meant. There is no rule that only-five-membered syllogisms should be used always, just because such usages are found in standard works⁷⁷.

Though the two namely Udāharaṇa and Upanaya are alone ample to establish pervasion, all the other limbs of inference are used just to achieve clarity so that the things to be proved might be clearly explained. So it is the conclusion of this school that all the five members might be used if the inference is meant for immature minds and the two membered or three membered syllogisms might be used when meant for fully mature minds.

Upamāna or Comparison is not a distinct means of Knowledge:

Upamāna or comparison is not a distinct means of valid knowledge according to this school. This school

subsumes comparison under Smṛti itself⁷⁸. Comparison is composed of three parts, and these relate to perception, inference and verbal testimony respectively. A person hears from a forester that a gavaya is just like a cow, and when he goes to a forest sees an animal similar to a cow, and then makes out that it is a gavaya, on the authority of the words of the forester. First of all, the person comes to know the meaning of the word gavaya from a forester, and this part of acquisition of knowledge corresponds to verbal testimony. When that person sees an animal qualified by cow similarity, he remembers the meaning of the Atidesa Vākya, or the directive sentence. This part relates to perceptual cognition for he recalls all about the gavaya on account of his reminiscent impressions. Lastly, when he sees the gavaya in the forest the knowledge of the cow similarity-cognition arises in him, and this is based on Vyāpti and so relates to inferential cognition. Thus, when Upamāna is analysed, we find that it is comprised of these three aspects of perception, inference, and word. So, this is not admitted as a distinct means of knowledge.

Inference includes Tarka also:

The Nayyāyikas distinguish Tarka from Anumāna or inference, but according to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita it is considered as a kind of Anumāna, rather than a separate logical category. Vedānta Deśika discusses this issue in his Nyāyaparisuddhi in detail, and concludes that Tarka is a kind of inference itself. It appears that the great Rāmānuja himself distinguishes Tarka from Anumāna in the ‘Vilakṣaṇatvādhikāraṇa’, ‘Jijñāsādhikāraṇa’ and even in the Gita Bhāṣya while commenting on the stanza ‘मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च’. Rāmānuja quotes while commenting on

the Sūtra 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्' the stanza, तर्कोऽप्रतिष्ठः, and clearly distinguishes Tarka from inference. Tarka and inference seem quite different even on the surface. 'This is like this on account of this' is the form of inference whereas 'this may happen so if that were so' is the form of Tarka.

‘किंच एवंप्रतीतिरिति ह्यनुमानस्वरूपम्, एवं चेदेवं स्यादिति च तर्कप्रकारः’ । न्या.परि. p-141

So, these two are not held as identical as seen above. It also appears that Varada Nārāyaṇa and Viśṇuchitta hold Tarka to be different from inference.. Vedānta Deśika has examined these views thoroughly and with his remarkable acumen, known for syncretism, has arrived at the conclusion that Tarka is not different from inference. Even in Tarka, the principle of Vyāpti is necessarily obtained and there is the Anusandhāna of the Vyāpyatva of the Vyāpya. In so far as the principle of invariable concomitance plays the central role, Tarka is the same as Anumāna. But, there is a slight difference between Tarka and Anumāna, as there is difference in the nature of the reason. The reason in inference happens to be the real as experienced, whereas the reason in Tarka might be falsely imposed for purposes of confutation⁷⁹.

The opinion of the Bhāṣyakāra does not go to prove that Tarka is different from Anumān Vedānta Deśika declares that the statement 'तर्को हि नाम' etc., of the Bhāṣya only establishes the validity of Tarka as a kind of inference only⁸⁰. Other statements of Rāmānuja regarding Tarka have to be carefully understood and explained, in the same way. Śri Viśṇuchitta has admitted in his 'Sangathimāla', while explaining the Sūtra 'Rachanānupapattih', that Tarka

necessarily contains invariable concomitance⁸¹. It cannot also be proved that the Bhāṣyakāra considers Tarka as different from inference in his commentary on the Sūtra 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्'. Rāmānuja has affirmed, in this context, that mere Tarka is incapable of establishing super-sensible objects. This feature is common to inference, as well as perception, and if Tarka itself is rejected then there is no possibility of any furtherance of knowledge⁸².

But the use of Tarka to substantiate the knowledge derived from scriptures is admitted by all.

Not only this much. The Bhāṣyakāra has expressly used the term Anumāna to mean Tarka in the 'Ārambhanā dhikaraṇa'⁸³. Even the author of Tatvaratnākara opines that Tarka is not independently capable of establishing things but only can do so being supported by scriptures. The Tatvaratnākara, no doubt affirms after a detailed discussion in the Nyāya-Pāda that Tarka is not valid. But this cannot be decisive. Even the Bhāṣyakara, who has expressly stated and placed the Nyāya school as a heretic school along with the Chārvākas, Bauddhas, Jains and others, has of course, used many technicalities of those schools also, while examining the validity of things in accordance with their own aphorisms. Whatever is said like this in the course of argumentation, cannot be defacto conclusions.⁸⁴ So, the validity of Tarka is unquestioned. If it is construed as 'This might be so, and happens to be non-decisive, it gets included in doubt or Samsaya. So, it is described as follows.

‘संभवासंभवपरामर्शस्तर्कः’

न्या.परि p- 144

Thus, Deśika has argued to establish the validity of Tarka, and after a synoptic survey of all the contextual texts

dealing with Tarka, he concludes that it is identical with inference.

To sum up, we find out that the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita admits the validity of inference as a means of knowledge with some unique characteristics of its own, such as;

1. The pervasion to be grasped after repeated observation.
 2. The rejection of inference for another.
 3. The refutation of the bare-negative reason.
 4. Releasing the restriction in the usage of the five members in a syllogism.
- and
5. Identifying inference with Tarka.

IV. ŚABDA PRAMĀNA

Verbal testimony is valid means of knowledge

Verbal testimony or śabda is a distinct means of valid knowledge different from perception and inference. This is significant in as much as this is the sole means for the establishment of, and enlightenment upon, the super-sensible entities. The experiences of all savants and saints are stored up in word, and this is the most important factor that promotes the furtherance of knowledge and adds to the phenomena of recollection and recognition. Word is the vehicle of human thought, and happens to be a very powerful guide. Verbal testimony is the sole authority for determining the ethical, spiritual and transcendental truths.

Definition:

Verbal knowledge is defined by Vedānta Deśika as

‘अनाप्तानुक्तवाक्यजनितं तदर्थविज्ञानम् तत्प्रमाणम् ।
कारणदोषबाधकादर्शनात् । न्या.परि p- 149

‘The knowledge of the meaning got from the sentence unuttered by a non-trust worthy person is valid, for it is far from the errors of instrument and free from incompatibility’. The term ‘Anāptānukta’ in this definition is significant, as it is used to refute the theory of the personal origin of the veda. The Nayyāyikas define verbal testimony as ‘Āptōpadesah śabdah’, and admit Divine origin to the Vedas. The Vedas are taken as authorities, as God, ‘The Most Trustworthy person’, has uttered these words. This standpoint is not admissible to Vedantins who advocate the Apauruṣēyatva or impersonality of the Vedas. If the Vedas were personal, then the defects of the Person would inevitably creep in and result in its invalidity. But the uttered statement of a non-trustworthy person would not be valid, as it would betray defective sources.

If cannot be argued that verbal testimony is invalid, as it is merely a verbal statement. Then we ask whether the sentence, used to attack the validity of verbal testimony, is valid or invalid. If this verbal statement finding fault with scripture is mentioned to be valid, then it also turns out to be equally invalid for the same reason of being a verbal statement as alleged above. If it is admitted that this sentence used to find fault is invalid, then it cannot invalidate the authority of the scripture. Thus, the validity of scripture cannot be questioned. The words of the mad and the like become invalid and incompatible, originating from defective sources, and so the validity of scriptures becomes established.

This is Distinct from Perception, Inference and Recollection:

Verbal testimony is different from perception, as there is no immediacy of awareness through the sense-object contact in it. It is not included in inference, as it has no major or middle term or mental reflection. Śabda has only Bōdhakatva whereas Anumithi has Vyāpti or pervasion. The opinion of Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas that verbal testimony is included in inference is not in accordance with our experiences. When we get knowledge from a sentence we never feel that we are inferring. Words have the power of connotation, and this is quite different from pervasion or Vyāpti. The Prabhākaras are of opinion that non-vedic or Laukika passages are included in inference, and this also is incorrect. Deśika affirms his stand that inference is beyond the sphere of verbal knowledge.⁸⁵ As we cannot establish any invariable association between the word and the object it signifies, we cannot at any time call this inference.

We cannot call verbal knowledge as recollection even. The subconscious impressions are essential for causing memory. This factor is not found in scripture which has for its object some thing not known before, and this Apūrvaviśayatva distinguishes this from memory. We remember only what we have experienced before. But verbal knowledge relates to something with which we become newly acquainted. So, verbal knowledge is distinct and different from perception, inference and memory⁸⁶.

This special characteristic of verbal testimony, which is distinct from others, has been recognized by all savants of the past.

Word and its Meaning:

The propagators of the Nyāya school expound that the

meanings of words are decided by either divine or human convention. This type of Vāchya-vāchaka-sambandha is not agreeable to this school. According to this school of thought, this convention is neither God-made nor man-made. The word and its meaning are eternally related to each other. Rāmānuja advocates this theory in his Vedārtha Sangraha, and Deśika strongly upholds it and contends that the words of the Veda need no such convention to convey meaning⁸⁷. All words that are in secular usage are also expounded to have originated from Vedic tradition, and so they do not need any prescribing authority⁸⁸. It is affirmed that all words are somewhere or other found used in the Vedas.


‘भाषाप्रयुक्तस्सर्वोऽपि वेदे क्वापि प्रयोगवान् ।

वेदैकनियतः शब्दः नान्यत्रेति व्यवस्थितिः ॥ न्या.परि. 150

Rāmānuja also strongly maintains in his Vedārtha Sangraha that all words are only Vedic.

Classification of Sentence:


A sentence is a particular group of words and this is of two kinds viz., personal (Pauruṣēya) and impersonal (Apauruṣēya) The original composition of a man is Pauruṣēya and sentences which are impersonal are Apauruṣēya.



The original compositions of human beings are both with and without sense, whereas the impersonal texts are always meaningful and never incompatible. The sentences like 'fire is cold', 'water is not liquid', are examples of non-sensible compositions

Vṛtti or senses and the word:

Again, there are two kinds of senses namely the primary sense and the secondary sense. The primary denotation signifies the philological or conventional meaning. When the primary sense is stultified, the sense nearest to it is taken, and this is the secondary denotation. This secondary relationship is of a two-fold nature—one that is mainly connected with the primary sense itself, and another connected with its attributes. 'A hamlet on the Ganga', is an example for the former, 'whereas 'Devadatta is a lion' is an example for the latter. In the former 'the bank of the Ganga' is implied, and in the latter, Devadatta is ascribed with the qualities of valour and strength connected with the word lion. This can be shown in the following way:



The Theory of the Verbal Knowledge:

A number of words make a sentence, and when we hear a sentence we get some knowledge. How do these words convey this knowledge? We find here two aspects. Many words are used and these have various meanings in a sentence in connection with various words. The words must have something to do with the different meanings

independently. But this is not all. The words alone cannot produce verbal knowledge. A group of disorderly and ungrammatical words can convey no sense. So, the connection between word and a word in a sentence is also an important factor. Then does verbal knowledge depend upon the connection in a sentence among the meanings expressed by words individually or does it depend upon the meanings expressed by the words in a sentence only that produce in us a knowledge of the mutual connection among them? This is an important question that has been elaborately discussed from very early times. Some philosophers give primary importance to the Anvaya, or connection among the words of a sentence, and affirm that the words of the sentence disappear after conveying their respective meanings, after which the meanings themselves produce in us a knowledge of their mutual connection which is called verbal knowledge. This theory of verbal knowledge is called the Abhihitānvaya vāda and is advocated by Bhatta mīmāṃsakas and Nayyāyikas. The followers of Advaita Vedānta also uphold this theory of the connection of the expressed alone.

The other view point about verbal knowledge gives primary importance not to the connection or Anvaya, but to the words. They argue that words by themselves cannot convey sense, but, that they can have the power of sense only in a sentence. So mutual connection is produced only in a sentence. So it is not the connection of the expressed which is important but the expression of the connected which is really essential for conveying verbal knowledge. The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas are the propagators of this theory of verbal knowledge which is known as Anvitābhidhāna vāda.

What is the theory of knowledge that is adopted by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita ? The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita is divided on this issue. Some teachers of this School held the theory of Abhihitānvaya as theirs, in accordance with the exposition of some Sūtras by Rāmānuja, whereas others like Yāmunachārya and others were advocates of the Anvitābhidhāna theory. Deśika upholds the theory of Anvitābhidhāna as the accepted theory of this school. Every word is formed of the Prakṛthi and the Prathyaya or the affix, and both these convey together a united sense. Likewise, all the words of a sentence together convey a total sense, as in the word Dandya. Though the word is divisible into the prakṛthi part and the prathyaya part, it conveys one Viśiṣṭārtha or a single combined sense. Similarly, the words of a sentence also convey a unitary sense comprising of the meanings reminded by the respective words.

‘यथापदानि प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेन विभक्तान्यपि विशिष्टमेकं पदार्थं वदन्ति ; एवं पदान्यपि परस्परस्मारितार्थविशिष्टमेकं अर्थं वदन्ति।’

स.सि. p- 240

This theory of knowledge is free from the fallacies of Chakraka or the wheel, or Punarabhidhā or tautology. The fallacy of chakraka in the other theory is as follows. First, the several words convey their respective senses. Then there is the process of reflection regarding the relationship of the words. Thirdly, the words yield their senses again according to the connection. Lastly, there is the awareness of the meaning. This is chakraka:

‘पदैरर्थप्रतीतिः । अनन्तरमाकांक्षादिपरामर्शः । पश्चात् पदैः अर्थाभिधानम् । ततोऽर्थप्रतीतिरिति चक्रकम् । स.सि.p-241

The fallacy of Anyōnyāśraya is inescapable in the theory of Abhihitānvaya. The meanings are possible to be conveyed only after reflecting over the Ākamkṣa and others the Ākamkṣa or expectancy and others are possible to be made only after knowing the meanings. All these defects are avoided in the theory of Anvitābhīdhāna. The theory of Abhihitānvaya, on the other hand, is very cumbersome, for one has to admit a triple power of sense.

1. Firstly, the power of the word to convey its sense.
2. Secondly, the power of the meanings of the individual words to convey their connection.
3. Thirdly, the power of the words conveying sense-connectedness in the individual word meanings.

‘पदानां स्वार्थबोधनशक्तिः पदार्थानां संसर्गबोधनशक्तिः,
पदानामेव पदार्थेषु संसर्गबोधनशक्त्याधानशक्तिरिति शक्तित्रयं
कल्प्यमभिहितान्वयवादिनः ।’

स.सि. p-241

But, the theory of Anvitābhīdhāna is not so. It is very simple. The individual words have got only Smāraakatva or the power of bringing a glimpse of their meanings to the hearers. But, consistent meaning is possible only in a sentence.

When a sentence is heard by a person the process will be as follows:

The several words recall to the mind of the listener a glimpse of their respective meanings. When the hearer has recollected the meanings of the words, he apprehends the meanings according to Ākamkṣa or expectancy, Yōgyatā or compatibility and Āsatthi or juxtaposition. The power of

denotation of words aids the hearer to get at the inter-related sense of the sentence. He gets a unitary idea out of the inter-related diverse meanings of the words⁸⁹.

Deśika has, in his Nyāya Pārisuddhi, profusely quoted from ancient thinkers to support the view of Anvitābhidhana, but, he is not very critical of those thinkers of the same school who are for the theory of Abhihitānvaya. In his Tattva Mukta Kalāpa he pronounces that even the theory of Abhihitānvaya, is not in any way damaging the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Based on the arguments of Rāmānuja, advanced in his Śrī Bhāṣya, some followers of this school admit Abhihitānvaya as the theory of verbal knowledge. Deśika, known for his syncretist tendency, admits of the possibility of conveying the sense of the sentence through the sense of the words, especially to the young children, at the time of their learning. But, it is an established fact, he says, that, whatever be the theory of verbal knowledge Abhihitānvaya or Anvitābhidhana, it is impossible to establish the Nirvisēṣa Brahman through verbal testimony⁹⁰.

The Aparyavasāna Vṛtti:

The theory of verbal knowledge as adopted by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, namely the Anvitābhidhana Vṛtti, signifies that the words have the power to denote the respective meanings along with the qualities or differences. The power of giving unitary meaning or 'Viśiṣṭārthābhidhāyitva' of the words is the conclusion that is drawn from the above theory of verbal knowledge.

‘एवमन्विताभिधानसामर्थ्याद्विशिष्टप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तेश्च
पदानामपि विशिष्टार्थाभिधायिवं सिद्धम्’ । न्या.परि. p- 152

The power of the word to denote is not, therefore, limited to the Viśeṣaṇa part, but it implies the Viśeṣya together with the Viśeṣaṇas. This deeper sense of denotation is called "Aparyavasāna Vṛtti." The substratum and the attributes go always together, and so words denote, according to the Anvitābhidhāna Vṛtti, the individuals qualified by the generic attributes.

‘तस्मात्तां तद्विशिष्टमभिदधति पदानि’। त.मु.क. 4-78

The Vaiśeṣika analysts are of opinion that the jāti or generic attribute is a distinct and eternal entity underlying all objective reality and they advocate that the jāti is the import of the words. The Mīmāsakas also opine that the words directly mean the jāti or the general, and that they indirectly indicate the individuals. This theory of the Vaiśeṣikas and the mīmāsakas, propagating the primary denotation of jāti to the words, is against experience and so inadmissible. The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita upholds that Brahman is the sole ground and sustainer of all others in this multi-universe, and that there is not an eternal entity like jāti. After all what is jāti? It is an attribute only that gives objectivity and reality to the objects. The words signify the individuals alone and not the generic attribute, for the generic attribute is in no way helpful to the furtherance of our activities. Moreover, our mind cannot conceive of the jāti without the individual at any time.

‘व्यक्तिशून्यां जातिं कदाचिदपि न स्मृशति धिषणा’। स.सि. 2333

The words we use are of different kinds and categories. Some words definitely mean the jāti, such as jāti and samanyam. Some other words mean only the

individual such as vyakti, svarūpam etc. words, other than these. that form the majority, mean the individual qualified by the generic attributes. So, it is justified to maintain that words in general denote the individual invariably accompanied with their characteristic features⁹¹.

The mīmāṃsaka view point that words have a two-fold import, a primary one meaning the jāti, and a secondary one meaning the individual or vyakti, is not tenable as all the words signifying the jāti must imply the substratum or the vyakti. Gōṭva or cow hood can be known only when the cow is known. It is impossible to know the genus with out knowing the particular. The prathyaya and the sthiti of Gōṭva depend upon its substratum, the cow, and this dependence of genus on the individual affirms that it is impossible to imply the genus in the absence of signifying the individual. So the import of the words like cow and others is undoubtedly the individual⁹².

Deśika has thus criticised other theories of verbal import and has established his theory that the words meaning the jāti must imply the vyakti or individual. This theory is extended to words signifying the attributes or guṇas also to imply their locus the guṇi.

गुणवाचिन्यपि पदे जातिशब्दोक्तनीतितः ।

अपृथक्सिद्धवाचित्वान्नयुक्ता गुणिलक्षणा” । न्या.परि. p-153

The attributes are inseparably related to their substratum, and so, all words meaning the Dharma or guṇa imply their substratum. This leads to the conclusion that words signifying the inseparable attributes denote their substratum, unless otherwise ordained.

All words meaning different material and spiritual objects mean ultimately Brahman the innerself of all. This school has propounded this import of Aparyavasāna Vṛtti, as it has realised the oneness of the Absolute Brahman as the Immanent principle, amidst the multiplicity of the sentient and the non-sentient entities. So, all the words, used to signify all objects sentient and non-sentient that are the inseparable attributes of Brahman, denote in the primary sense Brahman, the super subject, the All-self.⁹³

All words used to denote the bodies primarily mean the indwelling conscious being, and so they denote the Absolute who is the inner self of all. It is in this sense that Brahman is described as 'Sarva śabda Vāchya'⁹⁴.

It may be objected to this that any kind of transaction in this world would become impossible, if all words used by all would only refer to the cosmic principle. But it is not so. Though the import of all the words is ultimately the Absolute Reality, yet the denotation of some words is restricted by us according to our purposes to signify the attributes only, and these words are called Niṣkarṣaka śabdās. When we intend to signify objects other than Brahman, the scope of denotation of particular words is limited to such objects only. So, there happens to be no confusion.

It is according to this convention alone, that in the statement 'That thou art' the word 'Thou' refers only to Śvētakētu and not to Brahman, the Innermost self. If not, there would have been no chance of an advice at all. The nominative of address Śvētakētu is limited only to that individual as the situation of enlightenment naturally demands. The statement is expressed very clearly as 'That thou art'. In this instance, 'Sāmānādhikaranya' is desired

either through the relation of cause and effect or through the relation of body and soul. In both cases, the sense of the word thou results in that of the word 'That'.

So, it is concluded that except in the case of words purposefully used with limited denotation, all words signify Brahman only. Rāmānuja has expounded this theory of import of words by means of 'Sāmānādhikarānya according to the principle of Aruṇādhikarāna. So, all words denoting various objects sentient and non-sentient, denote Brahman only, as the world of matter and finite selves happen to be its inseparable attributes⁹⁵.

Verbal knowledge does not require kāryārtha only for being valid:

The Prābhākara Mīmāsakas maintain that words have Ādya-vyutpatti, only in activity which is observed from the activity of elders⁹⁶, and so all words are said to indicate something to be done. They are valid with regard to prescribing some activity or other. Only such sentences among the Vedas that enjoin action are valid, and others that denote existent things are invalid to the above school. Their theory is that the power of words to express things can be determined, only according to certain actions prescribed by them. An old man orders one, near by, to bring a cow and he goes and leads the cow there. The child, nearby, understands by this activity of the elders the meaning of the sentence "Bring the cow". After listening to various sentences like "Tie down the cow", "Bring the horse" and others, the child makes out the import of the words bring, tie down, horse and others. Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas contend that verbal knowledge depends upon only "Kāryārtha" and that words cannot denote existing thing or

"Siddhārtha". This theory of the Mīmāṃsakas is not admissible to the Vedantins who posit the theory that the words convey primarily the "Siddhārtha", or the existing things, as Brahman.

Even though the view point of the Mīmāṃsakas that the words depend upon Kāryārtha is admitted, it must be agreed that the power of the words does necessarily denote even the existing things. Of the four senses the word, namely Mukhya, Gauna, Lākṣanika and Tātparya, though a word has primary sense, it denotes something else by the power of intention or tātparya, and so there is no hard and fast rule that words do not denote things other than those determined by actions. Though the school of Mīmāṃsa considers the Veda as signifying "sacrificial action", other Existent things or Siddhārthas, such as the different agents like the Ritvik, the Yajamana and others, the different means such as kapāla, purōdāṣa and others, and the different results such as Svarga, svarājya and others, are also implied. These are all accomplished things and are implied by the power of intention, dependent upon the sentences enjoining sacrificial action.

‘अतः कार्यविशेषतया सिद्धस्यापि कार्यवाक्येषु तात्पर्यभूमित्वात्
व्युत्पत्तेः कार्यपरत्वनिर्बन्धो निर्निबन्धनः ।’

त.मु.क. p-4-72, स.सि. p-230

The Prābhākaraśāstra classify words as vedic and non-vedic, and contend that vedic words mean kāryārtha, whereas the non-vedic mean siddhārtha. This classification is not reasonable as no such watertight division could be made between vedic and non-vedic words.⁹⁷

There is no rule that words either vedic or non-vedic have meaning, only with reference to things that are to be done, for we see many statements like 'पिता ते सुखमास्ते' "your father is safe", serving some purpose. These words denote facts that are existing. It is in our ordinary experience to teach children gradually and repeatedly, by pointing out with our finger at different objects and using words that denote them. As a result of this, the children get an idea that such and such a word denotes such and such a thing. This strengthens the conviction that words have the power to denote even things that are already existing. So vedic words have the power to denote Brahman that is ever existing in all entities, as their immanent principle. What is of primary importance here is the relating of Bōdhya Bōdhaka Bhāva between the words and their relative objects. It is on account of this that the words convey both Kāryārtha and Siddhārtha.⁹⁸

The Principal Texts of Verbal Authority:

The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita believes in the authority of the entirety of the vedas, the eternal sacred teaching. The veda is impersonal or is Apauruṣeya, in as much as it is not the original composition of any person, just like any poetry, drama or story. The several references found therein such as 'the composers of the hymns', 'this is the breath of the Lord', 'the Riks and the Samans were produced', 'the yajus was born out of that' etc. do not go to prove its personal origination, but only its propagation at different times and ways. The vedic statements are inherently valid and authoritative. It is maintained that the order of the letters of the vedic scripture is also eternal, due to the eternal desire of the Supreme. The Lord is going to preach the Vedas to the four faced Brahma at the beginning of every

cycle of cosmic creation, according to the order that existed in previous creations. The Nayyāyika view that God is the author of the vedas and that the vedas are authoritative on account of their being His words, is not acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The Veda is equally authoritative, and it is on account of these Vedas that we can reach the supreme Being. These infallible texts establish the existence of the Divine being. The vedas contain the commands of the Divine Being, and they are the only means to know the Absolute Brahman, Lord Nārāyaṇa.

The vedas comprise of two parts namely the Karmakāṇḍa and the Brahma Kāṇḍa. The former deals with the ways and means of worshipping the Almighty, whereas the latter describes that worshipful Supreme Being.

The Smṛtis clarify and elucidate the significance of the former part, whereas the epics substantiate the teachings of the latter part.

The Itihāsa, Puṛāṇas and Smṛtis have the vedas or their origin. The Smṛtis of Manu and others are authoritative in to, as they never go against the teachings of the vedas anywhere. The Dharma śāstras are many, and they are valid as long as they agree with the vedas. The Puranas are classified into different types meant for different types of men. So such of the Purāṇas that are in full agreement with the teachings of the vedas are fully authoritative. Of the Āgama texts the Pāṇcharātrāgama is an important authority, as it does not contradict the veda anywhere. Whenever there is a difference of opinion between one Purāṇa and another, it is advised that the validity of such statements is to be judged, according to

their belonging to the satvic or rajasic or tamasic group. When there is a difference between the veda and the puranas, the purāṇas that are against the Veda are to be discarded.

In this school, nothing is accepted or discarded dogmatically only on the core of their belonging to certain texts, but the different texts are carefully examined in the light of the teachings of the veda, and such portions of even opposite schools, like the Pāśupata, Sāṃkhya and others, as are not opposed to the sacred teachings of the vedas, are accepted wholeheartedly. Utmost importance is, therefore, given to the validity and authoritativeness of the vedas, and the validity of all other texts is verified with reference to them.

The main features of Visistadvaitic conception of verbal knowledge may now be summarised as follows :

1. Verbal knowledge is the most important as it is the only means to know Brahman.
2. The theory of Anvitābhidhāna is the theory of verbal knowledge.
3. Verbal testimony cannot signify unqualified objects.
4. All words have the power to signify Brahman the Innermost self of all by the Aparyavāsana Vṛtti.
5. Verbal statements signify even existent objects.
6. All texts are valid so long as they agree with the Veda.

References :-

1. प्रकृष्टम् मानं (ज्ञानं) प्रमा ।
प्रकृष्टा मितिः प्रमितिः ।
प्रभात्मकज्ञानविषयं प्रमेयम् ।
प्रमात्यनेन, प्रमीयते अनेन इति वा, प्रमाणम् ।
2. Vedanta Desika refers to the different theories as follows :-
Akhyathi of the Prabhakara school, Anyathakhyathi of the Nyaya school, Visayarahita Dhi and Anadhista Buddha of the Boudhas Bahyarthakarayoga of the Soutranitkas. Sadasaditara Dhi of the Advaitic school, Sunya Dhi of the Madhyamika school, Atma Dhi of the Yogachara school and Yathartha Buddha of the Visistadvaita school. अधि. सा. 201
3. R.T.S. P. 89
4. T.M.K. 4-4
5. T.M.K. 4-7
6. R.T.S. P. 89
7. T.M.K. 4-3; See Sarvartha Siddhi.
8. T.M.K. 4-1, 2
9. T.M.K. 4-3; N.S., p. 238
10. 'सर्वं साक्षात्करोति स्वयमुपधिगणैरुज्झितस्संप्रसादः प्रामाण्यं तत्र नोपाध्युपनतमिति तत्तुल्यतान्यत्रयुक्तम् ।' त.मु.क. 4-104
11. T.M.K. 4-104
12. 'अतःस्वाभाव्यमेव प्रामाण्यस्य समुचितम् । एषा भ्रान्तिः स्वरूपे क्वचन न स्यात् सर्वं ज्ञानं धर्मिण्य भ्रान्तमिति वचनात् । तथा च विषयेऽपि स्वरूपांशे सर्वज्ञानसाधारण्यात् प्रामाण्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वमेव युक्तमित्यर्थः ।' स.सि. - 247
13. N.P. p. 171
14. N.P. p. 92
15. 'परस्वरविरुद्धानेकविशेषवत् ईदृशस्य विपर्ययस्त संशयान्नेदो मियो

- विरोधाभिमानविरहेण समुच्चिता ध्यवसायः।' न्या.परि. - 92
16. N.P. p. 92.
17. N.P. p. 92
18. 'किंसजकोऽयं वृक्षः इत्येवमादिरूपोऽनध्यवसायो नाम अन्यो ज्ञानविशेष इति केचित् । तदसारम् ... ।' न्या.परि. - 94
19. N.P. p. 94
20. 'ततश्च प्रतिपत्तौ वा व्यवहारोदयेऽपि वा ।
तथाभावान्यथात्वाभ्यां प्रमाभ्रान्तिव्यवस्थितिः ॥' न्या.परि. 91
21. 'तदत्रव्यवहृतिरुभयी बाधिताबाधिताख्या' त.मु.क. 4-10
'कथमस्मिन् पक्षे प्रामणाप्रमाणव्यवस्थादिकमित्यत्राह - व्यवहृतिरति-बाध व्यवहारहेतुर्ज्ञानमप्रमाणं भ्रान्तिरित्युच्यते' । स.सि. 180
22. T.M.K. 4-10, 11
23. 'सत्ख्यातिर्नाम ज्ञानविषयस्य सत्यत्वम् । तर्हि भ्रमत्वं कथम् ? इति चेत् विषयव्यवहारबाधात् भ्रमत्वम्' ।
24. Desika says - 'योग्यायोग्यादिभेदाग्रह इह चरमां गाहते संप्रतिष्ठाम्' त.मु.क. 4-10
25. Phil of Vis., P.N.S. p. 49
26. Vedanta Desika : A study . Dr. Satyvrath Sing, p. 186-187
See also into. to V.S. Sri S.S.R., p. 17
27. S.P. 1-1-1. p. 252
28. T.M.K. 4-10
29. T.M.K. 4-16
30. T.M.K. 4-17; स.सि. 187
31. N.P. p. 45
32. 'ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयावभासो मतिरिति कथितम्' । न.मु.क. 1-7

33. Dar p. 212
34. Dar. p. 212
35. T.A. 1-2
36. N.P. p. 85
37. S.B. II-1-13.
38. See Y.M.D.
39. N.P. p. 95
40. N.P. p. 95
41. N.P. p. 96
42. N.P. p. 96
43. N.P. p. 96
44. V.S. Conjeevaram Edn. pp. 400-401
45. N.P. p. 96
46. Dar p. 215
47. Y.M.D.
48. S.B. 1-1-1; T.M.K. 4-32
49. |
50. तत् योगिमुक्तेरेवराणां प्रभावविशेषाधीनमुपपादयिष्यते ।
51. स्मृतेः प्रमाण्याङ्गीकारेऽपि संस्कारसापेक्षत्वात् तस्याः प्रत्यक्षमूलभूतत्वात् मूलभूते प्रत्यक्षे अन्तर्भावइति न पृथक् प्रमाणात्वकल्पनम् ।
52. Bhartas and Advaitins take this as a cognition take this as a cognition consisting of Pratyaksha and Smṛti. Nayyayikas take this as a special kind of perception.
53. Phil of Vis. P.N.S. p. 60
54. 'त्र्यात्मकत्वात् भूयस्त्वात्'
55. S.B. 1-1-1
56. S.B. 1-1-1

57. The objection of the Charvakas against the distinctive nature of inference viz.,

विशेषेऽनुगमाभावात् सामान्ये सिद्धसाधनात् ।
तद्वतोऽनुपपन्नत्वात् अनुमानकथा कुतः ॥'

is counted thus : तत् स्ववचनविरुद्धम् । अनुमाननिरासाय हेतूपन्यासात् तस्य च हेतोः स्वसाध्यव्याप्त्यनभ्युपगमे अनुमानस्य तेन बाधितमशक्यत्वात् अभ्युपगमे तत्रापि विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः इत्यादि प्रसङ्गात् । न्या.परि. 98

This objection is self-contradictory as reasons have been duly put forward for the refutation of inference. If the inference used by the opponent for purposes of smashing down the validity of inference is admitted as not governed by the pervasion it becomes, in fact, ineffective. If pervasion is admitted the charge against inference applies to it also equally. Thus validity of inference cannot be refuted at any rate.

58. यो यस्य देशकालाश्यां समो न्यूनोऽपि वा भवेत् ।

स व्याप्यो व्यापकस्तस्य समो वाभ्यधिकोऽपि वा ॥ न्या.परि. 89

59. See T.M.K. 4-43, and 45

60. व्याप्तिरूपाधिसमीवेदुष्यति । न्या.परि. - 99

61. T.M.K. 4-47., See Sarvartha Siddhi p. 216

62. 'तदेवं निरूपाधिकसम्बन्धं व्यप्यमिति सिद्धम्' न्या.परि. 100

63. यथोपलभ्यं भूयोभिर्दर्शनैर्मयीयते तुसा ।

सकृदेवानवच्छिंसम्बन्धो न हि भासते ॥ न्या.परि. 99

64. 'सम्बन्धोऽयं सकृद्ग्राह्यः' न्या.परि. 99

65. 'तस्मादनुमानाङ्गभूता व्यप्तिः भूयोदर्शनावसेयैव' । न्या.परि 99

66. तत्र सर्वैरपि भूयोदर्शनम् न परित्याज्यम् । तत्रापि भूयोदर्शनजनित संस्कारसमुदायाधीनविमर्शविशेषेणोपाधिसम्भावनामुच्छिन्दता निश्शङ्कं सम्बन्धनियमसिद्धिरिति च सिद्धम्' न्या.परि. 99 'आद्येनैव दर्शनेन

व्याप्तिर्गृह्यते । भूयासां तु दर्शनानां व्यभिचारनिराकरणमात्रं फलमित्यर्थः । ...
तर्केण पुनः व्यभिचारशङ्कानिदानभूतोपाधिनिराकरणमिति विभागः ।'

स.सि. 216

67. N.P. p. 102

68. 'तर्हि विपक्षरहितस्य केवलान्वयिनो विपक्षवृत्त्यभावः कथमिति चेत्, हन्त किं
तस्य विपक्षवृत्तित्वमस्ति ? तदपि नास्तीति चेत् तर्हि तावदेवानुमानाङ्गमित्युक्तम् ।
तदभावेऽपि तद्वृत्तिलक्षणविशिष्टस्यासिद्धेः ' न्या.परि. 102

69. T.M.K. 4-51 न्या.परि. 102

70. T.M.K. 4-52, 53.

71. N.P. p. 103

72. N.P. P. 105

73. N.P. p. 105

74. 'तत्त्वतदितरयोः प्रतिक्षेपयोः साधनालक्षणत्वम् गन्धवत्त्वस्य' न्या.परि. 106

75. 'तदयुक्तम् । सर्वेषाम्यनुमानानां स्वप्रतिसन्धानबलेन प्रवृत्ततया
स्वव्यवहारमात्रहेतुत्वेन च स्वार्थत्वात् ।'

76. N.P. p. 107

77. उपपन्नश्च मृदुमध्यकठोरधियां विस्तरसंग्रहाभ्यां व्यवहारः' । न्या.परि. 108

78. N.P. p. 175

79. N.P. p. 142

80. N.P. p. 142

81. N.P. . 142.

82. 'अतीन्द्रियार्थे शास्त्र

83. N.P. p. 143

84. N.P. p. 144

85. T.M.K. 4-67

86. N.P. p. 149

87. T.M.K. 4-71

88. N.P. p. 149
89. N.P. p. 151
90. T.M.K. 4-93;
91. p. 233
92. T.M.K. 4-79; S.S. p. 233
93. N.P. p. 153; T.M.K. 4-85
94. S.B. II-3-17
95. T.M.K. 4-84, 85, 86
96. T.M.K. 4-72
97. T.M.K. 4-73
98. T.M.K. 4-74; A.S. 27, 28; S.B. 1-1-1; Y.M.D.; S.S. p. 231

Doctrine of Matter according to Vishishtadvaita

The scriptures declare that the supreme Brahman, the primeval cause of this universe is to be known as characterized by the inseparable attributes namely the sentient and the non-sentient orders or principles and it is the one reality that is the inner self of all other entities. Thus Brahman is transcendent and at the same time immanent in all entities. Brahman is the inner controller and container of all other substances sentient and non-sentient and so all words name Brahman in the ultimate analysis. The Absolute is the all self or 'sarvātmā' that pervades the universe without being affected by its imperfections. So is the conclusion 'All words signify Him' naturally drawn.

वेदविद्वेस्येऽस्य वाल्मीकि पराशर द्वैपायनवचोभिः च परस्य ब्रह्मणः
सर्वस्यात्मत्वावगमात् चिदचिदात्मकस्य वस्तुनः तच्छरीरत्वावगमाच्च
शरीरस्य शरीरिणं प्रति प्रकारतयैव पदार्थत्वात् शरीर शरीरिणोश्च
धर्मभेदेऽपि तयोः असंकरात् सर्वशरीरं ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मणो वैभवं
प्रतिपादयद्भिः सामानाधिकरण्यादिभिः मुख्यवृत्तैः
सर्वचेतनाचेतनप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवाभिधीयते । वे.सं (p - 190)

Thus according to Rāmānuja, Brahman alone is the supreme reality. Brahman is unity in and through diversity and this is not in conflict with appearance. unity is non-duality according to shankara. But according to Rāmānuja, unity is synthesis. The pramēya according to this darshana is a knowledge of Brahman characterised by the sentient and non-sentient. Pramēya is that by knowing which we attain beatitude and without knowing which we are bound down to samsāra.

अत्रयद्यपि प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयमिति व्युत्पत्त्य आरोपिताकारव्यवच्छेदार्था अनारोपितरूपं सर्वं प्रमेयं तथापि निःश्रेयसान्तरंगतया तदर्थिभिः प्रकर्षेण मेयं प्रमेयमिह विवक्षितं यद्विषयेण भ्रमेण संसारमः यद्विषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवर्ज्यमिह तदिह नः प्रकर्षेण मेयं प्रमेयम् ।

न्या.परि (p - 183)

The metaphysical Brahman is the same as the God or 'Īśvara' of religion and Ramanuja affirms that He must be known for going across the ocean of samsara. तापत्रयातुरैरमृतत्वाय स एव जिज्ञास्यः (श्री.भा. 1-1-1) The shruti also says that one becomes immortal only by knowing Brahman like this – तमेवं विद्वान् अमृत इह भवति । तमेवं विदित्वा अतिमृत्युमेति । (पु.सू)

Classification of Categories

The predecessors of Ramanuja classified 'tattva' as three entities namely 'chit', 'achit' and 'Ishvara'. Yamunacharya says in his 'Stotraratna' as follows – तत्त्वेन यश्चिदचिदीश्वर तत्स्वभाव भोगापवर्ग ... etc and means that the tattvas are three. The three entities are different though they are harmoniously united to form one unity. Ramanuja emphasises on unity when he asserts that the absolute is one. Both these are perfectly in keeping with the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

ततश्च ब्रह्मैकमेव तत्त्वमिति वा चिदचिदीश्वरभेदेन त्रीणि तत्त्वानीति वा पश्यतां न कश्चिद्विशेषः स्वरूपभेदस्य विशिष्टैक्यस्य वा चोभयेषामभिमतत्वात् ॥

न्या. परि. (p - 184)

All the followers of this school admit difference and distinction in nature between one another amongst the three entities namely Jivatman, Matter and Paramatman

and they affirm oneness of Brahman qualified by the other two entities. So, there is no difference of opinion amongst these masters.

The Sutrakara favours the idea of one Absolute Reality characterised by its modes as affirmed in the sutra “अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा” and also as described in the succeeding sutras. Prameya is only one Absolute Brahman with its modal expressions. Anything else is a Prameya only as a prakara of that Brahman. So for aspirants Brahman alone thus characterised is the goal of study.

There are other kinds of categorizations followed by different thinkers. Some describe the tattva as three according to the way of discriminating the body from the soul. केचित्तुदेहात्मविवेकक्रमानुसारेण भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा इति श्रुतिप्रक्रियया च त्रिधा तत्त्वं विभज्य चिन्तयन्ति तत्रापि सप्रकारद्रव्यचिन्तनादद्रव्यचिन्ताप्यन्तर्भवति ॥ न्या.परि (p – 184)

With the intention of discriminating the body from the soul, other masters classified "tattva" as the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the prompter, the Eeshwara.

This kind of classification is mentioned by shruti, yet it is not all comprehensive. Much is implied in this categorization as 'kaala' and 'adravya' are implicit in it.

Some thinkers declare the tattvas to be four or five viz – 'pradhānam', 'purusha', 'vyakta' and 'kaala' wherein 'purusha' includes 'paramapurusha' also.

प्रधानपुरुषव्यक्तकालास्तु प्रविभागशः ।

रूपाणि स्थितिसर्गान्तव्यक्तिसद्भावहेतवः ॥

and some others describe the tattva as twenty-five, twenty-six or twenty-seven. The twenty-five tattvas include the

twenty-four tattvas of the Sankhyas signified as 'achit' or 'prakriti' and the Jiva or 'purusha' implying his 'antaryaami' the Absolute Brahman.

The twenty four tattvas of the Sankhyas namely 'prakriti', 'mahat', 'ahamkara', eleven indriyas and five tanmaatras, five bhutas along with the Jiva and Paramapurusha form twenty-six tattvas.

These twenty-six along with 'kaala' make up twenty seven according to some other thinkers.

Though tattva is described in different ways like this it makes no difference for the mere reason that the ultimate ground and goal is only one Supreme to whom all others are modes. Many of these categories are effects of their causes and get subsumed under the one real cause constituting all these. The ultimate substance is one Brahman or paratattva.

चतुर्था पञ्चधा वा विभज्य चिन्तयतां कार्यविशेषैः सह
पञ्चषट्सप्तविंशत्यादि संख्या निवेशयतां च पूर्वाविशेष एव । न्या.परि
(p - 184)

Again this is classified into five categories as 'praapyam', 'praaptaa', 'praaptyupaaya:', "nivartyam", 'phalam' and along with the 'sambandha vishesha' or relationship, this is said to be six.

All these different kinds of categorization are not opposed to one another but affirm that the substance and sustenance of all is only one Absolute. Some classifications stress upon the number and nature of other categories with a definite purpose of enlightening the aspirant effectively on certain aspects. The details are described in some kinds of categorization where as they are implied in others. It is significant that all these kinds of categorization are meant

for the guidance of the seekers after truth and are propounded from a definite view point.

तत्रतत्र तात्पर्यभेदेन संप्रतिपन्न तत्त्वविशेषतच्छक्त्यादीनामेव
पृथग्गणनमिति मन्तव्यम् । न्या.सि. (p – 204)

Some categorizations are descriptive while others are comprehensive. Their significance is 'aikya' or 'vaishishtya' and so it is essential to realize the one reality – Brahman which includes all others in itself as its modes. Thus the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita advocates that the Prameya or 'metaphysical category' is only one namely, Brahman characterised by the sentient and the non-sentient.

Categorisation according to other schools :

Gautama defined Prameya as follows : “आत्म शरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनः प्रवृत्ति दोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयं” These twelve tattvas enumerated by the school of Nyaya are acceptable to this school. Deshika has made a mention of this in his Nyaya Parishuddhi (See nya. pari (p – 183)). The same Prameya is described briefly by some as four namely – “heyam”, ‘tasyanivartakam’, ‘haanam’, ‘tasyopaaya:’.

The seven-fold categorization of the school of Kanaada as ‘द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाख्याः पदार्थाः’ is reduced to two namely ‘dravya’ and ‘adravya’ as ‘saamaanyavishesha’ and ‘samavaaya’ and others are rejected summarily as not possible of being independent entities and of the remaining three ‘karma’ gets included in ‘guna’.

‘ये तु कणचरणादयः षट्सप्तादिरूपेण सर्वान् पदार्थान् विभज्य परीक्षन्ते ते सामान्यविशेषसमवायादीनां पदार्थान्तरत्वप्रतिक्षेपेन निरस्ताः । ततश्च द्रव्यगुणकर्माणि त्रीण्येवावशिष्यन्ते । तत्रापि कर्मणः

संप्रतिपन्नगुणातिरिक्तत्वपक्षेऽपि संस्कारादिगुणावान्तर विशेषवत्
गुणपक्षकक्षीकारात् द्वौ पदार्थौ ।

‘guṇa’ is always found inseparable from ‘dravya’ and so it is more significant to divide Prameya into ‘dravya’ and ‘adravya’ instead of ‘dravya’ and ‘guṇa’.

The followers of ‘śaivaagama’, postulate a categorization of thirty-six entities as detailed here under – Two tattvas namely ‘maayaa’ and ‘puruṣa’. Five ‘śuddhatattvas’ namely ‘śivatattva’, ‘śaktitattva’, ‘śadaśivatattva’, ‘Iśvaratattva’ and ‘vidyātattva’ and five tattvas namely ‘kāla’, ‘niyati’, ‘kāla’, ‘vidyaa’ and ‘rāga’ in addition to the twenty-four tattvas formerly explained. All the tattvas of this school could be included in the twenty-six or twenty-seven tattvas including ‘kāla’ as said above. ‘maaya’ is included in ‘triguṇam’, ‘puruṣa’ in ‘jivatattva’. The five ‘śuddhatattvas’ that are accepted to be only one in ‘Iśvaratattva’, the twenty-four tattvas in ‘achit’ otherwise called as ‘maaya’. So much so, thirty-one categories of the ‘śaivaagama’ school are included in Tattva-traya only. Among the other five, ‘rāga’ is a particular state of consciousness of the soul and not a distinct entity. ‘vidyātattva’ said to be the means of generation of knowledge and this is superfluous as the mind and the senses are enough for that purpose. ‘kāla’ which is said to be responsible for the cleansing of sin and merit, the dirt of the ‘jiva’ being the ‘kartṛśaktyatmaka’ is nothing other than ‘akṣaraavasthaa’ of the ‘prakṛiti’ itself. The ‘niyatitattva’ also is not a distinct one, for it can be included in the will of God if it means the ‘niyantritvashakti’ of God or karma itself in the form of ‘punyapaapa’ if it implies the rule of unavoidable effects. This may also be explained as the particular ‘śakti’ in the several causal collocations and so does not form a distinct category. (nṛ. si - p - 203)

Vedanta Deshika has analysed and described the different categories that are united as inseparable attributes with the Reality. The classical work Nyaya Siddhanjana as well as 'tattvamuktaakalaapam' deal with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics in a very thorough way. These two works deal with the Prameya according to the conclusions of Ramanuja. The Viśiṣṭādvaita siddhanta of Ramanuja has been systematized and interpreted admirably by Vedanta Deshika.

There are actually six entities to be known by a person who is desirous of attaining beatitude. They are namely –

प्राप्यस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं प्राप्नुश्च प्रत्यगात्मनः ।

प्राप्त्युपायं फलं चैव तथा प्राप्तिविरोधि च ॥

1. The nature of Brahman whom one has to attain
2. The nature of the individual self
3. The means of attaining perfection
4. The fruit of all Sadhanas
5. The obstructions for the attainment of perfection


These five along with the extra-ordinary relationship of the world of souls and matter with Brahman form the six essential things to be known thoroughly and of these a thorough knowledge of the three entities of 'tattvatraya', though forming a part of this is insisted upon for purposes of dispelling the 'dehaatmabhrama' and 'svatantraatmabhrama'. It is only for this purpose of discriminating the soul from matter and the Supreme from matter and soul that the scriptures describe reality in terms of 'bhoktaa', 'bhogyam' and 'preritaa'.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Prameya is divided into two categories namely substance and non-substance. They are classified further as follows –

द्रव्याद्रव्यप्रभेदान्मितमुभय विधं तद्विदस्तत्त्वमाहुः ।
 द्रव्यं द्वेधा विभक्तं जडमजडमिति प्राच्यमव्यक्तकालौ
 अन्त्यं प्रत्यक् पराक् च प्रथममुभयथा तत्र जीवेशभेदा-
 न्नित्या भूतिर्मतिश्चेत्यपरमिह जडामादिमां केचिदाहुः ॥

त.मु.क 1-6

Substance is broadly classified into two divisions namely 'jada' or material and 'ajada' or non-material.



Avyakta or matter as well as kaala or time form 'jadadravya'. The non-material is further classified into two divisions namely the pratyak or the self-aware substance and the paraak or the substance that is not self aware. The pratyak is again two fold namely the finite self and the universal self.

The Parak is again two fold as the Nitya vibhuti or transcendental matter and Mathi or Dharmabhuta jnana or attributive consciousness. The adravaya is ten fold being the five qualities of the five elements and the three gunas

namely 'sattva', 'rajas', and 'tamas' along with 'shakti' and 'samyoga'.

Thus according to Vishishtadvaitic metaphysics the real Reality or Brahman is the self-aware transcendental being and the six fold characterization of substances namely 'avyakta', 'kaala', 'jiva', 'Ishvara', 'nityavibhuti' and 'dharmabhutajnaanam' or 'mathi:', is not in contradiction or in conflict with the former three fold division of the 'tattvatraya' or the enumeration of only one Supreme being as the principle of 'vishishtaikya'. The visheshya or substratum is more prominent than the 'visheshana' or attribute. So of these six substances, the three namely 'prakriti', 'jiva' and 'Ishvara' happen to be visheshyas and the other three namely 'kaala', 'nityavibhuti', and 'mathi' are attributes and so these three are included in the former three while classifying only three entities. 'kaala' or time is a 'visheshana' for all the three entities. 'dharmabhutajnaana' is an attribute of both 'jiva' and 'Ishvara'. 'nityavibhuti' or transcendental matter forms an attribute of 'Ishvara' according to his will and transforms into forms like the divine form as well as other accessories like mantapa, gopuram etc. This becomes an attribute of 'nitya' and 'mukta' also according to the will of the Supreme. Thus the six substances are all implied while mentioning only three. These five namely 'kaala', 'avyakta', 'jiva', 'nityavibhuti' and 'mathi:' are included as attributes in the one transcendental Supreme when we state that reality is one on which the existence of all others depend. Therefore there is no conflict or difference in the metaphysical position even though the Prameya or tattva is described as one Supreme Reality in unity or three entities or six entities.

While examining the viewpoints of Vaisheshika atomists, regarding the seven fold tattvas, Deshika

examines them carefully and finds fault with such type of categorization. His views on some of the categories may be expressed thus –

‘**dravya:**’ – The definition of ‘dravya’ as given by Deshika is as follows – ‘तत्र द्रव्यं दशावत्’ (त.मु.क. 1-9) उपादानं द्रव्यं अवस्थाश्रय उपादानम् । अतथाभूतमद्रव्यम् ।

A material or dravya is that which happens to be a material cause of things coming into being. A material cause is that which is capable of assuming different states. It abides in the effects, which are changes of its states. An effect or state or ‘avasthaa’ is that which is an attribute of the substratum and which is ‘aagantuka’ and ‘aprithaksiddha’ with it. This definition of a state being qualified by the term ‘aagantuka’ excludes all inseparable attributes like that of Prameyatva in non-materials like ‘shabda’, ‘sparsha’ and others. Then even ‘shabda’ and others would have become ‘dravya’. The term ‘aagantuka’ excludes all non-materials, as the quality of ‘prameyatva’ is natural or ‘svabhaavasiddha’ to them. The term ‘aprithaksiddha’ also is significant in defining ‘avasthaa’. Any substance which is ‘aagantuka’ cannot be an ‘avasthaa’. A certain quality not always existing with the substratum but which occurs only at certain times is an ‘aagantuka dharma’ and according to this ‘ghatatva’, ‘kapaalatva’, “churnatva” or ‘pindatva’ occur only at certain times and happen to be ‘aagantukadharmas’ of Earth. Similarly Brahman qualified by the ‘chit’ and ‘achit’ takes upon the states of ‘prakrititva, mahatva, ahamkaaratva, tanmaatravta’ and ‘aakaashatva’ at the time of evolution. This ‘aakaashatva’ would then become an ‘aagantuka dharma’ of ‘brahman’ which is its substratum. ‘aakaasha’ is the container of ‘shabda’ and by this relationship of

‘aadhaaraadheyabhaava’, ‘aakaasha’ is taken to be ‘shabdavishishta’ and vice-versa, that is ‘shabda’ is ‘aakaashavishishta’. The term ‘aprithaksiddha’ in the definition of ‘avasthaa’ excludes ‘shabda’ from becoming a ‘dravya’ being the ‘upaadaana’ to ‘aakaasha’ by ‘aadheyasambandha’ as the material ‘aakaasha’ is not ‘aagantuka’ to ‘shabda’ but natural ‘svabhaavasiddha’. The essential characteristics of ‘dravya’ according to the Nyaya Vaisheshika systems is different from the above definitions. They analyse ‘dravya’ as ‘samavaya karana’ and so quite different from the karya. But according to Vishishtadvaita the dravya or ‘upaadaana’ abides in the effects which are only changes of states. While Vishishtadvaita divides ‘dravya’ into six categories, the Nyaya Vaisheshika philosophers classify ‘dravyas’ as nine namely – पृथिव्यग्नेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि.

‘guna’ – The Vaisheshikas enumerate twenty four gunas. These are all inclusive in the several categories of this system and never remain exclusive. The five qualities namely ‘sukha’, ‘du:kha’, ‘ichChaa’, ‘dvesha’ and ‘prayatna’ are really aspects of consciousness and so are included in ‘mathi:’. Vedartha Sangraha of Ramanuja explains that these are concepts of our consciousness.

प्रीतिश्च ज्ञानविशेष एव । ननु च सुखं प्रीतिरित्यनर्थान्तरम् । सुखं च ज्ञानविशेषसाध्यं पदार्थान्तरमिति लौकिकाः । नैवम् । येन ज्ञानविशेषेण तत् साध्यमित्युच्यते स एव ज्ञानविशेषस्सुखम् । वे.सं p – 217.

The two gunas namely ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’ are in essence the divine will to protect and to punish and so are aspects of divine consciousness. Buddhi which is subject to expansion and contractions possesses the characteristic of a dravya in addition to its being a guna. Refer nya. pari (p – 181).

The other *gunas* form the category of 'adṛavya' and so the Nyaya Vaisheshika categorization of 'padaartha' into 'dravya' and 'guna' is not acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita. 'dravya' which in the ultimate analysis means Brahman is scientifically analysed into 'avyakta, kaala, jiva, Ishvara, nityavibhūti and dharmabhūtajñānam'. The *gunas* form 'adṛavya' and so in this system the category of 'guna' in addition to 'dravya' is not admitted.

'*karma*' – Karma or motion is accepted as a distinct category by the Vaisheshikas. There are two opinions about the concept of Karma. Some philosophers of this school prior to Ramanuja considered this as a distinct category whereas some others that preceded. Swamy Deshika argued that there was no need of postulating it as a different entity in between the cause and effect. It is Deshika's opinion that Samyoga is responsible for our knowledge of motion at different places.

या नाम कर्मसामग्री त्वयेष्यते सा तत्तत्कर्मफलतयाभिमतं संयोगविशेषमुत्पादयन्ती नियतस्वभावमेव तमुत्पादयति । अतः एक एव संयोगोऽनेक निष्ठोऽपि सन् क्वचिच्चलतिप्रत्ययं क्वचित् संयोगमात्र प्रत्ययं च जनयति यथैक एव समवायो गुणगुणिभ्यामविशेषेण स्वतो मिलितोऽपि सन् क्वचिदाश्रयप्रत्ययं क्वचिदाश्रितप्रत्ययं च जनयति न ह्याश्रयभाव आश्रितभावो वा समवायस्वरूपातिरिक्तः तद्वदिहापीति ।

Deshika concludes as follows –

प्रत्यक्षन्तु कर्म स्वरूपतो दुरपह्वम् । तत्र भाष्यादिष्वतिरेकविधिनिषेधादर्शनादर्थान्तरविरोधाभावात् च उदासितव्यमिति । इदं तु मन्यामहे अतिरेकेऽपि गुणवर्गान्निराशयन्तरं कर्म विभाजकाभावात् स्वेच्छा कल्पितविभाजकस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वेन

यथाभिमतमेकं गुणमुभयं वाङ्गीकृत्य राश्यन्तरकल्पनप्रसङ्गात्
गुणावान्तरवैचित्र्यस्य गुणत्व विरोधभावात् अतो द्रव्यमद्रव्यमित्येव
विभागः।
न्या.परि । (p – 180)

Though Karma is admitted as a perceptible entity by
Deshika, he includes it under the category of 'adravya'.

“saamaanyam” or generality which is admitted as a
distinct category by the Nyaya Vaisheshika, philosophers is
rejected as such in this school. The Sutrakara himself has
discarded 'saamaanya' as a distinct category in the
'aarambhanaadhikaranam' where he establishes that the
effect is nothing other than a different state of the cause.
So there is not a substance like 'avayavi' different from the
'avayava' s and consequently the theory of 'saamaanya'
connoting the generality of 'avayavi' such as 'jarness' is
totally defeated by the Vedantins.

‘सामान्यमपि परोक्तं सूत्रकारैरेव निरस्तप्रायम् तथा हि
तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः इत्यादिभिः सूत्रैः कार्यदशाया-
मुपादानस्यावस्थान्तरापत्तिमात्रमेव न पुनः पराभिमतमवयव्याख्यं
द्रव्यमस्तीति समर्थनात् घटाद्यवयव्यभावे तदाश्रित घटात्वादि
सामान्य- मवयविसमवेततया । अभ्युपगतगुणादयस्त
दुभयारम्भप्रक्रियाजालं च निर्मूलितम् ।
न्या.परि (p – 179)

In the opinion of Vedantins the effect is nothing but a
change in the state of the cause. There is no 'avayavin'
composed of 'avayava' s and so 'saamaanyam' is not
admitted as a distinct category. Deshika discusses in detail
the defects of accepting 'saamaanya' and concludes that it
cannot be a distinct category. It is included in 'adravya' in
this school.

“vishesha:” – The system of Vishishtadvaita
considers 'vishesha' a distinct category of Vaisheshikas, as

superfluous. This category is described as – “अन्त्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिः विशेषः परिकीर्तितः” "Kaarikavali-10" and is postulated to explain the distinctions in the eternal atoms and entities. The Vaisheshikas are of the opinion that the world evolves out of the contact between the eternal atoms as ‘paramaanudvayasamyoga’ etc. They admit that the five elements namely the Earth, fire, water, air and space are eternal in their atomic form and every atom of every type is differentiated from others by this quality of Vishesha. Vishesha is thus admitted to distinguish one kind of atom from another. This view point is not acceptable to the Vedantins who do not admit of the eternal character of the atoms or of the constitution of the cosmos from the atoms. ‘paramaanukaaranavaada’ is criticised by the Sutrakara in the sutra महदीर्घवद्वाहस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् and incompatibilities of this school of thought are spoken out.

The Vedantins explain that the distinctive character of things is self constituted and not due to any category like particularity. The chit, achit and Ishvara differ from one another on account of their very nature. The achit is jada and differs from chit and Ishvara. The chit though self aware like Ishvara is different from Him on account of its atomic nature or ‘anutva’ and ‘prakaratva’. Ishvara differs from the chit on account of His ‘prakaratva’ and ‘vibhutva’. ‘vishesha’ need not be admitted just to explain the distinguishing features of these. The distinction between two non-eternal objects becomes established by their ‘jaati’, ‘guna’ and others and like wise between eternal objects also this ‘vishesha’ is not necessary. ‘prithivi’, ‘ap’, ‘tejas’, ‘vaayu’ and ‘aakaasha’ are non-eternal according to the Vedantic school being the evolution of primordial matter and ‘dik’ or direction is also non-eternal being only related to space or ‘aakaasha’. ‘vishesha’ or particularity is not needed to

distinguish time as it is easily distinguishable owing to its form of moment, day, hour etc and also due to its being 'paraak' and 'achetana'. The distinction between the finite self and the infinite is also very plain owing to one's 'anutva, niyaamyatva, aadheyatva, sheshatva, shariratva' as well as the other's 'vibhutva, niyantritva, aadhaaratva, sheshitva and shariritva'. It may be argued then that particularity is to be essentially admitted to distinguish one self from another. This is also untenable. There is distinction between one self and another in the state of samsara owing to their unique and particular experiences of pleasure and pain as well as their desires and dispositions.

The baddha and the 'mukta' are differentiated by the fact of their being ignorant and omniscient. The muktas and nityas are also easily differentiated on account of their purity being beginningless or otherwise. During the state of liberation also difference between the mukta and the nitya is possible, as the muktas are capable of re-collecting all their past qualified by certain circumstances in each particular case. Then how to distinguish between one mukta and another? That is easy for the former experience of one is different from another and is easy of distinguishing one from another. So there is no need to postulate a distinct category of 'vishesha' just to differentiate one from another.

‘यश्चान्योन्यमत्यन्ततुल्येषु मुक्तादिषु मिथो व्यावृत्तधीजननाय
द्रव्यत्वादिहेतुना विशेषारव्यः पदार्थः कल्प्यते सोऽपि
तुल्यन्यायतया सूत्रकारैर्दूषितप्राय एव । न्या.परि. (p – 178)

Then what about the nityas that are similar in all aspects ?

तेषामपि हि सत्यसङ्कल्पानां विचित्राः सङ्कल्पेच्छादयः
 ईश्वरस्येवानियतदेशकालविषयापर्यनुयोज्यसामग्रीका
 अनाद्यनन्तसन्तानवन्तः सन्तीति किमन्येन विशेषेण अपि च
 यद्दर्शने यत्र यदारोपो न भवति स हि तस्य ततो भेदः ॥

Thus the school of Vishishtadvaita discards 'vishesha' as a distinct category.

'samavaaya:' – is admitted as a distinct category by the Nyaya Vaisheshika philosophers just to explain the relationship between 'dravya' and 'guna' and others which are independent entities. This is described as –

घटादीनां कपालादौ द्वयेषु गुणकर्मणोः । तेषु जातेश्च सम्बन्धः
 समवायः प्रकीर्तितः । kaarikaavali ..

This is not admitted as a distinct category by the Vedantins as they argue that this relationship leads to infinite regress or 'anavasthaa'. समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ॥ Vedanta Sutrās - II – 2 – 12.

The school of Vishishtadvaita postulates a relationship of 'aprithaksiddhasambandha' or never to be separable relationship, which is not a distinct entity but only a concept of dependence. The relationship between "dravya" and 'guna' is one of 'aprithaksiddhasambandha' in this school of thought and not one of inherence or 'samavaaya'.

'abhaava' is a distinct category according to the Nyaya Vaisheshika thinkers. This again is not accepted by the Vishishtadvaitic philosophers. The Sutrakara criticises the school of 'aarambhanavaada' by the sutra 'असद् व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च' (II – 1 – 18) in the

‘aarambhanaadhikarana’. There is no category like ‘abhaava’ in the real metaphysical sense and so the school of Vishishtadvaita refutes ‘abhaava’ as a distinct category.

Having so far discussed about the nature of Supreme reality, which is a unity in and through the multiplicity of the chit and achit, which is in strict metaphysical sense the object of all Vedantic study, we shall now proceed to understand more about the several categories as analysed by Vedanta Deshika. The philosophy of reality concerns the study of six categories namely the ‘jadadravya’, ‘kaala’, ‘jiva’, ‘Ishvara’, ‘nityavibhuti’ and ‘mati’.

Matter or Jadadravya

‘jadadravya’ – ‘jadadravya is defined as a material which is a non-sentient substance which is not self aware. It is not self-aware. These things are objects of illumination and illumined by knowledge or consciousness. This exists for consciousness and is not in it. ‘jadadravya’ is two fold namely ‘trigunam’ and ‘kaala’.

‘trigunam’ or ‘prakrititattva’ is spoken of as ‘akshara’, ‘moolaprakriti’, avidya and maya. This is the locus of the trigunas namely satva, rajas and tamas. This prakriti is eternal or ‘akshara’ but is ever changing. Mutation is the law of matter, but it cannot work of its own accord. Divine will is responsible for its working. ‘triguna’ or matter is the underlying principle of all material evolution. This is called ‘mula prakriti’ for the very fact of its being the underlying principle of material evolution which brings out all changes or mutations. It is called triguna being the substratum of the three gunas. It is termed ‘avidya’ as it obscures real knowledge. It is called ‘maayaa’ as it exhibits wonders of creation. The Gitacharya called this as ‘daivi hyeshaa gunamayi mama maayaa duratyayaa, (Gita 7 – 14). The

term 'maayaa' does not connote something which is unreal but it only points out this 'prakriti' which is a means of wonderful creation.

विचित्रपदार्थसृष्ट्युपकरणत्व is said to be the real connotation of the term 'maayaa' and never 'mithyatva'. Ramanuja points out in his gadyam the three fold functions of prakriti as follows –

भगवत्स्वरूपतिरोधानकरीं विपरीतज्ञानजननीं स्वविषयायाश्च
भोग्यबुद्धेर्जननीं देहेन्द्रियत्वेन भोग्यत्वेन सूक्ष्मरूपेण चावस्थितां
दैवीं गुणमयीं मायां । etc. (Sharanagati Gadmay)

‘मायाम् तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् मायिनम् तु महेश्वरम्’ । (Shev. Upa)

This is defined as follows –

‘अचेतना परार्था सा नित्या सततविक्रिया ।

त्रिगुणा कर्मिणां क्षेत्रं प्रकृते रूपमुच्यते ॥ (R.T.S.) p – 85

The Vishnu Purana mentions as follows –

तेनमायासहस्रं तच्छम्बरस्याशुगामिना ।

बाळस्य रक्षता देहमेकैकं च विरोधितम् ॥ Vi. Pu 1-19-20

Prakriti is defined in different ways. A material that has the quality of rajas through 'aprithaksiddha' relationship is 'prakriti' or a material that has the quality of tamas through 'aprithaksiddhasambandha' is 'prakriti'. Though time or 'kaala' is also associated with the qualities of 'rajas' and 'tamas' by temporal relationship ('kaalikasambandha'), it has not these by an inseparable relationship and so the definition will be apt. We cannot likewise define prakriti as that which has the quality of 'satva' through 'aprithaksiddhasambandha' as it becomes too wide and

includes 'nityavibhuti' also. Prakriti is that which happens to be the causal collocation of that material qualified by the states of 'mahatva' or 'ahankaaratva'. Perception in the case of materials like a jar and a piece of cloth etc and scripture in the case of 'mahat' and 'ahankaara' that cannot be seen are pramanas for the existence of 'triguna'.

‘अजामेकां लोहित शुक्लकृष्णाम्’ etc

The 'saatvik' quality promotes knowledge and happiness, 'rajas' is the cause of passion and sorrow and 'tamas' is responsible for delusion, sleep and laziness (Refer Bhagavad Gita). In pralaya matter is in a static, undifferentiated stage which is called 'avibhaktatamas'. These three qualities at that time, will be by divine will equally proportioned; when their proportion varies evolution or creation ensues. The 'kaalaantaraanuvritti' of this stage of creation is 'sthiti' or stage of existence. The primordial stage of matter when the three qualities of 'satva, rajas and tamas' are 'sama' or of equal proportions is called as 'avyakta, aksharam and tamas' having very subtle changes or 'vikaara'. The same is called 'vyakta'. when there is tension of differentiation due to different proportions of these 'gunas. This 'mulaprakriti' is said to be infinite in space and is described as 'अनन्तस्य न तस्यान्तस्संख्यानं वापिविद्यते' 'तदनन्तमसंख्यातं', etc, but this implies that it is infinite only in such spaces as not contacted by the 'nityavibhuti'. The nityavibhuti is said to be beyond the "trigunam" as it is said in 'स्वसत्ताभासकं सत्त्वं गुणसत्त्वाद्विलक्षणम्' etc.

Though there is 'gunatrayasaamya' in all spaces in 'mulaprakriti' it is classified into four types in view of the different states due to the slightest changes that ever take

place. These are 'avibhaktatamas, vibhaktatamas, akshara and avyakta'. 'avibhaktatamas' is just like a seed that is stored in the granary for sowing. 'vibhaktatamas' is just like the seedling that is about to germinate above the soil. 'akshara' is just like the seed that is soaked in water and 'avyakta' is just like the seed that has swelled to sprout. These four stages are necessarily seen in the germination of a seed and the same happens to mulaprakriti and so these different names are given to that.

As against 'avyakta' the 'vyakta' is that which transforms into the twenty three forms beginning from 'mahat' and ending with 'prithivi'. Even at the time of creation, prakriti which is infinite contains parts where changes take place and also parts where changes are not noticed just as a vast ocean contains parts of disturbance and non-disturbance. But matter is always undergoing change and so at a space bereft of transformation in the form of 'mahat' 'ahankaara' etc. there is an under current of change noticeable though very subtle. Matter undergoes change for the sake of spiritual evolution of the universe in accordance with the law of karma and divine will.

'prakriti' according to Vedantins is quite different from the concept of 'prakriti' accepted by Sankhyas or Buddhists, Nyaya Vaisheshikas or Jainas. The Sankhyas consider 'mulaprakriti' as an equilibrium state of the three qualities and assigned to it independent potency to work. The doer, enjoyer and tempter is 'prakriti' whereas the soul is merely a 'saakshi'. Nyaya Vaisheshika thinkers imagine that prakriti is a conglomeration of atoms and it remains a mystery how these different atoms set to work independently. Buddhism considers matter as the sense-ultimates in perpetual flux but Vishishtadvaita considers matter as a real element and a mode of divine

manifestation. This prakriti can function only on account of and in accordance with the divine will. Prakriti by itself cannot evolve, but only when it is 'brahmaatmaka'. So the views of Sankhyas stating independent action to prakriti is smashed to pieces.

There are two views regarding the 'saavayavatva' or 'niravayatva' of 'prakriti'. darsha (p -202).

The first stage of evolution in prakriti is the mahat tatva with the three states of satva, rajas and tamas. This is a real state of a real cause. This is different from the mahat of the Sankhyas that consider a particular mental state like 'adhyavasaaya' (Ref - darsha - (p - 203), nya. si (p - 193)

“अव्यक्ताहंकारावस्थाव्यवहितोत्तरपूर्वावस्थाविशिष्टं त्रिगुणं महान्” (N.S. p - 193)) as mahat. Adhyaavasaaya is an aspect of consciousness and cannot be attributed to a non-sentient object like matter. This mahat is of three states according to the three gunas and is named according to the preponderant guna as saatvika, raajasa and taamasa. Mahat changes into ahamkaara with the same three states according to the predominance of the three gunas.

‘ahankaaratatva’ is defined as ‘इन्द्रियाव्यवहितपूर्वावस्थाविशिष्टं त्रिगुणमहंकारः’ (N.S. p - 193). The concept of ahamkara as abhimaana cannot be accepted as it is an aspect of consciousness not possible in an achetana. ‘अभिमानोऽहङ्कार इति सांख्यलक्षणं दूषणीयं”, nya. si (p - 193). This is called ahamkara as this causes the impression of self in the body which is non-self. ‘स च अनात्मनि देहे अहंभावकरणहेतुत्वमात्रात् अहङ्कार शब्दवाच्यः’. ‘ahamkara’ so is not here the knowledge of the self as it is a different one from ‘ahamartha’. ‘ahamkaara’ also means ‘durabhimaana’ or

conceit that results in insulting the nobler in this world.
 ‘अहङ्कारस्य उत्कृष्टजनावमानहेतोः गर्वापरपर्यायस्याभिमानस्य तथोक्तेः,”

This is called ‘ahankaara’ aptly as the contact of this tattva with the self is the root cause of mistaking the body for the self and also insulting the elders. This tattva is anyhow different from the attitude of ‘garva’ or conceit which is advised to be given up through discrimination.

‘अहङ्कारं बलं दर्पं कामं क्रोधं परिग्रहं । विमुच्य निर्ममशान्तः
 ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते” ॥ ordains that a mumukshu should give up totally ‘ahamkaara’ or ‘garva’ which is possible of discarding through discriminating intelligence whereas contact with ‘ahamkaaratattva’ is not possible of giving up without the grace of God as it is the ‘daivigunamayi maayaa’ of the Lord. This ‘ahankaara’ is again three fold due to the predominance of ‘satva’, ‘rajas’ and ‘tamas’. The satvika ahamkara is called ‘vaikaarika’, ‘raajasaahankaara’ as ‘taijasa’ and ‘taamasaa’ as ‘bhutaadi’. Satvikaahamkara is the origin from which the eleven sense organs evolve whereas ‘taamasa’ causes the evolution of the five elements. ‘raajasa’ is ‘anugraahaka’, ‘sahakaari’ or an aid for both.

From the satvik ahamkara aided by the rajasic ahamkara, originate the eleven sense organs. The indriyas are defined as follows by Deshika – “प्राणाद्यन्यत्वे सति
 हृत्कर्णचक्षुरादि शरीरप्रदेशविशेषावच्छिन्नव्यापारतया
 तत्तत्कार्यविशेषशक्तमिन्द्रियम्” । – (nya. si p – 193)

The sense organs are those that are different from the different vital airs such as ‘praana, apaana, vyaana’ and that are found in several parts of the body such as the heart, ear, eye and others and powerful of carrying on the several activities of those parts. The definition of Varada

Vishnumishra that the indriyas are different from the body and are helpful to the atman and are supported by the vital airs. 'अशरीरं प्राणधार्यमेव यत् द्रव्यं पुरुषोपकारकम् तदिन्द्रियम्' न्या.सि. p - 193 and the definition of the Sankhyas that the evolutes of the satvik ahamkara are indriyas सात्विकाहं कारोपादानकमिन्द्रियम्' (nya. si - p - 193) are narrow as these exclude the 'apraakritendriya'. Indriyas are of two types 'praakrita' and 'apraakrita'. The sense organs that are supported by only 'shuddhasatva' without even the least contact with 'rajas and tamas' are 'apraakrita' and those that are associated with the three gunas are 'praakrita' indriyas. Some acharyas are of the opinion that this classification of 'apraakrita' and 'praakrita' nature applies to even 'avyakta, mahat and ahamkaara'. Again indriyas are two fold namely 'jnaanendriya' or cognitive sense organs and 'karmendriyas' or conative sense organs. 'ज्ञान प्रसरण शक्तं इन्द्रियं ज्ञानेन्द्रियम्' nya-si. (p - 193). Indriyas that are powerful of causing apprehension are cognitive sense organs and these are six in number divided into two kinds namely internal or 'aantara' and external 'baahya'. The karmendriyas are five in number. These are conative sense organs. They are 'vaak, paanipaada paayupastha' useful respectively for speech, grasping, movement, excretion and generation.

मनः ज्ञानेन्द्रियम् - The Sankhyas consider 'manas' as a 'karmendriya' or conative sense organ as all activities are possible only through the mind. They say 'उभयात्मकमत्रमनः इति'. This view is not acceptable to Vishishtadvaita according to which, mind is a strictly cognitive sense organ for the simple reason that the mind functions only through the medium of consciousness. 'तस्य च ज्ञानद्वारैव कर्महेतुत्वात्

न्या. सि. (p – 194). If it is to be viewed like this even the eye and others will have to be considered as conative sense organs. Mind is the inner co-ordinating organ of sense-knowledge and it has a three fold function. The sankhyas classify 'anta:karana' or mind into three kinds namely 'ahamkara, chitta and buddhi which is not admitted here. 'अंतः करण त्रैविध्यभङ्गः', see darsha (p – 203). The same mind functions in all the three ways and happens to be the cause of bondage or release. It is called 'ahamkaara' when it identifies the soul with the body. It is called chitta when it desires something and it is called buddhi when it discriminates the true from the false or the eternal from the non-eternal. So the concept of three kinds of ahamkaara is not admitted by this school.

मनः एकमेव अन्तः करणं । सङ्कल्पाध्यवसायादयः तद्व्यापारभेदादेव जायन्ते इति नान्तःकरण वैविध्यम् । तथा च भाष्यम् - अध्यवसायाभिमानचिन्तावृत्तिभेदात् मन एव बुध्यहंकार चित्तशब्दैर्व्यपदिश्यते इति । उदाहृतं चैतत् प्राणे सूत्रकारैः पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते इति” । (II – 4-11) nya. si 194, ta. Mu. ka 1-37.

‘एकेन्द्रियवादनिरासः’ It is not tenable to argue that only one single sense organ is capable of functioning in different ways owing to its various 'vritti' s just like the mind. This is contradicted by the 'aagama' in the first place and experience next and more over this differentiation of sense organs is not invented by any one but laid down in the scriptures and so there is no room for 'gaurava' here. If not, it may be argued that, just as the Vaisheshikas conceive of one and the same 'aakaasha' to take the form of the organ of ear according to the previous merit of the purusha,

there might be only one sense organ powerful of forming different organs for all people in the world. This is not acceptable at all. Then, let the body itself assume the form of the sense organs. This is also not correct for the scripture lays down difference between the body and the sense organs. The body originates from the tanmatras and is 'bhautika' whereas the sense organs originate from 'ahamkaara'. So the arguments that there is only one sense organ for all and that the body itself is the sense organ are laid low.

It is stated in some particular context in the Mahabharata that the five sense organs originate from the five elements or 'bhuta' s. The scriptures also lay down that the sense organ of ear was born of the 'dik - दिशः श्रोत्रं भूत्वा कर्णौ प्राविशत्?' Is it not contradictory? No. This should not be construed in the strict sense of origination for the purpose of this statement is to stress upon the fact of आप्यायकत्व of the five elements. Deshika states - "तदप्यखिलमाप्यायनाभिप्रायेण निर्वाह्यम्" nya. si (p - 194). This has been thus explained in the Vedartha Sangraha. 'एवमाहंकारिकाणां इन्द्रियाणां भूतैश्चाप्यायनं महाभारत उच्यते' इति ve. sa (p - 188). The same interpretation is to be applied for explaining the statements 'अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः आपोमयः प्राणः तेजोमयी वाक्।' Here nobody even the 'bhautika' can assert that the mind is parthiva. नखलु हैतुकैरपि मनसः पार्थिवत्वं कल्प्यते । वायुरूपस्य प्राणस्याप्यत्वम् । तस्मादाप्यायनपरत्वमेव तत्र वाच्यम् । एवमन्यत्रापि ।

तैजसानीन्द्रियान्याहुः देवावैकारिका दश । एकादशं मनश्चात्र देवा वैकारिका स्मृताः ॥ vi. pu 1-2-46

वैकारिक तैजसः भूतादिः इति त्रिविधोऽहंकारः । स च क्रमात् सात्त्विको राजसस्तमसश्च । तत्र तामसाद्भूतादेराकाशादीनि भूतानि जायन्ते इति सृष्टिक्रममुक्त्वा तैजसाद्राजसाहंकारा देकादशेन्द्रियाणि जायन्त इति परमतमुपन्यस्य सात्त्विकाहंकारात् वैकारिकाणि इन्द्रियाणि जायन्त इति स्वमतमुच्यते ।

ve. sam (p – 188)

The statement 'इन्द्रियाणि तन्मात्रेषु' does not imply 'laya' but only 'pravesha' and so the tanmatras are not the origin of the indriyas. (ta. mu. ka I 34-35) It is thus established that all the sense organs are not bhautika but only 'ahamkaarika'.

The subtlety of the sense organs – Some thinkers consider the mind as eternal. But this is not correct for the very reason that scriptures lay down the origination of the mind from satvik ahamkara. Mind is said to be all-pervasive by some others but it is also not acceptable to the philosophers of the school of Vishishtadvaita.

‘यत्तु मनो विभु सर्वदा स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वात् ज्ञानासमवायिसंयोगाधारत्वात् नित्यत्वे सति द्रव्यानारम्भ कद्रव्यत्वादात्मादिवदित्यादि । तदेतत्सर्वमात्मानुवादिनं प्रति न शोभते।’ sarvaarthasiddhi (p – 46). (ta. mu. ka 1-39)

The sutrakara also says that these indriyas are all subtle or minute and not all pervasive by nature in the sutra 'अणवश्च' (II – 4- 6). But this is meant not to affirm that the sense organs are all atoms but only to stress upon their extreme subtlety. When the soul departs from the body all these sense organs accompany the soul unseen by anyone and this goes to prove that they are very subtle.

‘शरीरं यदवाप्नोति यच्चाप्युत्क्रामतीश्वरः ।

गृहीत्वैतानि संयाति वायुर्गन्धानिवाशयात् ।

(Gita 15 - 8)

तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणा अनूत्क्रामन्ति (बृ.उ. - 4-4-2) etc are authorities for this.

The scripture lays down that all these are ‘समाः’ and ‘anantaā:’. ‘एते सर्व एव समाः सर्व एवानन्ताश्च’. So why can we not say that these are all pervasive? The sense organs are called ‘samaa:’ or equals for they are equally ‘upakaranas for the self. The several ‘vrittis of the indriyas are so manifold that they are called ‘ananta’. All the indriyas have in common the ‘upakaranatvadharma’ and so are called ‘samaa:’. So this statement does not establish the all pervasiveness of the sense organs.

The sense organs are subject to wonderful change and are associated with the self in accordance with his karma and assume larger or smaller proportions as and when the soul gets into larger bodies like that of an elephant or smaller bodies like that of a mosquito. Change of proportion necessitated by temporal conditions is not contradictory to their nature.

‘नचैतेषां जीववदणुत्वं विशेषतो दृश्यते । तथा सति श्रोत्रादीनामनेकाधिष्ठानवर्तित्वम् स्पर्शनरसनयोः पृथुप्रदेशव्यापित्वं न स्यात् । सिद्धेऽपि ह्यणुत्वे विकासशक्त्या वृत्तिविशेषद्वारा आप्यायकप्रचयाद्वा पृथुत्वमङ्गीकार्यम् । अन्यथा पिपीलिकादि शरीरस्थस्य स्पर्शनस्य गजादिशरीरप्रवेशे तादृशपृथुत्वासिद्धिः प्रसङ्गात् गजादिभ्यः कीटादिशरीरप्रवेशे तु तादृशा सङ्कोचः’ ।

sarvaartha siddhi (p - 46) under stanza 39.

The several sense organs are not by nature (svarupata:) defective but they become 'doshavishishta' when their substratum or locus is defective. A blind man, therefore need not go blind when he enters into another body by means of the 'parakaayapraveshavidyaa'.

The functions of the several sense organs get obstructed in several states on account of the 'adrishtavishesha' of the soul. Due to difference in 'adrishta' between one soul and another the sense organs are keen and sensitive in cases of some people like yogins and others where as they are dull in case of others.

According to the Gita,

शरीरं यदवाप्नोति यच्चाप्युत्क्रामतीश्वरः ।

गृहीत्वैतानि संयाति वायुः गन्धा निवाशयात् ॥

(Gita 15 - 8)

the soul is said to transmigrate along with his particular set of sense organs and so it is ordained that the Jiva enjoys pleasures or sorrows through the sense organs attached to him. The physical parts of the five elements that are 'aapyaayakas to the sense organs leave the body at the time of its destruction and so these sense organs become less powerful at that time. But they regain their original power when they enter another body.

‘शरीरविनाशे च इन्द्रियाणि आप्यायकैर्मात्रया हीयन्ते । शरीरान्तरे पुनरापूर्यन्ते।’ nya. si (p - 196). The sense organs that are left behind by those who are liberated stay till the time of mahapralaya whether they are taken up by others migrating here or not. The indriyas are thus not destroyed at the time of the liberation of the soul but enters into the lives of other migrating Jivas.

“मुक्तपरित्यक्तानि अन्यपरिगृहीतानि अपरिगृहीतानि वा यावत्प्रलयमवतिष्ठन्ते इत्यादिकं द्रष्टव्यम्” nya. si (p – 196)

It is argued by some that Ramanuja admits that the conative sense organs are different from body to body as they would be born and destroyed with each body. This view is attacked by Deshika who establishes on the authority of the comments of Ramanuja himself that the conative sense organs also are not non-eternal and do not change from body to body as they would not be subject to origination and destruction caused by those bodies.

‘अतः एकादशेन्द्रियाण्यपि शरीरान्तरेष्वप्यनुवर्तन्ते इति भाष्यकाराभिप्रेतमिति प्रतीमः’ । (न्या.सि. p – 197) (Sri Bhashya III – 1 – 3; III – 1- 4)

The followers of Yadava Prakasha affirm that the conative sense organs are born along with the several bodies and are lost with the destruction of these bodies. This view is not acceptable to Ramanuja. The sense organs originate from the ‘ahankaaratatva’ and this ‘ahankaara’ does not get itself destroyed at every time of the destruction of everybody. On the other hand it stays till the time of pralaya when the evolutes merge in their origin or source. So it cannot be admitted that sense organs are born and lost at each time. On the other hand the self takes along with him all the eleven sense organs when he migrates from body to body.

The different theories propounded regarding the sense organs by different thinkers of the schools of Charvakas, Buddhists and Vaisheshikas declaring –

- ☐ Distinction of sex
- ☐ The acceptance of only cognitive sense organs

- ❑ The theory of only one sense organ instead of eleven
- ❑ 'tvagindriya' or touch as the only sense organ
- ❑ Attributing the sense organ – Lord only to the body
- ❑ The origination and destruction of the karmendriyas along with the adventures of birth and death
- ❑ The mind as all pervasive
- ❑ The mind as eternal
- ❑ That the mind is originated of Rajasahamkara
- ❑ That the mind is bhautika

are all set at naught as they are devoid of scriptural sanction.

Indriyas are declared by the scriptures to be of two kinds like the cognitive and conative sense organs. They are decidedly eleven in number according to their different characteristics. They are different from the bodies and stay till the time of Mahapralaya and so they are not eternal. The mind being one of them cannot be treated as eternal. These eleven indriyas are 'anugraahaka' in causing perception of different types.

Of the five cognitive sense organs the organ of sight goes out to the several objects and cognises them. (Ref ta. mu. ka – 40) This power is obstructed whenever it is blocked by any non-transparent body. Even a light only wards off the darkness obstructing cognition but does not of itself bring cognition to the visual apparatus. The attributive consciousness flows through the sense organs and illumines the several objects that it contacts. The sense organs are so only 'anugraahakas and it is the consciousness of the self that illuminates the objects of cognition. Ramanuja makes this point explicit when he declares –

‘ज्योतिषां दीपादित्यमणिप्रभृतीनामपि तदेव ज्योतिः प्रकाशकं दीपादित्यादीनप्यात्मप्रभारूपं ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशयति । दीपादयस्तु विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षविरोधिसंतमसनिरसनमात्रं कुर्वते । तावन्मात्रेण तेषां प्रकाशकत्वम् । (Gita Bhashya XIII – 17)

“ज्ञानमेव हि सर्वस्य प्रकाशकं । बाह्यानि तु ज्योतीषि विषयेन्द्रियसम्बन्धविरोधितमो निरसनद्वारेण उपकारकाणि” (Gita Bhashya XV – 6)

The organ of ear catches the sound that reaches it from afar. It is capable of cognizing the directions as well as the nearhood or otherwise of the sound. There is also another view that sound that arises near and afar is grasped at different times and so that sound waves travel towards the ear and enable sound perception.

(ta. mu. ka 41)

TANMATRAS – The tanmatras are defined as ‘भूतानां अव्यवहित सूक्ष्मावस्थाविशिष्टं द्रव्यं तन्मात्रम्’ (nya. si p-197) or that material which comprises of the state immediately antecedent to the state of the elements. Tanmatra is a particular intermediary state between that of the ahamkara and the element. Milk that has begun to transform into curds attains a middle state in between the state of milk or the state of curds. Similarly the tamasahamkara that has commenced to transform into the five elements attains a state in between the ‘ahamkaaratvaavasthaa’ and the ‘bhutatvaavasthaa’ while the ‘ahamkaaratvaavasthaa’ has just ended and the ‘bhutatvaavasthaa’ has just commenced. This is called ‘tanmaatram’ and happens to be the material cause of the elements unlike the qualities of sound etc or ‘shabdaadiguna’ s as the Samkhyas say.

(न्या.सि.प – 197)

The element in general is defined as the material concentrated (utkataavasth) that is the substratum or locus of the qualities like sound etc. These have three states like 'shaantatva, ghoratva and mudhatva'. 'anukulavedaniyatva' or being possible of known as favourable is 'shaantatva' and the contrary is 'ghoratva'. The state of being bereft of either is 'mudhatva' or being 'udaasinavedaniyatva'. The tanmatras do not have these stages or 'avasthaa' s.

The tanmatras as well as the gross elements are five fold. They are 'shabda, sparsha, rupa, rasa, gandha' tanmatras and 'aakaasha, vaayu, agni, jala and prithivi'

(न्या.सि.प – 197)

The Sankhyas posit that all the five tanmatras originate from the tamasahamkara and of these the 'shabdatanmaatram' transforms into akasha without the assistance of others. The other tanmatras aided by the previous ones evolve into the other gross elements. Thus 'taamasaahankaara →

shabda, sparsha, rupa, rasa, gandha tanmaatraani .

shabdatanmaatram → aakaasha:

sparshatanmaatram helped by shabdatanmaatram → vaayu:

rupatanmaatram aided by sparshatanmaatram and shabda → agni:

rasatanmaatram aided by shabda-sparsha-rupa tanmaatram → jalam

gandha-tanmaatram aided by shabda-sparsha-rupa-rasa tanmaatram → prithivi

'साङ्ख्यव्यास्तु - पञ्चापि तन्मात्राणि साक्षात् तामसाहङ्कारोत्पन्नानि ।
तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रं आकाशारम्भकम् । इतराणि तु तन्मात्राणि पूर्व

पूर्वं तन्मात्र सहकृतानि उत्तरोत्तर भूतारम्भकाणि इत्याहुः । तदसत्।
आकाशाद्वायुः इत्याद्यनन्यथासिद्धोपादानक्रमविशेषानिदर्शनात् ...
(न्या.सि. p – 197)

The above opinion of the Sankhyas is not admissible as it directly contradicts the statements of the infallible and authoritative scriptures that have shown the order of evolution.

So the doctrine of the Sankhyas described above stands refuted.

The characteristics of 'Akasha' – The definition of 'Akasha' is given as follows – 'अस्पर्शत्वे सति विशिष्टशब्दाधारत्वं श्रोत्राप्यायकत्वं च आकाशलक्षणम् ।' We have to admit on the authority of the scriptures that this gross element is helping us immensely by अवकाशप्रदान । न्या.सि. p- 198, त.मु.क्त. 1-45. अतः प्राणिसञ्चारादिप्रतिघातकत्वाभावादस्योपकारकत्वकथनमिति तात्पर्यं निपुणनिरूपणीयं॥ (स.सि. - p – 52). 'अवकाश' or empty space in between two or more substances is necessary for avoiding their collision and enabling their easy movement. This is the function of ether or 'akasha'. Space is not a different thing provided by Akasha, but akasha itself is that moving space. (Ref sa. Si p-52.) It cannot be argued that akasha is not necessary as mere absence of obstruction would enable the movement of objects for this cannot refute the scriptures.

Akasha is non-eternal – The Nayyayikas argue that 'Akasha' is not subject to either creation or destruction and hence is eternal just like the 'self' or Atman. But this is not sound. The scriptures affirm the origination of 'Akasha' . The Sutrakara affirms that 'Akasha' originates – (see

‘वियदधिकरणम्’ (2-3-1) ‘तस्माद् वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशस्संभूतः’ declares the तैत्तिरीय श्रुति। What does this eternality mean ? Does it mean that it is far from any transformation or does it mean that the material exists always? The former is untenable for the ‘paramanu’ –s of the gross elements like ‘prithivi’ and others are also not subject to any transformation. The second is also not sound for it attempts to establish the already established. (न्या.सि. p – 198, त.मु.क - I – 47). Akasha is therefore ‘anitya’ and ‘avyaapi’ - non-eternal and non-prvasive.

Akasha is perceptual – Akasha is an object of perception. प्रत्यक्षं व्योम नीलं नभ इति हि मतिश्चक्षुषैवास्मदादेः’ (ta. mu. ka 1-42). When we open our eyes we notice ‘Akasha’. The birds soar in the heights. "There is a hole here". "This is a well" are perceptions of the nature of establishing the perceptibility of ‘Akasha’. It may be argued ‘Akasha is not perceptible being impossible of sight and touch being bereft of form and touch. Even other sense organs like that of the ear and the nose as well as the tongue cannot grasp it. It is even impossible of mental perception. So ‘Akasha’ is not perceptible. This prima facie view is refuted for akasha is not bereft of rupa or form ‘रूपादिप्रत्यक्षवद्यथादर्शनं व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः’ (sa. si p-51). Akasha also has got rupa on account of the principle of quintuplication and is not impossible of being perceived by the eye. (त.मु.क : 1-43.)

Moreover an object though bereft of rupa or form can be perceptible to all the six cognitive sense organs. For example kala or time is with no form but yet is perceptible. If it is argued that rupa or form must be the cause of visual perception in the case of objects other than time or kala as

time though formless is perceptible, it will be replied that nothing stands in the way of admitting the perceptibility of the formless akasha also just like time also on account of its being perceptible. Ref nya. si p-198. The several directions or 'दिशः' are included in 'Akasha' alone. They are not different categories.

The Buddhists and some Charvakas also argue that there are only four elements and 'Akasha' is only 'Avaranaabhava'. 'आकाशस्त्वावरणाभाव एव । स च निस्स्वभावः । तुच्छतयैवोपलम्भात् । यत्र चावरणं न तत्राकाशः । अभित्वा दुर्दर्शत्वात् भेदे त्वावरणाभावस्यैवसिद्धेः ।' (स.सि. 1-46) So they say that there is no Akasha itself. For this the following reply is given – 'The Akasha is seen as a bhavapadartha. 'सद्रूपेणैव भानान्नभवति वरणाभावमात्रं विहायः संसर्गाभावमात्रं न च भवति यतो नास्ति संसर्गबोधः' । (त.मु.क. 1-46)

So is the perceptibility of 'Akasha' established. From Akasha originates the 'sparshatanmatram' from which vayu is evolved.

Vayu is perceptible – The Nayyayikas argue that Vayu is not perceived by the sense of touch as it is bereft of any form. Being formless, they say Vayu is not possible of perception. This viewpoint is inadmissible for the perception of vayu cannot be avoided. We form a direct perception of vayu and say it blows. It is cognisable through the sense of touch or 'sparsha'. There is no question of inference of Vayu at all through touch for the quality of touch cannot exist independently like that of 'gandha'. It also may be pointed out that the same position has to be accepted regarding the case of fire, water or Earth for after separating the quality of touch in them also,

we may proceed to infer them through these qualities. In that case even those gross elements like the Earth, fire or water will not be objects of perception born out of the sense of touch. A blind person cognises objects only through touch and never through sight. So Vayu is directly perceived through the sense of touch though it is bereft of the qualities grasped by other sense organs. Fire is 'nirgandha' and 'निरस' but yet is cognised by 'darshana' and 'sparshana'.

(त.मु.क. 1-51)

‘अन्याक्षग्राह्यतादृग्विधगुणविरहो हान्यदक्षं न रुन्धे निर्गन्धो नीरसोऽपि स्फुरति यदनलो दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्याम्।’

‘स्पर्शवत्वमेष हि स्पर्शनेन्द्रिय ग्राह्यत्वौपयिकं न रूपवत्वम्।’

(न्या.सि. p - 199)

‘ततश्च इन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्यविशेषगुणविरहेऽपि वायोः त्वगिन्द्रिय ग्राह्यत्वमविरुद्धमित्यर्थः । यदि रूपशून्यद्रव्यत्वात् वायुरप्रत्यक्ष इत्युच्यते तदा रसशून्यद्रव्यत्वात् तेजोपि किं तथा गन्धशून्य द्रव्यत्वाद्वा ।’

(स.सि. p - 58)

The Prameya sangraha says – “त्वगिन्द्रियस्यापि स्पर्शवद्वस्तुविषये शक्तिः’। (न्या.सि p - 199) So is the perceptibility of Vayu established.

The characteristic of Vayu – Vayu is characterised by its ‘tiryaggamana’ or downward movement when it is not obstructed by any ‘prithividraya’ or by another wind wave. This might be due to its inherent nature or the will of God. ‘तस्य च वायोः स्वभावाद्वा अदृष्टात्मकेश्वरसंकल्पाद्वा स्वारसिकं तिर्यक्प्रसरणम्’। (न्या.सि. p - 199) Whirlwinds as well as upward movements are caused by external pressure of

different winds or obstructive materials. The plurality of wind is established by this. The winds are many and different 'एतेन वायोर्नानात्वमपि सिद्धम्' । (न्या.सि p - 199) When wind is obstructed from all sides it gets the 'stambheebhaava'. Vayu is defined as 'अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शविशिष्टत्वे सति गन्ध शून्यत्वम्' and so according to this though it is bereft of the qualities of heat or cold by nature it is superimposed with the qualities of coldness or heat due to contact with water or fire and good and bad smell due to contact with several objects possessing these qualities of fragrance or otherwise.

Vayu is beneficent to mankind by its fourfold existence namely tvagindriyaapyaayaka, praana, sharira and vishaya. 'स च त्वगिन्द्रियाप्यायनेन प्राण शरीरविषयात्मतया च उपकरोति।' (न्या.सि. p - 199)

Vayu is 'aapyaayaka' to the sense organ of touch or tvagindriya residing as one with it.

In the second form Vayu assumes the form of the vital airs and sustains the existence of all living beings.

Prana is a vayu-vishesha - Prana is a particular kind of Vayu and not merely wind. The scriptures count prana together with Vayu, 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनस्सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च । खं वायुः ज्योतिरापः । (Ref Narayanopanishat) and differentiate it from ordinary wind. Prana is neither the action of Vayu for it is accepted as a material or dravya. It is not entirely a different entity from Vayu for it is named as Pranavayu itself. Prana cannot be even considered as the element of Vayu that forms the causal state of forming the body. 'देहोपादानत्वावस्थापन्नो वायुः प्राणस्स्यात् किमधिककल्पनया इत्यत्राह'

(स.सि p - 59) The Pranavayu is quite different from the body as it is affirmed by the scriptures 'यावद्वयस्मिन् शरीरे प्राणो वसति तावदायुः' (The Gitakara says) 'अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा प्राणिनां देहमाश्रितः,। प्राणापानसमायुक्तः पचाम्यन्नं चतुर्विधं। (Gita) So Pranavayu which is a particular kind of Vayu prescribed to be known by the shastras like yoga and others assumes the tenfold form of prana, apaana, vyaana, udaana, samaana, naaga, kurma, krukara, devadatta and dhananjaya. So it is decided that prana is not mere Vayu but a particular type of Vayu.

‘तस्माद्वातोविशेषं घन जलकरकान्यायतः प्राप्यकंचिद्देहान्तर दार्शविध्यं भजति बहुविधोपक्रियो वृत्तिभेदैः। (त.मु.क 1-53)

The Sutrakara establishes that the Mahaprana is not merely the second gross element or its action of tremor 'spandarupakriya' but only Vayu that has attained an avasthantara in the sutra 'न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात्' (वे.सू. II-4-8) He also affirms by the sutra 'पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते' (वे.सू. II-4-11) that apaana, vyaana, udaana and samaana are all different vruttis of one and the same prana. Though desire (kama), thought, decision and others are different they are taken to be the different vruttis or states of one and the same mind. Similarly the vital airs are different vruttis of one and the same pranavayu.

The Pranavayu supports the indriyas and the body and is thus beneficent to all living beings. This Pranavayu exists even in immovable bodies like trees as in movables. 'एवं जङ्गमशरीरेष्विवस्थावरशरीरेष्वपि असावस्त्येव'. If there were no pranavayu there the tree could not have absorbed water and carried it to the different parts of the tree like the

flowers, leaves, fruits and others. But in the sthavara bodies the pranavayu does not exist in its fivefold states. 'स्थावरेषु हि प्राणसंभवेऽपि तस्य पञ्चधा अवस्थाय शरीरस्य धारणार्थत्वेनावस्थानं नास्ति'.

The savants of yoga have prescribed the control of this pranavayu alone through the means of 'rechaka-puraka' and 'kumbhaka' as the fourth step of the eight-fold ashtaangayoga. 'अस्यैव रेचक पूरककुम्भकरूपं नियमनमष्टाङ्गयोगे चतुर्थमङ्गम्।' (न्या.सि p- 199) The yoga shastras and ayurveda deal with these vital airs in greater detail.

This in brief is about the second benefit that results to mankind by Prana.

Pure vayu different from the vital airs forms the material cause of the body in combination with the other four gross elements. Such aerial bodies are found in vayuloka.

The fourth type of Vayu is different from the other three dealt with before namely 'tvagindriyaapyaya', 'praana', and 'sharira' and is called 'vishayavayu'. This is of the form of terrible storms and air caused by the fans and others.

'प्राणाख्यात् वायोरन्य एव शरीरोपादानभूतो वायुः । तदुपादानत्वं वायुप्रचुरेषु मारुतादिशरीरेषु व्यक्तम् । विषयत्वं चण्डवाततालवृन्त पवनादिषु' । (न्या.सि. p-199).

Tejas - From Vayu originates the rupa tanmatra and from this tejas or fire is evolved. The scripture 'vaayoragni:' refers to tejas alone. A doubt arises here. We have seen in one daily experience that the leaves, grass and wood alone turn into ashes, smoke and flames. These are all 'paarthiva'

matter and wind only helps this matter to burn and transform into fire. And it is unreasonable to state that only peculiar fuel generates peculiar fire. So the parthiva material happens to be the material cause of fire and vāyu is only efficient cause or instrumental in the generation of fire. So the statement 'vāyoragni:' implies only that Vāyu is the instrumental cause of fire. This contention is unfounded for the term vāyu in the ablative case implies only the state of material cause as is found in the case of other words with the same termination in the same context – 'एतस्मादात्मन आकाशस्सम्भूतः आकाशाद्वायुः' etc. The word 'vāyo:' implies only 'upaadaanatva'. Moreover in the 'layaprakarana' agni or tejas is said to immerse itself in Vāyu. Laya is possible only in the material cause and never in the instrumental one. Wood, leaves and grass are composed of the five elements as per the principle of quintuplication and so fire emanates from these materials only on account of its latent particles of tejas. So fire is not caused only by the parthiva material. Parts of Agni exist there even before they burn and also after fire is extinguished.

Those particles are very subtle and are not visualised. Moreover fire is generated even from the waters of the ocean as well as watery clouds. Can we so say that water is the material cause of fire? No.

‘तदेवं तत्रतत्र लीन एवाग्निः सहकारिविशेषाददृष्टाद्युपनीत सजातीयावयवयोगाच्च उद्भूत उपलभ्यते।’ (न्या.सि. p-200).

So such parts of tejas that are latent in several objects assume the form of external fire. When a favorable situation occurs and this happens at the time of 'Vyashtisrishti' which is only after 'panchikarana' but during the 'samastisrishti' vāyu alone is the material cause of fire

as established in the scriptures.

‘अतः समष्टिसृष्टिदशायां वायोरेवोपदानात्
अग्नेरुत्पत्तिरुपपन्ना । व्यष्टिदशायां तु तेजस एव सूक्ष्मात्
स्थूलतेजसः समुद्भव इति’ (न्या.सि. p-200).

The definition of tejas is given as follows – ‘उष्णस्पर्शत्वं
भास्वरूपवत्त्वादिकं च तेजसो लक्षणम्’ । (न्या.सि. p-200).

The material which is qualified by the touch of heat or brightness (lustre) is tejas. ‘तच्च वाक्चक्षुषोराप्यायिकम्’. (न्या.सि. p-200) Tejas is necessary for cognising all objects other than darkness. Darkness can be cognised without the aid of light. This is beneficial to the eyes of those that are unaided by the ungent as well as the eyes of living beings other than those like the owls. Intense light is necessary for cognising minute objects. (न्या.सि. p-200). Here the tejas that helps the cognition of objects is different from that which is ‘indriyaapyaayika’. For this reason namely that such ‘indriyaapyaayakatejas’ resides in the eye so long as the eye is active and hence exists even in darkness when cognition of objects is not possible only by that alone. So to enable cognition of objects tejas quite different from that of the ‘indriyaapyaayika’ is necessary. This tejas also is four-fold namely 1. ‘indriyaapyaayaka’ 2. ‘vaishvaanara’ 3. ‘sharira’ and 4. ‘visaya’.

The Indriyaapyaayaka tejas was explained before. The vaishvaanara resides inside the body and aided by the five-fold pranavayu helps digestion of food and drink. Ref nya. si (p-200). The third kind of tejas namely sharira is distinct from the other two and happens to be the material cause of the body with the other four elements and the bodies of tejas are

that of the Sun and Agni that are found in the tejoloka.

The fourth is different from all the other three. Sunshine, lightening, Earthly fire and moonlight are the viśhayatejas.

Here comes the question of nature of light and luminosity. Tejas is of two kinds namely prabhā and prabhāvat. Prabha or light is a particular kind of tejas that is subject to contraction or expansion according to the existence or otherwise of an āvarana and that is capable of extending far or nearby in accordance with its intensity and capacity – ‘आवरणसदसद्भूवाधीनसङ्कोच विकासो यथावेग शक्त्यधिष्ठानदेशाधिकदेशप्रकारीतेजोविशेषः प्रभा’।

This light is produced along with its substratum and is destroyed along with it. It is narrow at the point of its locus but becomes wider and wider as it extends or traverses farther. ‘अस्याश्चमूलाग्रयोः धनविरलत्वादयो यथादर्शनं ग्राह्या’. So it is said to be having सूक्ष्ममूलत्व and पृथ्वग्रत्व. Luminosity or prabhā is not at any cost the component parts of the prabhāvat. (त.मु.क. 1-56). The parts or āvayavas of the light do not emerge on all sides in the form of lustre. If so several objects like the gems and the Sun ought to have been exhausted of their content of brightness resulting in their very destruction. Moreover it is impossible that the component parts are dispersed by the light for the very reason that luminosity cannot be disturbed by wind.

The course of the Sun's light that falls on the Earth is not diverted by wind. Likewise the light that falls on a wall through a wind is not diverted by the blowing of wind just like the fire particles of Earth. Luminosity is a real entity of a light but different and distinct from it and this resides at its locus or substratum such as a lamp or a gem or the

Sun and traverses straight so far as its intensity permits.

It is necessary to deal with the nature of the flame of a lamp in this connection. The 'loukikagni' in the form of a flame gets destroyed at the very time of the destruction of its locus. So, we must admit its transitoriness. The oil, wick and other things necessary for the flame do not come together only once and so also the above decision cannot be avoided. The causal collocation of a flame gets together stage by stage and results in the production of a number of flames and so we must admit the destruction of all those flames to avoid incompatibility of not seeing a number of flames at the same moment. We observe only one single flame and so the destruction of others has to be admitted. Flame after flame is produced and destroyed and so there is a continuous stream of flames resulting in the illusion of a single flame due to close similarity though there are a good number of them.

It cannot also be argued that these flames get themselves destroyed without any cause for it is impossible to think of an effect without a potent cause. The general causes like 'adruṣṭa' and 'Ishwara' exist always or the speed itself in the stream of flames might be the cause of the destruction of the former flames just as speed alone is responsible for the destruction of a lump of mud that falls on the ground.

The substratum that is inseparably connected with luminosity is prabhavat. Light and lustre are inseparably related with each other. These two are the two real forms of tejas and are different from each other.

आपः - (Water) From tejas originates the 'rasatanmaatram' and from this is water evolved. It is

defined as “शीतस्पर्शवत्त्वं निर्गन्धत्वे सति विशिष्टरसवत्त्वम्”. The quality of intensified cold touch is the differentia of ‘jalatattva’. Water by nature is white, sweet and cold but assumes different colours and tastes and temperature due to its contact with different substrata. ‘Dravatva’ or fluidity is the characteristic of water. This is again of four categories namely ‘praanaapyaayaka, rasanaapyaayaka, sharira and vishaya. It is stated in the scriptures as ‘आपोमयः प्राणः to show it "prahapyaayakatva" and it can be perceived that it is ‘rasanaapyaayaka’ in the form of Saliva that is secreted at the time of chewing our food. Jalasharira is that which is found in Varunaloka. For vishayajala rivers, oceans and others are examples.

पृथ्वी – This jalatattva is the source of gandha tanmatra and Earth originates from it. It is defined as ‘विशिष्टगन्धवत्त्वं रसवत्त्वे सति विशिष्टस्पर्शवत्त्वम्’. Earth is by nature fragrant, tasteful, dark and devoid of cold or hot touch. ‘सा प्रथमं सुरभि मधुरकृष्णानुष्णाशीतस्पर्शजाता’ (न्या.सि. p-20)

The ‘anushnaashitasparsa’ continues at all times. Hot or cold touch is only due to contact with fire or water. The Chandogya Upanishat affirms that the Earth is black by the statement ‘यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्य’. Different colours are not impossible due to various kinds of ‘paripaaka’. Similarly though fragrance is the characteristic of Earth, other kinds of smell are possible due to ‘paripaakavishesha’.

माधुर्यरस or sweet taste is the natural quality of water, which is the material cause of Earth, and so madhuryarasa as a rule follows in Earth also. But other tastes might also follow due to paripaka. Likewise should not the quality of

'dravatva' found in the cause follow even in its effect? It does. Though this dravatva is obstructed in certain parts of Earth due to different reasons resulting in hardness it becomes manifested at some other parts due to the contact of fire and water. This is beneficent to mankind being 'aapyaayaka' to the mind and the sense organs. 'अन्नमयं हि सोम्यमनः' supports this. 'आप्यायन्ते च ते नित्यं' also supports that this is 'aapyaayaka' to the sense organs. Prithivi is the material cause of the several bodies of men, beasts and immovables. Mud, stones, trees and darkness are all examples of 'vishayaprithivi'.

तमस् - Darkness is affirmed to be a पार्थिवद्रव्य. How can this be? A material is that which is the locus of a state. In darkness there is the blue colour and the action of movement is also visible. त.मु.क. 1-60. We can cognise darkness without the aid of any light by our own eyes. Darkness is not mere absence of light. It cannot be said that the blue colour is superimposed in it for it is never seen otherwise. The scriptures speak of both darkness and light as 'नासीत्तमो ज्योतिरभून्नचान्यत्' and admits both of them as real and distinct objects. 'यस्य तमश्शरीरम्' and other such statements affirm that tamas also is the body of the inner controller. So tamas is a different and distinct entity. Deshika mentions the various opinions of celebrated thinkers about darkness in his Nyaya Siddhanjana in great detail and concludes that it is only parthiva 'तथापि न पृथग्द्रव्यत्वसिद्धिः' in essence.

कालः - After dealing with the twentyfour categories forming avyakta we will now take up kala, which is the other jadadravya.

Time is eternal – Kala or time is eternal. It has neither a beginning nor an end. The theory that kala is created from mayatattva is untenable as it is ruled out by scripture 'अनादिर्भगवान् कालः नान्तोऽस्य द्विज विद्यते'. This theory of the creation of time is opposed to even ordinary reasoning.

‘उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं नाशतः पश्चाच्च कालोनास्तीति वदन् किं तत्र पूर्वशब्दस्य पश्चाच्छब्दस्य च निरर्थकत्वं मन्यते ? सार्थकत्वं वा ? पूर्वत्र निरर्थकनिग्रहस्थानापत्तिः । उत्तरत्र कालस्यैव तदर्थत्वान्न तत्र कालनिषेधे स्ववचनविरोधः ।’

त.मु.क. 1-67

Does time continue or not after pralaya? Does it not exist even before the world is recreated? If it exists then there is no need for its creation from mayatattva. After all what is creation? It is mere ‘avasthaantaraapatthi’ or change of state for the subtle to the gross. This does not apply to time. Time is referred to by scriptures as before creation or after creation. The ‘before’ and ‘after’ of these statements become incompatible if काल did not exist at all times. If these references to time are meaningful then time has to be admitted as real and eternal. Nor can it be argued that time is negated in the past and future in relation to space for designating the attributes of pastness or futureness to space it is inevitable that it should be related to time. Spatial references are necessarily temporal.

यतः कुतश्चित् कालांशात् परतः पूर्वतोऽपि वा ।

कालो न चेत्त्वदुक्तिस्थं पौर्वापर्यं न सिद्ध्यति ॥

कालाधीनभवद्भव्यभूतादिव्यवहारवान् ।

देशोऽन्योपि ततः सोऽपि तदभावे न सिद्ध्यति ॥

(न्या.सि. p-204)

Just as time is eternal and necessarily related with the world here it is found even in the Nityavibhūti, which is pure satva, only with this difference that it is subordinate to all objects there instead of subordinating them as in the case of the 'triguna'. So, kala does continue there also. 'नित्यविभूतावपि कालस्याहेतुत्वमात्रम् । न त्वभावः'

(न्या.सि. p-204)

This is made clear by the statements 'कालं स पचते तत्र न कालः तत्र वै प्रभुः' etc. If this is not accepted the statements 'सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः' cannot be explained.

'कालस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम्' – Time is perceived by all the six cognitive sense organs at the time of perceiving the several objects. We see objects qualified by temporal relations. Time need not be an object of inference as it is observed inevitably along with the objects of perception. Our perceptions are of the kind viz 'This stands here for a moment; I hear the sound now' etc.

'कालोध्यक्षावसेयः क्षणलवदिवसाद्यंशतोऽर्थान्विशिषन्' । (त.मु.क - 1-68)

It cannot be said that time is inferred after obstructing objects connected with priority and posteriority which process is a far fetched one. Time is associated with the several objects at the time of perception itself and so is an object of direct perception.

'कालसम्बन्धरूपोऽयं परत्वादिरितिस्थिते ।

लिङ्गसिद्ध्यैव कालस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमुपागतम् ॥

अतोनुमानमात्रेण कालोऽन्यो नैव सिध्यति

केवलागमसिद्धे च न लोकव्यवहार्यता ॥’

(न्या.सि. p-205)

Even those who argue that time can be inferred have to admit its perceptibility as they posit the reason a ‘hetu’ that objects are related to time as ‘paratva’ and ‘aparatva’. This in the long run amounts to perception itself. After all inference is based on perception. So time is not exclusively to be inferred. It is directly perceivable. The Nyaya tattva expounds ‘संयोगविभागसंख्याकालः’ (न्या.सि. p-205) just to establish that time cannot be negated by inference. The very same text affirms ‘यथा सर्वे प्रत्ययाः कालोपश्लिष्टा एव दृश्यन्ते तदिति देशकालविशिष्टतयैव स्मृतिरपि जायमाना प्रागपि कालानुभवं साधयतीति।’ (न्या.सि. p-205).

Bhagavan Ramanuja says in his Sribhashya that time does not exist independent of the objects ‘कालस्य पदार्थविशेषणतयैव प्रतीतेस्तस्य पृथगस्तित्व नास्तित्वादयो न वक्तव्याः’ (Sribhashya II-2-31). The Shrutaprakashikakara comments on this statement as ‘अनेन कालस्य अणुत्वनिराकरणं फलितं अनेककालकल्पनमभुक्तं एकस्मिन्काले अनेकपदार्थाः सन्तीत्येव प्रतीतेः’ and establishes that time is all pervasive and one. ‘अत एव कालस्य पृथगणनाभावः’

Time or kala is found in its double aspect as ‘mahakala’ and ‘khandakala’. Mahakala qualifies all objects of all the worlds and is all pervasive. Similarly khandakala in the form of kshana, lava, dina, paksa, maasa are also pervasive of all things of all the worlds. The entire world exists in relation to that particular point of time and has the quality of सर्वमूर्तद्रव्य संयोगत्व’

Time is subject to vikara or change. What is vikara or mutation? We observe change in a clod of mud when it is shaped into a jar. The component parts of mud undergo a change to take the form of a jar. So we generally form the idea that vikara or change is possible only in an object which is 'सावयव'. But this is not all correct. Even a 'niravayava dravya' can undergo vikara. Then we have to define vikara in its correct sense. Vikara is the attainment of a 'जन्यधर्म' necessitating a different name. The मृत्पिण्ड attains the janyadharm of ghatatva and comes to be designated as a ghata. Similarly time is subject to the janyadharm of क्षणत्व, दिनत्व etc and gets different names. So the different states of kshanatva, dinatva and others are said to be the vikara of time. This vikarasvarupa of time is explained by Ramanuja in his Vedartha Sangraha 'निमेषकाष्ठाकला विभूतिः'. (न्या.सि. p-205). Sri Narayanarya says in his Nitimala the same changing nature of time in the following words - 'कालोऽनाद्यनन्तोऽजस्र क्षणपरिणामिमुहूर्ताहोरात्रादिविभागवान् परिणामपरिस्पन्दहेतुः'. Ref nya. si (p-205).

Is an all pervading object subject to mutation? Yes. Even a vibhudravya is subject to vikara as we take vikara to mean 'avasthaantaraapatti' instead of 'avayavaparivartana'. A 'niravayavadravya' though is incapable of 'avayavaparivartana' is not so of 'avasthaantaraapatti'.

'विभोर्विकारित्वानुपपत्तिर्बाधिकेति चेन्न अवयवोच्छूनतादिलक्षणस्य विकारस्यानभ्युपगमात् । अवस्थान्तरापत्तिमात्रस्याविरोधात् । (न्या.सि. p-205)

Even a vibhudravaya has the states of officiating as a cause as laid down in the scriptures. The relationship of cause and effect as such in general is not possible to be disregarded by anyone. But it may be argued thus – “A vibhudravaya has no kaaranatva for it exists in all places at all times and results in the incompatibility of the effect being present always in all places. But the relationship between cause and effect is not so. It is restricted. We observe the effect only in such times and places where the causal collocation is complete. The kaaranasaamagri exists in a particular place at a particular point of time and produces the effect only there. If an eternal and all pervading object becomes the cause the effect must also be likewise. This is far from experience. So it is essential to admit that vibhudravayas have no kaaranatva”.

This argument is not correct. Firstly this is opposed to scriptures. For the scriptures affirm kaaranatva to vibhudravayas.

‘नित्यविभोर्देशकालव्यतिरेकाभावेन कारणत्वं दुर्ग्रहमिति चेन्न तावन्तरेणापि धर्मिग्राहकेणैव तत्सिद्धेः । सामान्यतश्चान्वयव्यतिरेकयोरपि सुशकत्वात् । सामान्यतः सिद्धस्य पारिशेष्यादिभिर्विभुत्वादिसिद्धेः । (न्या.सि. p-204).

An all pervasive eternal object can possess kaaranatva even without these two namely desha and kala. This would be possible both by positive and negative concomitance. So kala is qualified by eternity, pervasiveness and parinaama.

Time is not identical with God. It is distinct and different from aakasha and others. (त.मु.क. 1-65) This is established by scriptures as a different entity from

prakruthi and purusha. The Vishnupurana also describes this. ‘विष्णोः स्वरूपात्परतोदिते द्वे ... तद्द्विज कालसंज्ञम्’ (Vi. pu.)

In some contexts the cosmic principle is called kala. ‘कालोऽस्मि लोकक्षयकृत् प्रवृद्धः’. The great sage Parashara has himself said so. So it is futile to admit another entity namely Time apart from God. But this argument is not all sound for God is declared to be the inner soul or indwelling principle of even Time in the above context as in the case of the self, mind and ahankara. Moreover Time is declared unequivocally as a different entity by virtue of its being the material cause of all effects and being pervasive and eternal.

‘ब्रह्मा दक्षादयः कालः’ is an example of this. This is the vibhuti of the cosmic principle just like other objects and so Time is a different and distinct entity from God. अनादिर्भगवान् कालः’ (त.मु.क. 1-66)

Direction – dik or direction is accepted as an eternal pervasive entity by the Nayyayikas. But this is not admitted by Viśiṣṭādvaita. Direction is not a different entity. It is subsumed under ‘ākāśha’ alone. The different names for directions are given according to the nearhood or otherwise or being in front or behind the space where the Sun arises. (न्या.सि. p-206). The statements ‘पद्भ्यां भूमिः दिशः श्रोत्रात्’ ‘दिशः श्रोत्रम्’ mean the creation of the respective presiding deities. ‘अभिमानिदेवतोपाधिसृष्ट्यानिर्वाहात्’ (न्या.सि. p-206).

So far we have discussed how the universe comprising of the twenty four categories is evolved from the one cosmic stuff the ‘mulaprakruthi’. This cosmic stuff or achit assumes self-differentiation in successive stages and forms the twenty four categories namely prakruthi, mahat, ahankaara, eleven indriyas, five tanmatras and five

mahabhutas according to the will of the Paramatman.

These twenty form categories as well as the finite self are admitted by the philosophers of the Sankhya school also. The Sankhyas attribute everything to the cosmic stuff itself and posit that mula prakruthi undergoes all these changes independently. The Sankhyas cannot explain the fact of the inert matter undergoing change like that. The fact of consciousness cannot be explained in matter. But the school of Vishishtadvaita upholds that mere matter cannot function without the will of the divine. Prakruthi can itself transform into the form of the twentyfour categories only on account of the immanence of God. God is abiding in avyakta and has it as His mode. He is the first and the instrumental cause and nothing can happen without the sankalpa or will of God. So it is the conclusion of Vishishtadvaita that the Supreme is the inner controller or antaryaami of all objects sentient and non-sentient and that He alone is responsible for all that comes into being. This conclusion is arrived at in the light of the infallible scriptures. So avyakta or the cosmic stuff transforms into different categories only ensouled by the divine and so the ultimate analysis says that it is God, the inner soul of avyakta that is the material cause of the universe.

This aspect of creation of the elements and the sense organs is called 'samāshti sruṣṭi' or collective aspect. The next stage would be vyāshti sruṣṭi in which the elements are combined by tripartition or 'trivṛuthkarana' to form the gross universe. The sadvidya of the Chandogya Upanishat deals with this aspect of creation. This trivṛuthkarana implies panchikarana or quintuplication by means of which all the qualities are included in all elements. (त.मु.क. 1-17) This quintuplication is necessary for the formation of the gross universe with all its objects for the categories and

elements by themselves are not capable of functioning at all. After quintuplication everything will be ready and fully equipped for the finite self to enter into it. The Supreme happens to be the indwelling principle of the finite selves and makes the finite selves, his modes, enter into different bodies according to their previous karma and differentiates names and forms. The process of individuation is carried out by the Supreme, through Brahma, the fourfaced creator. These are described in the Puranas in great detail.

Thus Vishishtadvaita rightly understands according to the scriptures that all categories or tattvas exist, function and transform only in accordance with the will of the Divine, who is immanent in all, though transcends them. It is seen from the above that the various changes of jadadravya or achit are possible due to His will alone.

Jadadravya divided into avyakta and kaala forms the lilavibhuti of God. The avyakta is the mode of the cosmic principle who as well pervades the eternity and infinity of kala. This is one aspect of the philosophy of reality.

The Gita affirms in the words of Bhagavan Krishna that the category of prakruti is the 'aparaaprakruthi' as follows –

भूमिरापोनलो वायुः खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च ।

अहङ्कार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥

Githa 7-4.

The eight forms of the aparaaprakruti mentioned here include the twenty four categories described above under the main head of jadadravya. Bhagavan Krishna has announced that all materials are his modes - 'मयिसर्वमिदं प्रोतं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव'. So all materials of all types form naturally the body of the cosmic self at all places, time and states of these. This achit, due to God's will, forms the

body of the finite self according to his karma for the enjoyment of the fruits of his actions.

This prakṛuti tattva is to be understood first of all as it screens from us the nature of the real self and the universal self. This limits our knowledge and creates a sense of pleasure in itself which is abhogya. It obstructs our self realisation and God realisation. भगवत्स्वरूपतिरोधानकर्त्री स्वविषयायाश्च भोग्यबुद्धेर्जननी' says Ramanuja in his Gadyam. So it is our primary duty to know the nature of prakṛuthi to be safe from its dangerous influences and for developing an attitude of disgust and rejection of it and also for renunciation.

SOME WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

Selections from the Upanishads	<i>Rs. 200/-</i>
Principal Upanishads - Vol I (<i>Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Mandukya, Taittiriya, Mahanarayana-Svetashwatara</i>)	<i>Rs. 250/-</i>
Principal Upanishads - Vol II (<i>Chandogya</i>)	<i>Rs. 250/-</i>
Principal Upanishads - Vol III (<i>Brihadaranyaka</i>)	<i>Rs. 250/-</i>
Vedanta Deepa - Vol I	<i>Rs. 250/-</i>
Vedanta Deepa - Vol II	<i>Rs. 250/-</i>
Essence of Srīmad Rahasyatrayasaram	<i>Rs. 250/-</i>
Philosophy of Sadhana in Visishtadvaita	<i>Rs. 300/-</i>
Mahanarayanopanishad	<i>Rs. 75/-</i>